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Abstract 
 
This study provides with behavioural insights on three components of the political economy of 
organisations namely power, leadership and coordination. In the second chapter, we implement 
a lab experiment to study how the experience of power affects the value given to powerful 
positions. We contribute to the literature on the value of decisions rights by replicating in the 
lab a real-life-like power asymmetry. Moreover, we manipulate the status and the legitimacy of 
the powerful positions, and elicit the value of power from the powerful and the powerless 
reference points. We find that those who have experienced and exercised power are willing to 
let go substantial pecuniary compensations to remain in charge.  
 
The third chapter experimentally compares teams versus individual in a coordination task. Since 
in our setting teams do not necessarily outperform individuals, our results partially contrast the 
state of the art on this arena. We contribute to the literature on organisational behaviour by 
pointing out the importance of coordinating institutions such as voting rules, communication, 
joint incentives, etc., to promote teams’ coordination.  
 
Finally, we empirically study the role of formal leaders in real-life organisations: football teams. 
We contribute to the literature in organisational behaviour in sports by implementing an 
adaptation of the red card into the sport production function to estimate the relative effect of a 
captain dismissal in both Northern and Southern European leagues. We find context specific 
results, as we find that the captain dismissal only affects the match outcomes in Southern 
leagues when the away captain is sent-off. This result might open a window to incorporate 
leadership and cross cultural studies in the literature of the home team advantage. 
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The purpose of this thesis is to provide some behavioural insights regarding the political 
economy of organisations. I focus my study on three main research questions: “what are the 
determinants of the value of power?”, explored in Chapter 2; “what are the dynamics that 
differentiate teams and individuals performing coordination tasks?”, presented in Chapter 3. 
Finally, Chapter 4 looks at the role of formal leaders on team performance. 
 
Two different methodological approaches are adopted. In the second and third chapters the 
conclusions are supported by the results of computer-based lab experiments conducted 
recruiting college students. In chapter two, we generate a power asymmetry among participants 
to analyse how the experience of power affects individual behaviour, and in the third chapter we 
recreate a day-to-day coordination challenge to compare individuals and teams’ performance in 
the absence of further coordinating institutions.  In contrast, for the fourth chapter we use data 
provided by real interactions of individuals that are performing real life tasks. Specifically, we 
use a database of football matches from six major European football leagues, and their captains’ 
main attributes to carry an “applied” analysis, in the traditional economics sense. 
 
The second chapter studies the intrinsic value of power. We analyse the value of power in a real 
effort task experiment in which a minority of individuals (participants A) have decision rights 
on the rate at which most individuals (participants B) earn, and have no control on their own 
fixed rate. Participants were matched in groups of three in which one individual A, decided the 
piece rate for two individuals B.  Even when power has no extrinsic economic value, it has both 
procedural (from the asymmetric distribution of rights) and consequential (the rates at which 
most participants earn) content. After experiencing power, participants A may sell it to 
participants B, before being randomly re-matched and play the same real effort task again. We 
systematically manipulate the attributes of power (legitimacy and entitlement), and the status of 
the decision rights associated with it. Our findings suggest that the willingness to pay of those 
who have not experience of power (participants B) can be fully rationalized by subjects’ risk 
attitudes (a preference for a fixed rate), the material benefits of the A-role and the demand effect 
or individual priors regarding bidding or being labelled as A. Participants A, with an experience 
of power, are willing to suffer substantial losses to retain decision rights. 
 
The third chapter studies the challenges of teams’ coordination in the absence of 
communication, consensus and other institutions that favour team learning. We compare the 
effectiveness of teams and individuals in a setting in which individual incentives may crowd-out 
choices that would enhance social welfare. In our main treatment, groups of four teams jointly 
produce in a quasi-continuous version of the minimum effort game. As the overall output is 
determined by the minimum team contribution, the strategic interaction between teams follow 
	 10	
the logic of a coordination game. However, as individual decisions within teams are costly and 
not necessarily unanimous, the game becomes a social dilemma within each team, in which 
individuals have an incentive to free ride on the efforts of others. The game combines some 
interesting properties of coordination and public goods games in a realistic setting in which the 
individual’s effort is always costly. We compare this main treatment with two different 
baselines in which individuals rather than teams jointly produce outcomes with either a weakest 
link (as in the interaction between teams in our main treatment) or a linear technology (as in the 
interaction within teams). Our findings suggest that in this more complex and natural setting, 
individuals outperform teams. Teams suffer significant efficiency losses, not because they 
coordinate worse than individuals, but because they coordinate in an inefficient equilibrium. 
 
Finally, in the fourth and final chapter we explore the extent to which leaders facilitate 
cooperation and coordination within real world setting, in this case a sporting environment. We 
study the effect of the regular captain on football team performance by using an innovative 
approach that looks at captain versus non-captain dismissals. We implement an adaptation of 
the red card dismissal into the sport production function methodology to isolate the effect of the 
team captain on team performance. This analysis differs conceptually with respect to the team 
coach leadership in that captains are horizontally positioned regarding other on-the-field 
players, but they are still different in terms of status. It also differs to the studies already carried 
out by sport psychologist, based on survey data, in that we are not looking at individual 
perceptions but actual team outcomes.  We analyse data from six major European football 
leagues, three Northern leagues and three Southern leagues between 2012 and 2015. We find 
that while, relative to non-captains, home captains dismissals do not affect the team outcomes, 
home teams of Southern leagues appear to be able to exploit the dismissal of the away captains. 
This result does not hold for Northern leagues, suggesting that Northern teams appear to exhibit 
certain dynamics that allow them to overcome the absence of their regular leader. Further 
research considering the criteria for captain appointments within each team, and individual team 
players’ performance would complement the findings presented here.  
 
In the remainder of this document, chapters two, three and four are presented, comprising the 
introduction, related literature, methodological approach (or experimental design), and 
empirical results. Conclusions will also be provided by the end of each section.  Finally, some 
general concluding remarks will be presented in the fifth chapter. 
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Chapter 2. The Behavioural Toxicity of 
Power1 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
1 Co-authored with: Enrique Fatas, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, e.fatas@uea.ac.uk 
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1. Introduction 
Power is not a means; it is an end […] The object of power is 
power George Orwell, 1984 
 
Most social relationships are asymmetric in nature. Within Firms, teams, universities, 
and families, some individuals have the resources needed to request others to follow 
their commands and make decisions they would not make otherwise. In the political 
science literature, this is called power (Dahl, 1959; Emerson, 1962), and social 
psychologists have long documented how power is intrinsically valued by most 
individuals and its effects on behaviour (see Sturm and Antonakis, 2015 for an 
interesting survey on this topic).  
 
In this branch of the literature, power asymmetries are generated by priming, recalling 
or creating imaginary environments in which participants experience a power 
imbalance. In these environments power is desired because it brings along autonomy 
from and influence over others (Lamers et al, 2016)2, and because it creates the 
conditions to obtain higher material benefits than those received by powerless 
participants (Bendahan et al 2015). Power enhances individuals’ creativity (Galinsky et 
al 2008, and Guinote, 2007), as well as cognitive skills (e.g. speediness to act), attention 
(e.g. information selectivity), and flexibility (e.g. on information processing). When 
power perception becomes strong, and individuals see their power well above the power 
of others, they are more optimistic, confident, and risk seeking (Anderson and Galinsky, 
2006), and more prone to initiate competitive interactions (Magee et al 2007).  
However, powered individuals more frequently make corrupt and self-interested actions 
(Bendahan et al 2015).  
 
In Economics, the study of power asymmetries, and their effects on economically 
relevant decisions, is quite recent, focusing on the instrumental and consequential value 
of decision rights in a principal-agent framework (Fehr et al, 2013; Bartling et al, 2014; 
Bobadilla-Suarez et al, 2016; Charness et al, 2012) and the subjective value of being in 
control (Charness and Gneezy, 2009; Sloof and Siemens, 2014; Owens et al, 2014, 
Coats and Rankin, 2015).  
                                                
2 Lamers et al (2016) conducted nine experimental studies in which participants were induced to imagine or to recall 
a highly (lowly) influential or a highly (lowly) autonomous experience. They found that, while influencing others 
have a secondary role, the desire for power is mainly driven by the need for autonomy. 
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In this study, we bridge the psychological and economic literature studying how the 
experience of power changes individual behaviour in a real effort task laboratory 
experiment. In our setting, individuals are asymmetrically endowed with minimal 
power, defined as the ability to affect others’ outcomes (by choosing the rate at which 
they earn) without being able to affect their own or to extract any surplus (as they earn 
at a fixed rate). As participants repeatedly interact with each other, the first part of the 
experiment is designed to generate an asymmetric experience of power. In a second 
stage, power can be exchanged, and individuals may sell their powerful positions, or 
buy them, and we measure how the asymmetric experience of power changes its value.  
 
The contributions of this study are multiple. First, we manipulate the institutions 
through which power is allocated and exercised to identify the effect of these 
institutions on the behaviour of the controlling and subordinated parties. We run a 2X2 
between-subjects experimental design. In the first dimension, following Ball and Eckel 
(1996) and Ball et al (2001), powerful positions are assigned to either top or bottom 
performers (as per their individual score in a 1st block, in which they face the same real 
effort task): High and Low treatments, respectively. In the other dimension of our 
factorial design, we manipulate the information given to participants regarding how 
power is allocated: while in the Baseline (BL) treatments subjects receive no 
information about the selection procedures, in the Legitimacy (LT) treatments subjects 
are aware of the mechanism. 3 
 
Second, we carefully control for any effect of power on individual and group 
performance. As groups are always formed by one participant with high power 
(participants A) and two individuals without power (participants B), we use individual 
performance in 1st block to classify participants in three categories: high, medium, and 
low, as per their tercile. Whereas in the BL-High and LT–High conditions individuals in 
the 1st tercile become participants A, in the BL–Low and LT–Low, those in the 3rd tercile 
become participants A, and the rest become B. As we know the individual productivity 
of A and B participants in every condition, we can measure the impact of power on their 
productivity.  
 
                                                
3 We also controlled for high-performance-enforcement and high-performance-centrality (as a proxy for 
charisma/visibility). The findings are aligned with the LT results and are presented in the Appendix 1.1. 
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Third, we decompound the Willingness to Pay (WTP) and Willingness to Accept 
(WTA) for power and calculate the proportion associated to any residual material 
benefits of power (an extrinsic value of power linked with higher rates being assigned to 
specific productivity levels), any insurance value of being a participant A (linked with 
risk aversion and uncertain rates) and any confusion, demand effects or priors regarding 
the A-label itself, generated by our elicitation mechanism (with an additional No Power 
treatment (see Zizzo, 2010; Bardsley, 2005; Bardsley, 2008, Eckel et al, forthcoming).  
 
Our results strongly suggest that power generates substantial and significant losses for 
those holding it in block 2. Participants with an experience of power in that block (A) 
set very high selling prices, relative to the buying prices offered by participants with no 
experience of power (B). Differences are significant and large in every experimental 
condition (BL-High, BL-Low, LT-High and LT-Low). The only (and informative) 
exception is the No power condition, in which participants A and B face an identical 
environment to the one faced by participants in the other four treatments, the same real 
effort task, and a minority of top performers (as in BL-High and LT-High) are selected 
into A roles using the same framing and labels; however, without power asymmetries, 
selling and buying prices of the A-position are indistinguishable in this control 
treatment.  
 
By setting extraordinarily high selling prices, participants A forego large monetary 
earnings. In that sense, this study provides evidence supporting the toxicity of power on 
individual behaviour only for those who have experienced it first. In sharp contrast, 
participants B buying prices can be fully rationalised as a combination of risk aversion, 
material gains, and demand effects. While the literature discussed at the beginning of 
this introduction has documented the value of power and authority (e.g. Bartling et al 
2014), this is the first time such effect has been studied. Moreover, we do not find 
evidence that a clear majority of individuals intrinsically value power, as those without 
experience of power react rationally to uncertainty, minor gains and noise (e.g. demand 
effects). The intrinsic value of power sharply increases for those who enjoyed it and 
exercised it.  
 
Interestingly, and contrary to Fehr et al (2013) and Bartling et al (2014), we do not find 
evidence of a positive impact of power on productivity. Additionally, our design allows 
for a classification of participants A by their ruling types. Participants A may use their 
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power to equalise participants B’s payoffs (assigning higher rates to the less productive 
participant B), reward (if the more productive participant B gets a higher rate) or 
passive (if she keeps the status quo and assigns the same piece rates to both participants 
B). We study if the way power is handled generates significant differences in its value 
and find that this taxonomy does not account for differences in the value assigned to 
power by As (and do not affect individuals’ productivity).  
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section presents the 
related literature. The third section illustrates the experiment design and procedures. 
Results are provided in the fourth section. Finally, the main conclusions are available in 
the last section of the chapter.  
 
2. Related Literature 
 
Previous research linking behaviour and power has focused on how individuals value 
control and autonomy in agency settings in which principals are endowed with the 
autonomy to make payoff relevant decisions on behalf of both players. Individuals are 
willing to forgo large monetary benefits to remain autonomous and retain their decision 
rights (Fehr et al, 2013; Owens et al, 2014; Coats and Rankin, 2015; Neri and 
Rommeswinkel, 2014; Bobadilla et al, 2016). Fehr et al (2013, p 2) summarises well the 
main result: “The allocation of decision rights has non-pecuniary consequences that 
inhibit the delegation of authority. In our experiment, the fact that the principals are 
willing to sacrifice some of their earnings to keep authority suggests a preference for 
the decision right”. This result is even stronger in other studies in which individuals are 
willing to pay to have the (illusory) control on results that are randomly determined 
(Charness and Gneezy, 2010; Sloof and von Simmens, 2014). 
 
Holding the agents’ autonomy comes at a cost. Fehr et al (2013) studies a delegation 
setting in which principals may give up their decision rights without a binding effort 
contract. The authors find that delegation happens rarely, and this has a significant and 
positive effect on effort: while principals retaining control choose effort levels above 
the optimum, the opposite happens to agents with no decision rights. These results are 
consistent with similar effects found in Charness et al (2012) and Falk and Kosfeld 
(2006). In Charness et al (2012)’s gift-exchange game individuals giving up the control 
upon efforts and wages provide higher efforts for the principal’s benefit, and delegation 
	 16	
is a Pareto-improvement strategy. Falk and Kosfeld (2006) conducted a two-stage 
principal-agent game in which the principal is entitled to restrict the agent's choice set to 
protect her own payoffs. They found that more controlling principals induce less 
performer agents as the latter perceived this action as a sign of distrust and autonomy 
inhibition. 
 
Bartling et al (2014) is the experimental study closest to our research question. Their 
setting differs to the one used by Fehr et al (2013) in that principals may request a 
binding minimum effort level to agents to delegate their decision rights, being effort 
levels of whoever is in control directly related to the project’s probability of success. 
They study the intrinsic value of decision rights comparing the monetary values of two 
lotteries: a controlling and a delegation lottery. Both lotteries are the gambles that 
would take place if the principal remains in control, or if the decision is made by the 
agent, respectively. The difference between the value of both lotteries is the intrinsic 
value of retaining the decision rights: 
 
Value of control lottery + Intrinsic value of decision rights = Value of the delegation 
lottery 
 
The value of the delegation lottery is significantly higher than the control lottery, and 
the intrinsic value of decision rights is positive and substantial for a large majority of 
principals, and it increases in settings in which incentives are not aligned and there 
exists a conflict of interest between principals and agents. Interestingly, there is no 
explicit control of individuals’ risk attitudes and the ex-post differences between the 
value of both lotteries (as higher effort levels increase the probability of winning the 
lottery).  
 
In our setting, we measure the intrinsic value of retaining decision rights over someone 
else’s payoffs controlling for individual risk attitudes, confusion and any residual value 
of power. As individuals earn by participating in a real effort task, the analysis of any 
effort enhancing effect of power on productivity is more direct. The details of our 
design are explained in the next section.   
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3. Experimental Design and Procedures 
 
Figure 1.1 presents our between-subjects factorial design. In each condition, different 
participants make decisions in an identical sequence of four blocks. In block 1, 
participants are asked to add 2-digit numbers for three minutes, being paid for their 
individual productivity in this real effort task (RET), at a rate of 5 experimental 
currency units (ECU) per correct answer, while mistakes do not count. Block 1 serves 
two purposes. First, it generates a clean measure of productivity differences across 
individuals. Second, it allows us to rank them into productivity terciles: high, medium 
and low.  
 
In the block 2, one third of the participants are selected into, and labelled as, 
participants A4, while the rest are labelled as B. The labels chosen (A versus B) and the 
explanations given to participants in the experiment introduce this role allocation as a 
selection process (using a diagram in which participants A are above participants B). 
Other than that, the experimental instructions are unloaded, and use neutral terms.   
 
Subjects are randomly allocated to groups of 3, with one participant A and two 
participants B, and they all face the same RET for 10 rounds of 1 minute. While 
participants A earn at the same, constant piece rate of 5 ECU per correct answer, the 
rate at which participants B earn is chosen by participants A satisfying a simple budget 
constraint: in every round, group and condition, the average rate at which participants B 
earn must be also 5 ECU. In other words, power (being A) gives no explicit advantage 
to participants A, other than the exercise of power itself.  
 
Participants A make the additional decision on rates at the end of each round, so each 
subject knows the rate at which she earns when the round starts. After receiving 
information about the individual productivity of participants B (their scores), and their 
own score, participants A assign rates for the next round. Participants B do not observe 
the productivity of any other participant, and only receive information about their round 
payoffs. 
 
  
                                                
4 From the 1st or the 3rd tertile	
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Figure 1.1: Experimental stages 
 
 
In the block 3 both A and B-subjects receive an additional endowment of 150 ECU5 that 
is directly added to their earnings. In this block, we directly ask participants A for their 
willingness to accept (WTA) for selling their role in the last block of the experiment, 
and participants B are invited to bid their willingness to pay (WTP) to get the A-
position. While the mechanism used for participants A is a standard BDM mechanism 
(as in Becker, DeGroot and Marschak, 1964), participants B set their WTP in an 
ascending price auction, being common knowledge that the top half WTP will be 
randomly matched with one WTA. The role is exchanged whenever the WTP of 
participants B is at least as high as the WTA of the participant A they are randomly 
matched with. The ascending price auction has an interesting property: as only half of 
the WTP are matched with the WTA, the number of participants A and B is kept 
constant for the last block of the experiment (one third and two thirds, respectively). 6 
 
At the beginning of block 3, the existence of a last block of ten rounds (block 4) is 
publicly announced. If the random matching between one WTA and one WTP finishes 
in a role exchange, the entire WTP value is debited from the B-participant experimental 
account and transferred to the A-Player’s account. Otherwise, no exchange happens and 
participants keep their roles in block 4. By making participants B to pay their WTP in 
full, we generate a strong test for any endowment effect linked with power experience. 7 
Rational participants A with no intrinsic interest in the unprofitable exercise of power 
(e.g. choosing rates) should rationally post a low WTA price, maximizing their chances 
of selling their role. Block 4 is identical to block 2, participants are randomly re-
matched in brand new groups (following a pure stranger matching protocol), and they 
                                                
5 The 150 ECU given to all participants controls for any differences in earnings generated in previous blocks.   
6 As we explain later in this section, the session size is always 18, with 6 participants A and 12 participants B per 
session.  
7 The endowment effect (see Thaler, 1980) is a direct legacy of loss aversion as in prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). The discrepancy between WTP WTA happens when individuals overweighting losses over gains by 
using a reference point, and losing what is theirs is less desirable than obtaining an equivalent gain. We specifically 
control for any endowment effect with the No Power treatment, as we discuss in the following section. 
	
Block 1
Individual 
RET
Block 2
A B B
RET
Block 3
Power 
exchange
Block 4
A B B
RET
Questionnaire
Demographics
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face 10 rounds with the same RET and rules. The experiment finished with a 
questionnaire. 
 
Table 1.1 below presents the 2x2 factorial design used in the experiment (plus one 
additional control treatment, described below). We classify participants in three groups 
per their individual productivity in the 1st block: high (1st tercile), middle (2nd tercile) 
and low ability individuals (3rd tercile). High ability individuals become participants A 
in the High treatments, and low ability participants get the role in the Low conditions. 
While in the Baseline conditions (BL-High and BL-Low), and in the No Power 
treatment, subjects were not aware of the mechanism used to assign roles, in both 
Legitimacy treatments (LT-High and LT-Low) participants were aware of the selection 
criterion. 8 
 
Table 1.1: Experimental design9 
 High Low 
No Power NP -- 
Baseline BL-High BL-Low 
Legitimacy LT-High LT-Low 
 
The experimental design targets a set of research questions. First, we want to study the 
effect of productivity differences on the valuation of power. Do high and low ability 
individuals value power in different ways? We are agnostic on the interaction between 
these two variables.  
 
If participants A always chose to reward the most productive B individuals with higher 
rates, power could come at a cost for high ability individuals if they expect to earn at a 
rate higher than 5 if becoming B. We should observe then low WTA values in the High 
condition (high ability individuals anticipate higher rates if selling power) and low WTP 
in the Low conditions (high ability individuals are not interested in power, as they earn 
                                                
8 As additional controls, we also implemented two treatments in which we manipulate participants A’s centrality and 
their ability to enforce rates beyond the budget constraint. In the centrality treatment, we increased participants A’ 
visibility by reporting their productivity to the other group members at the end of each round (see Carpenter et al, 
2012, and Fatas et al, 2010 for other experiments on centrality). Even when participants in these sessions were not 
aware of how roles were assigned, as in the BL treatments described in the main text, this information could allow 
participants B to learn about any productivity differences (e.g. participants A being more productive in the High 
condition). In the enforcement treatment, the sum of both rates at which participants earned could be lower than 10 
ECU. As we found no significant differences with the BL conditions, we report the results of these two additional 
treatments in the appendix A.1.2. Results, and procedures, area available upon request. 
9 Instructions are available in the Appendix A.1.3. 
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at high rates as B). If rates do not follow productivity, but aim to equalize earnings by 
assigning higher rates to less productive participants, power could be potentially 
attractive to high ability participants if they earn at a rate lower than 5 as B. Therefore, 
we should observe high WTA (WTP) in the High (Low) conditions among high ability 
participants.  
 
Second, we are also interested in learning if the legitimacy of power has any effect on 
the way the A positions are valued by individuals. In our experiment, we proxy 
legitimacy by the information participants get about how roles A and B are assigned. As 
only in the LT treatments subjects are aware of the criterion used to assign roles, we can 
compare BL-High versus LT-High and BL-Low versus LT-Low, keeping all other 
experimental features constant, to see any effect of this information. By revealing in the 
LT-High treatment that the best performers become participants A, we expect both 
WTA and WTP to be higher than when it is common knowledge than the low ability 
individuals get the job of assigning rates (as in the LT-Low condition). This effect 
should not be observed in the BL-High versus BL-Low comparison, as subjects are not 
aware of the selection criterion, and cannot value more (less) the A role because it was 
originally assigned to the best (worst) performers in block 1. 
 
Participants in the experiment could very well get confused in block 3. They could also 
bid for role A just because they positively react to the implicit demand of bidding (see 
Zizzo et al 2010). Individuals could bring strong priors and beliefs to the lab about the 
meaning of getting an A rather than a B label, or about the convenience and prestige of 
leaving the lab having been selected for a role. Therefore, we control for the potential 
noise created by the specifics of this setting, and run a control treatment: No Power 
(NP). 
 
In the NP treatment participants do the initial RET in block 1, and the top third 
performers become participants A, as in any High treatments, and the selection criterion 
remains unknown, as in the BL condition. We still use the same diagram presenting a 
pyramid with participants A over participants B, and the same wording describing the 
assignment of roles as a selection process (a minority of subjects selected as A, a 
majority becoming B). The differences with every other treatment is that in blocks 2 and 
4 all participants (A and B) always earn at a rate of 5 ECU per correct answer, and 
always receive information about their own score and earnings. As in any other block 3, 
	 21	
they may still sell and buy the A-position for block 4. If the difference between WTA 
and WTP were generated by confusion, demand effect, priors on labels, or any other 
spurious endowment effect, the gap in the valuation of role A should still be positive in 
the NP treatment.   
 
We conducted 14 computer-based sessions (2 sessions per treatment) programmed in Z-
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) at the CBESS lab at the University of East Anglia. Sessions 
were symmetric in that we kept the session size constant: 18 participants, of which 6 
were allocated the role A and 12 role B. The sessions lasted 80 minutes and participants 
earned £11.4 on average (US$18), including a £2 participation fee. We recruited 180 
participants, 36 for each treatment.10 Since individuals were grouped up in the block 2, 
we had 12 independent observations for participants A and 12 independent observations 
of participants B per treatment (see Table 1. 2). Payments during the experiment were 
made in Experimental Currency Units (ECU) at an exchange rate of £1 = 150 ECU 
(Experimental Currency Units).  
Table 1.2 Treatments summary Table 
 No power Baseline Legitimacy Total 
 A B A B A B A B 
High 12 24 12 24 12 24 36 72 
Low - - 12 24 12 24 24 48 
# Ss 36 72 72 180 
 
4. Results 
 
We start the results section by addressing a simple question: how is power used by 
participants A in block 2, before studying bids in block 3 of the experiment in 
subsections 4.2 (for the No Power condition, our natural benchmark) and 4.3 (for the 2 
x 2 factorial design). In subsection 4.4 we will separate the different elements of 
power’s valuation. We will finish this part with the analysis of power on productivity by 
comparing performance in Blocks 2 and 4, controlling for participants’ roles. 
4.1 Ruling on rates 
 
In block 2, participants A receive information about the productivity of participants B in 
their group in that round, and then decide the rates at which they will earn in the 
                                                
10 252 participants in total, including the 72 participants in the Centrality and Enforcement treatments described 
previously. 
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following round. Figure 1.2 below plots the average rates at which participants B were 
paid, per quintiles of total earnings (being Q5 the highest earners’ quintile), and for each 
experimental condition, including a non-linear fit. By inspection, not a single participant 
earned at a rate lower than 3 (higher than 7) in any treatment. 11  Participants A in both 
Baseline treatments are on average moderately more egalitarian than in Legitimacy 
treatments. Participants getting the low rates (from 1 to 3) are more productive than 
those getting the high rates (from 7 to 9): +2.8 correct answers per round in BL-High 
and +3.6 in BL-Low. There is no difference in scores in the two Legitimacy conditions: 
-0.5 for LT-High and +0.7 for LT-Low. 
 
As the non-linear fit lines document, the connection between average rate and total 
earnings is weak and insignificant, mainly because participants A do not regularly use 
extreme rate values to reward or punish participants: on average, 22% of the times. 
Extreme rates (9-1, 8-2 and 7-3) are used slightly less frequently by top performers 
(17.5% of times in BL-High and 16.7% in LT-High) than by bottom performers (23.3% 
in BL-Low and 30% in LT-Low).  
Figure 1.2 Average rate per quintiles 
 
 
Given the strict rate constraint Participants A face in our experiment (both rates must 
sum 10 each round) we can easily categorise participants A as egalitarian, meritocratic 
or symmetric: if they reward the most productive participant B with a higher rate, we 
label them as meritocratic; if they compensate the less productive participant B with a 
higher rate, we label them as egalitarian, and if they give both participants B the same 
rate, we label them as symmetric.  
 
                                                
11 Figure 1.11 in the Appendix A.1.1 represents the average rates paid for each quintile in the control treatments. 
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We follow a combination of two simple rules to categorise ruling behaviour across all 
decisions in Block 2. As the three rules are mutually exclusive, we first count the 
number of rounds each participant A behaves as meritocratic, egalitarian and 
symmetric and if she has a unique mode, we assign her to the corresponding type. We 
also use a simple a scoring rule and calculate the squared difference between the rates 
they assigned and the rates they should have assigned if they behaved as meritocratic, 
egalitarian or symmetric types. We assign them the type that minimises the squared 
distance across all rounds in Block 2. For discrepancies between both methods, we 
create an additional Others type. 12 
 
Our results are illustrated in Figure 1.3. Almost half of all participants A (45%) can be 
categorised as symmetric, 23% as egalitarian and 15% as meritocratic. Interestingly, if 
the best performers in Block 1 are selected as participants A, they tend to be slightly 
more symmetric and less egalitarian when they are aware of the selection rule (even 
though, the distribution of types in BL-High and LT-High are not significantly 
different). When bottom performers are selected as participants A, they get much more 
meritocratic when they are aware of the selection method: the distribution of categories 
in BL-Low is significantly different from the one we observe in LT-Low, as no 
meritocratic types are observed in the former and 38% of subjects A are classified as 
meritocratic in LT-Low. 13  
 
Figure 1.3 Ruling categories 
 
 
                                                
12 Given the low number of participants A per treatment we opt for this simple taxonomy strategy. A detailed report 
of the categorization by both rules is provided in Table 1.11 in the appendix. We did not find differences between the 
CT and the EN treatments relative to the BL. Figure 3 shows that both methods coincide in more than 80% of cases.  
13 We compare the distribution of types in BL-Low and LT-Low with a Fischer Exact test (p-value< 0.038). 
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4.2 No Power 
 
In the NP condition, the A-position does not bring along neither additional material 
benefits nor extraordinary decision rights. Are individuals still willing to buy and sell an 
apparently meaningless A-position? We answer this question in this subsection. If 
participants see the A-position as empty of any valuable content, those holding the A-
position in block 2 should be willing to sell it at any positive price, but participants B 
should still refrain from posting any positive bid. Furthermore, perfectly rational 
decision makers (aware of similar levels of rationality in the other participants) will set 
a WTP = WTA = 0.  
 
We find at least three realistic motives for participants to submit positive bids in the No 
Power condition: (i) individual are confused about the power exchange mechanism in 
block 3 and/or do not understand the instructions (as in Andreoni, 1995), (ii) they are 
willing to do what is implicitly asked to them in the laboratory by the experimenter 
(demand effects, as in Zizzo, 2010), and (iii) participants may intrinsically value being 
selected into the A-role, hold by a minority of them (one third) and labelled with the A 
letter (linked with the framing of the experimental setting). As this treatment is 
introduced as a control treatment for all these motivations together, we will not try to 
disentangle between these three competing explanations, but report the differences 
between those holding the A-label in block 2 and those holding the B-role. 14 
 
Figure 1.4 below presents the average WTP and WTA in the NP condition. By pure 
chance, A and B participants’ WTA and WTP are on average the same: 103.3 ECU. 
Hence, bids are positive and close to the endowment they receive at the beginning of 
Block 3, consistent with a sizeable demand effect (and/or moderate levels of confusion 
or framing effects). As the gap between WTP and WTA is zero, we can conclude that in 
the power-free setting of treatment NP, the A-position per se does not generate any 
endowment effect (Khanemann and Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 1980; Kahneman et al 1990; 
Isoni et al, 2009), and that the experience of holding the label A does not alter how 
participants value it. 
 
                                                
14 All participants passed three very short comprehension quizzes at the beginning of blocks 1, 2 and 3, including 
multiple choice and open questions. Participants easily passed all quizzes in all treatments, and we did not notice any 
noticeable impact on their valuation of A-role. Even if their individual performance in the comprehension quiz were 
informative about the level of confusion, it would be highly speculative to conjecture about the magnitude of the 
other two motivations (demand and framing effects) from their decisions and their answers in the questionnaire. 
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Figure 1.4 WTA and WTP in the No power treatment 
 
 
We summarise Figure 1.2 in our first result: 
Result 1: When the A-role has no additional decision rights, no differences are observed 
between the willingness to sell the role and the willingness to buy. In other words, we 
do not find an ‘endowment effect’ in the No Power condition, and being selected as 
player A or B makes no difference in terms of their willingness to accept/pay in the 
power exchange stage.  
 
4.3 Minimal Power 
 
Figure 1.4 documents positive but indistinguishable bids for both roles when 
participants A are not provided with an additional decision right.  We start studying the 
exchange of minimal power in block 3 in the simplest comparison. The only difference 
with respect to the NP treatment is that in the Baseline-High (BL-High) condition 
participants A now make decisions on the rates at which participants B earn. The 
selection mechanism used to allocate roles (Block 1’s best performers become 
participants A) and the (lack of) information about this selection procedure is identical 
in both treatments. Thus, any differences across these two treatments should be driven 
by the existence of power asymmetries in BL-High.  
 
Figure 1.5 presents the average WTA and WTP across treatments and roles in block 2. 
Whilst the WTA substantially (and significantly) increases in BL-High with respect to 
NP, the WTP is not significantly different in both conditions. In other words, while the 
WTA-WTP gap is zero in the NP treatment, it goes up to 280.0, more than twice the 
average WTP, in the BL-High treatment. 
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Figure 1.5 WTA and WTP BL High vs NP Table 1.3 WTP, WTA and Gap: BL-
High vs NP 
 
 
 A B Gap 
NP 103.3 103.3 0 
 (96.7) (83.6) (116.6) 
BL-High 415.0 135.0 280.0 
 (117.3) (113.1) (149.3) 
 
We summarise Figure 1.5 and Table 1.3 in our second result: 
Result 2: Keeping the selection procedure and the information constant, the exposure to 
power generates a vast and significant disparity between the willingness to accept and 
the willingness to pay for the A-role (that is, for power) in our experiment. While the 
willingness to pay for power of participants B in the BL-High condition does not differ 
from the WTP of participants B in the NP treatment, the average WTA of those 
participants with a previous experience of power is four times larger.  
 
As explained in the previous section, in our 2x2 experiment design we carefully control 
for the role assignment mechanism (top- versus bottom-performers are selected as 
participants A in High and Low conditions) and the status of the decision rights by 
making the selection procedures common information only in the Legitimacy treatments 
(LT). By comparing BL-High and BL-Low we can tell if the exposure to power 
generates a different willingness to retain it for high and low skilled participants A. 
Note that even when in these two treatments of our experiment participants were never 
informed about the selection protocol, it could be that any exposure to power effect 
could be mediated by subjects’ skills. The rationale for these differences are twofold.  
 
First, being all our participants university students, and being the real effort task loosely 
related to the tasks they face as students, we cannot discard that high skilled individuals 
felt more entitled to more powerful positions because they had priors about their 
superior relative performance. Second, even when the selection procedure was not 
revealed to subjects, those participants A could easily compare their own individual 
performance in Block 2 with the performance of participants B in their group, as they 
were informed of individuals scores at the end of each round. This information could 
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reinforce any positive correlation between individual skills and their sense of being 
entitled to power (role A), and this entitlement effect should reduce the distance between 
WTA and WTP in the BL-Low condition. 
 
Similarly, by making explicit the selection procedure in the LT treatments, we 
exogenously manipulate the status of power. While participants are aware that the role 
A is reserved for the best performers in the LT-High condition, subjects can see that 
participants with lower relative performance in Block 1 were granted the same role in 
the LT-Low condition. This status effect should lower the WTA and WTP in LT-Low 
with respect to LT-High. We are quite agnostic on the net effect on the gap between 
WTA and WTP across both LT treatments. 
The WTP, the WTA and the gap values in our four main treatments (BL-High, BL-Low, 
LT-High and LT-Low) are reported in Figure 1.6 and Table 1.4. Interestingly, we find 
that the second part of Result 2 is not affected by the entitlement and status effects 
defined above. The value given to the A-role by Participants B in the NP, as measured 
by their WTP for it, is not significantly different to the value given in any treatment in 
which the A-position comes with an additional decision right. Not even when the WTP 
values are pooled across High and Low conditions, or across Baseline and Legitimacy 
treatments. Hence, the WTP for power when participants have not been directly 
exposed to it (they have no previous experience of it) does not significantly change 
when participants see they are more entitled to it (as in BL-High) or when they do know 
the A-role is reserved to the best performers (as in LT-High) relative to the WTP 
observed in the BL-Low and LT-Low conditions.  
 
Figure 1.6 The value of minimal power: WTP and WTA in the 2x2 conditions 
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The first part of Result 2, on the large and significant effect of power exposure on WTA 
does not change across the different treatments, yet they are significantly higher than 
the ones observed in NP (p-values of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test are 0.0001 for 
BL-High, 0.0044 for BL-Low, 0.0003 for LT-High, and 0.0014 for LT-Low), and 
significantly larger than the WTP observed in all four treatments. The magnitude of 
these significant differences make these results economically relevant, as participants in 
the experiment are posting WTA values in the 50% of their Block 2 earnings’ range. 
The large WTA values (on average 409.4 and 332.0 in the High and Low conditions, 
and 360,4 and 381,1 ECU in the Baseline and Legitimacy treatments) generate 
substantial losses to those exposed to power in Block 2, as they fail to sell their decision 
rights in Block 3. We will carefully explore this finding in section 4.4. 
 
The entitlement effect on the gap is significant when pooling data from High and Low 
treatments (p-value < 0.0465, see means and standard deviations at the bottom of Table 
1.4). This result is driven by the entitlement effect alone; relative to the BL-High, the 
BL-Low gap is cut in half when participants A learn about their weak relative 
performance, free of any legitimacy or status effect (p-value = 0.0567). The gap is not 
statistically different in LT-High than in LT-Low, even when the former is 37% larger. 
The entitlement effect never eliminates the large disparity between WTA and WTP, as 
highly skilled participants B in the Low conditions bid significantly less than their 
lowly skilled counterparts, even when comparing the most productive tercile. 15  
Table 1.4 WTP, WTA and Gap 2x2 Conditions 
  High Low H & L 
Baseline 
WTA 
 
415.0 
(117.3) 
305.8 
(159.4) 
360.4 
(147.8) 
WTP 
 
135.0 
(113.1) 
159.6 
(144.9) 
147.3 
(129.2) 
Gap 
 
280.0 
(149.3) 
146.2 
(155.6) 
 
Legitimacy 
WTA 
 
403.8 
(139.6) 
358.3 
(183.2) 
381.05 
(161.0) 
WTP 
 
120.4 
(99.1) 
151.7 
(121.2) 
136.05 
(110.7) 
Gap 
 
283.4 
(163.7) 
206.7 
(191.9) 
 
BL & LT 
WTA 409.4 (126.3) 
332.0 
(170.1) 
370.7 
(153.3) 
WTP 127.7 (105.5) 
155.6 
(132.2) 
141.7 
(119.8) 
Gap 281.7 (148.2) 
176.4 
(173.6) 
                                                 
15 See Table 1.9 in the Appendix for a similar analysis of Centrality and Enforcement treatments.  
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It is interesting to note that the status effect plays a tiny, marginal role with respect to 
the effect of being exposed to power in Block 2. The WTA in the BL-High and the LT-
High (same selection rule not being or being common knowledge) are almost identical 
(415 versus 403.8), and the WTA in the BL-Low and the LT-Low are not statistically 
different (305.8 versus 358.3). Being exposed to a high or a low status power does not 
change the way power holders are willing to sell it. Similarly, the WTP in the BL-High 
and the LT-High (BL-Low and LT-Low) are strikingly similar: 135.0 versus 120.4 
(159.6 versus 151.7). We cannot discard this could be a consequence of the information 
A players receive about their superior (inferior) relative performance in the BL-High 
(BL-Low treatments). However, it is worth noting that WTA are significantly and 
substantially higher than the WTP within all four conditions. 
 
We summarise these findings in the following result: 
Result 3: The exposure to power generates a large and substantial effect in every 
treatment in our factorial design, as the WTA are always significantly and substantially 
larger than the WTP. The difference is partially mediated by an entitlement effect, as 
the gap between them becomes significantly smaller in Low conditions. The status of 
power generates no sizeable effect, as the WTA and the WTP are never significantly 
different when comparing LT-High and LT-Low treatments. 
 
4.4 Disentangling the components of the bids for power 
 
Given the magnitude of the difference between WTA and WTP, and its limited 
sensitivity to the experimental manipulations we implemented in the laboratory, the 
natural question is to ask ourselves why participants in our experiment are willing to let 
substantial amounts of money go to retain power, when they decision rights attached to 
it have minimal economic value. In this section, we explore at the individual level how 
much of individuals’ value of power can be explained by three rational reasons: risk 
attitudes, skill-dependent economic benefits and a residual linked with confusion, 
demand and framing effects.  
 
(i) Risk Attitudes 
As participants A earn at a certain and constant rate of 5 ECU, rational risk averse 
players may be willing to spend sizeable amounts of money to buy it, or may be 
reluctant to sell it, unless they are offered a sufficiently large amount to compensate for 
the loss of this certainty. In this subsection, we give risk aversion the best chance to 
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explain the bids we observe before we deal with any potential material benefits of 
earning at a constant rate in the next subsection. 
 
We use Holt and Laury (2002) seminal paper to calculate the WTA and WTP that 
extremely risk averse subjects would be willing to pay to keep or buy power in Block 3. 
To calculate the bid value compatible with the utility gains of being a participant A or 
B, we use the cut-off point that Holt and Laury (2002) used to define highly risk-averse 
subjects (between 1% and 4% of the population): Constant Rate of Risk Aversion 
(CRRA), ! = 0.97. Assuming that individuals are able to anticipate the true distribution 
of rates (see Figure 1.10 in the Appendix 1.1), we can compare the certain outcome of 
earning at a constant rate with the uncertain payoff of a participant B being paid at an 
uncertain rate, that we obtain from the actual distribution of rates observed in the 
experiment with. 16 
We use the weighted probability of being paid at any rate observed in the corresponding 
treatment to compute the utility of an extremely risk averse individual, and then 
calculate the WTP (WTA) that would make her switch from the certain (uncertain) 
scenario and sell (buy) the A-role at the cost (benefit) of certainty. In other words, for 
each individual, we obtain the maximum bid for power he would make if being 
extremely risk averse. 17  
 
Table 1.4 presents the WTA and WTP values that highly risk-averse individuals would 
have set in the BL-High, BL-Low, LT-High and LT-Low conditions. 18 Even extremely 
risk averse individuals would only be willing to bid moderately to eliminate uncertainty. 
To put these numbers into perspective, Table 1.4 shows the percentage of the actual 
bids that these extreme values represent. An average slightly below 30 ECU represents, 
approximately, 8% of the WTA and 21% and WTP we observed. The cut-off WTA 
values are not statistically different from the WTP ones. 19  
 
  
                                                
16 The assumption is of course unrealistic. It could be that individuals have unrealistic beliefs about the rates they 
could be paid. Given the very high CRRA we use, we still believe this is a strong test for the findings presented in the 
previous section. Moreover, any astronomically high CRRA would only generate higher WTA and WTP, and would 
never explain the difference. We run alternative assumptions about participants’ beliefs in the next section.  
17 See Appendix A.1.2 for details. 
18 We report the same results for the CT and the EN treatments in the Table 1.10 at the Appendix 1.1, with no 
significant differences.  
19 We do not find significant differences for the riskier condition, namely the EN, in which risk aversion would make 
completely sense (see Table 1.10 in the Appendix A.1.1)	
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Table 1.5 Participation of risk aversion in the actual value of power by treatment and role 
 Baseline Legitimacy 
 A B A B 
High 39.58 28.00 38.67 26.46 
% 10% 21% 10% 22% 
Low 17.50 30.04 20.83 32.79 
% 6% 20% 6% 22% 
 
We summarise this finding in our result 4:  
Result 4: Risk aversion can only explain a moderate proportion of the bids observed in 
the experiment, even if we assume very high CRRA for all participants: 8% of WTA and 
21% of WTP. 
 
(ii) Material Benefits  
 
Even though our design imposes an identical average rate for A and B participants, a 
constant rate of 5 ECU could still be economically attractive for those participants B 
earning at a rate lower than 5 ECU in block 2, 20 or for those participants A fearing a 
similar outcome in block 4. A powerful position would protect participants form this 
potential payoff loss, giving them another rational motive to bid for it. In this 
subsection, we study how different individuals could measure the material benefits by 
looking at the only information participants A had when deciding on rates: their 
productivity. 21 
 
We approximate the expected earnings of participants holding the A role in block 4 
('(,*+ ) multiplying their individual score in block 2, ,(-. , by the constant rate of 5. The 
potential earnings for the same individual in the B role ('(,/+ ) would be her score in the 
same block 2 multiplied by the average rate at which similarly productive participants 
B, in the same treatment, earned (0/123). The material benefits of the A role would the 
difference: 
 '( = '(,*+ − '(,/+ = ,(-. 0*123 − 0/123     (1) 
The economic benefits of the role A are reported in Table 1.6. We find that the material 
benefits are less than 10% the bid values in all conditions. 22 In fact, we find that the 
economic benefits of the A-position can be negative when participants A are more 
                                                
20 5.2% of participants B earned at a rate lower than 5 in at least 6 rounds in block 2.  
21 In this part of the chapter we exclusively consider individual productivities. A more sophisticated exercise could 
consider the relative performance of individuals within each group, rather than the absolute level of performance.  
22 Participants A assign rates of 5 ECU 60% of the time. These results are basically the same for the EN and CT 
treatments as reported in Table 1.11 in the Appendix A.1.1.  	
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generous with participants B that are as productive as they are (as in the BL-Low). In 
general, we do not have strong evidence to suggest that the WTP and WTA values are 
largely driven by the material benefits linked to holding the power, as Table 1.6 and 
Result 5 document: 
 
Table 1.6 Participation of the material benefits in the actual value of power 
 BL-A BL-B LT-A LT-B All A All B 
High 30.2 3.7 17.0 2.1   
%  7.3% 2.8% 4.1% 1.8% 5.70% 2.30% 
Low -23.2 6.2 24.4 2.6   
% -7.6% 3.9% 6.8% 1.7% -0.40% 2.80% 
 -0.15% 3.35% 5.45% 1.75% 2.65% 2.55% 
 
Result 5: The material benefits linked to the difference between the participant A rate, 5 
ECU, and the rates awarded to participants B with specific productivity levels, only 
explains a very moderate proportion of the bids observed in the experiment (on 
average, 2.65% of all WTA and 2.55% of all WTP). 
 
(iii) Noise Residual (demand, confusion, plus framing effects) 
 
Since in the NP condition participants A and B certainly earn at the same rate, the WTP 
and WTA values cannot be explained by risk aversion, material benefits, the additional 
decision right (power), or its experience. Still, positive bids submitted by participants A 
and B in the NP treatment could be generated by an experimenter demand effect, as 
described by Zizzo (2010), confusion regarding the mechanism used in Block 3, or a 
preference for the role A, as identified by Eckel et al (2016), and mentioned in section 
4.2. As this residual could be driven by demographic characteristics of subjects, we 
estimated different models to control for any differences across the different treatments. 
Even when we admit the sample in the NP treatment is quite small, we did not find any 
systematic and significant demographic explaining the size of the demand-confusion-
framing effect. Thus, we use the average WTP and WTA values in the NP condition to 
control for the proportion of noise that the specifics of the experiment might be 
generating on individuals’ bids.  Table 1.7 below puts into perspective how WTA/WTP 
observed in the NP treatment count as a fraction of the average bids observed in each 
treatment: 
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Table 1.7 Participation of noise (confusion-demand-framing)  
 BL-A BL-B LT-A LT-B All A All B 
High 415.00 135.00 404.80 120.40   
% 24.89% 76.52% 25.57% 85.80% 25.23% 81.16% 
Low 305.8 159.60 358.30 151.70   
% 33.78% 64.72% 28.83% 68.09% 31.31% 66.41% 
 28.66% 70.13% 27.10% 75.93% 28.27% 73.78% 
 
While we cannot exclude a large fraction of the WTP (almost 73% across all four 
treatments) is consistent with the combination of confusion, demand effects and 
framing, the percentage goes down to 31% of the WTA, and we summarise this finding 
in our Result 6: 
 Result 6: The effect of confusion, demand and framing is quite limited for participants 
A (28.3% of actual WTA, across all four treatments) and quite substantial for 
participants B (73.4% of the actual WTP, across all four conditions). 
 
4.5 Summary  
Figure 1.7 below pools all three components into one single visual result. For each 
treatment and role, we can see how the different explanations may account for the bids 
we obtained in our experiment, in percentages of the actual values. From the relative 
size of bars, by inspection, we can see that the combination of risk aversion, extrinsic 
material benefits and noise (confusion, demand and framing effects) may explain most 
of the WTP submitted by participants B in our experiment (around 95% of the average 
bid, across all four treatments). Even when we are giving each component its best 
scenario, the value of power when participants in the experiment have no previous 
experience of it can be fully rationalised by a combination of effects, none of them 
related to power per se. 
 
Figure 1.7 The Components of the WTA and WTP values 
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The big picture is very different for those participants with a direct exposure to power. 
The left part of figure 1.7 shows that using the same method we applied to participants 
B, in each experimental condition, we can only explain 40% of the bids submitted by 
participants A. In other words, more than half of the bids need to come from the only 
difference between those subjects on the left and those in the right part of Figure 1.7: 
the experience of power. We summarise this finding in our next result: 
 
Result 7: Not all participants in the experiment were willing to pay significant and 
substantial amounts of money for power (the additional decision right). While we are 
able to almost fully rationalise bids submitted by Participants B (without exposure to 
power) using a combination of standard economic (material benefits, risk attitudes) and 
behavioural factors (confusion, demand and framing effects), at least 50% of the bids 
submitted by participants A, with a previous power exposure, cannot be explained by 
this combination of factors. This gap is consistent with the existence of a vast, intrinsic, 
substantial and significant value of power in every experimental condition. 
 
4.6 Underbidding bias  
 
The market exchange we created in block 3 of the experiment consisted of a two-side 
auction in which A and B participants could sell and buy an additional decision right on 
rates (‘power’). The WTA values chosen by participants A in each session were 
randomly matched with the top 50% WTP values chosen by participants B. Rational 
participants A have an incentive to truly reveal their WTA particularly when, in case of 
a successful transfer of power, they receive in full the WTP value they are matched 
with. If they chose a WTA higher than their true value, they would miss the possibility 
of receiving an acceptable compensation for the A-position they hold. If they chose a 
WTA below their optimal bid, they could be transferring the A-position they hold for a 
price below their true valuation. 
 
We were fully conscious that this mechanism worked very differently for participants B, 
as there is no incentive compatible mechanism for both sides of a market like the one 
we implemented in our experiment. The first half of participants B leaving the auction 
had every incentive for truly representing their individual valuation for power in their 
bid. By bidding higher, they would pay their bid in full, if matched with a sufficiently 
low WTA, and the bid would be above their true value. By leaving the auction before 
the ascending price reached their true valuation of power, they would be missing the 
opportunity of buying it at a price below their true valuation. Hence, assuming full 
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rationality, this half of participants B are also truly revealing their value for the A 
position in the bid.  
 
For the other half of participants B, the WTP elicitation method might generates a bias 
because their bids are always paid in full, if successfully matched. This bias could 
explain the disparity we observed in the experiment between WTA and WTP values, as 
participants B could best respond to the expected WTA by posting a bid below their true 
value of power. We explore how this possibility could change our results interpretation 
in this section. 
 
We estimate this bias by making different assumptions about the expectations of 
participants B on the WTA. We use four different distributions of WTA values for both 
high and low conditions, and compute the WTP that maximises their expected earnings, 
given each distribution of WTA. To obtain the probability of buying the power, we use 
the real distribution of WTA observed in each treatment, a normal distribution, a 
Poisson distribution (in both cases using the actual means and standard deviations of 
each treatment), and a uniform distribution. Rational participants B should simply react 
to these distributions by choosing the WTPi that maximises their earnings, given their 
true value (Vi) 23:  argmax:;< =( − >?@( ∗ @(>?@ ≥ >?D)	  (2) 
The idea behind this exercise is simple. For one expected distribution of WTA values, 
say uniform with one WTA in the ten multiples of 50 going from 50 to 500, a rational 
bidder getting in the second half of the auction, with a true value of, say, 200 would be 
better off by bidding below 200. By bidding 200, this participant B would have the 
chance of buying the A role 4 times out of ten, and misses the opportunity in the other 6 
(when matched with WTA of 250, 300, 350, 400, 450 and 500). However, her expected 
earnings are zero, as she always pays the price in full, and the price exactly matches her 
true value.  
 
If bidding 150, this same participant B buys the decision right 3 times out of ten, and 
misses the other 7 (when matched with WTA between 200 and 500). Now the bidder 
makes the difference between her true value (200) and the price paid (150, her bid) each 
time she buys, making an expected profit of 15, (0.3 * 50). It is not difficult to see that 
                                                
23 Being @(>?@ ≥ >?D) the probability of buying i.e. the probability for the WTP being at least as high as the 
WTA. 
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the optimal bid for this participant B would be 100, as she would still buy 0.20 of the 
times (when matched with WTA of 50 and 100), making 100 each time (and the 
expected earnings would go up to 20). By bidding below the optimal WTP (say, 50), 
she is increasing the profit to 150, but she is also reducing the probability to 0.10, and 
the expected earnings to 15 (as when bidding 150).  
 
For each assumed distribution of WTA, we can interpret the bids (a WTP of 100 in the 
example) as the rational WTP submitted by a participant B who is trying to maximise 
her expected earnings, and estimate their real valuation of power from there.24 Table 1.8 
and figure 1.8 summarise the corrected WTP, estimating the average optimal bid 
participants B should submit if all were fully rational.  
 
Table 1.8 Corrected WTP  
 
WTP Normal Poisson Uniform Actual WTA 
High  127.7 155.0 136.5 226.7 183.2 409.4 
 (105.5) (135.4) (122.3) (225.9) (154.9) (126.3) 
Low  155.6 211.0 173.3 278.5 223.7 332.0 
 (132.2) (196.7) (167.8) (285.8) (207.7) (170.1) 
 
After controlling for the underbidding bias, the WTA values are still significantly higher 
than the corrected WTP, for each distribution. Even if we pool data from High and Low 
conditions, all corrected WTP values are significantly lower than the corresponding 
WTA. In the high conditions the WTA is significantly higher than the WTP with a p-
value<0.001 (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) for all the distributions considered. In the 
low conditions, WTA are always larger than the corrected WTP (p-value<0.001 for the 
Normal and Poisson distributions, p-value<0.05 for the actual distribution, and p-
value<0.06 for the Uniform).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
24 This method is sometimes inconclusive (when two WTP generate the same expected earnings for one specific true 
value) and may generate a second order bias, as a rational bidder with a true value between 200 and 249 and the 
beliefs described in the example would still bid 100. We assume that all possible true values are equally likely and 
compute the average. The number of inconclusive cases is quite moderate, given that only 50% of participants B can 
gain by budding below their true value. 
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Figure 1.8 WTP, corrected WTP and WTA 
 
 
We believe we are again giving our data the strongest test, as we consider this method 
to be an upper bound of any underbidding bias for two reasons. First, for each 
distribution of WTA considered, but the Poisson which does not differ from the real 
distribution, and each experimental condition, the correction breaks the distribution of 
bids in two parts, creating arbitrary and artificial jumps in exactly the 50% cut-off point 
between the lower half and the upper half of WTP (as shown in Figure 1.13 in 
Appendix A.1.1). Second, the method would generate a massive jump of WTP in the 
NP condition, making the WTP to be significantly larger than the WTA we observe. 25 
We summarise these findings in our next result: 
 
Result 8: Even correcting for the underbidding bias and considering different types of 
beliefs distributions, the exposure to power in Block 2 generates a substantial and 
significant increase in the bids in Block 3. 
 
 
4.7 The Effect of Power on Individual Productivity 
 
We finish the analysis of our results by specifically exploring one result of previous 
studies. Fehr et al (2013) and Falk and Kosfeld (2006) found that controlling parties 
tend to overprovide efforts, and subordinating parties do the opposite. This is consistent 
with other studies that found that the control over someone else’s efforts crowds out the 
intrinsic motivation for individuals to perform on the principal’s benefits (Charness et al 
                                                
25 Figures with the distributions and the NP results are available in the Appendix. 
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2012). In this section, we study to what extent being a participant A (controlling party) 
or being a participant B (controlled party) shapes individuals’ performance.  
 
Given that participants in the experiment face an identical real effort task once in Block 
1, and ten times in Block 2, we focus in the productivity gains of participants A and B 
calculating the difference between the average score per minute in blocks 1 and 2. 
Figure 1.9 below presents the average productivity gains of participants A and B once 
the roles are assigned in the NP, High and Low conditions, pooling the data coming 
from BL and LT sessions.26  
 
In every treatment, we use individual productivity in Block 1 to assign roles. As 
explained above, we rank individuals by their individual score and assign roles (A and 
B) based on whether they are in the top or bottom tercile. In both BL-High and LT-High 
(BL-Low and LT-Low) treatments, subjects in the top (bottom) tercile in Block 1 
become participants A in the second Block. We compare the productivity gains of those 
participants in the top and bottom tercile across the different conditions, and depending 
on whether they are a ‘controlling’ (getting role A) or ‘controlled’ (B) party in Block 2. 
27  
 
Figure 1.9 below shows the average productivity gains in absolute terms for two groups: 
the top and bottom tercile of participants (left and right side, respectively). For each 
group, we plot the productivity gains using three bars: the left one for the No power 
treatment, the one in the middle for High treatments, and the one in the right of each 
box for Low conditions. The two boxes tell a very different story.  
 
Top performers (left box of Figure 1.9) do better when assigned the A role (as in High 
conditions) than when they become participants B (as in Low conditions), but the 
difference is not significant (and the magnitude of the effect is not significantly different 
from what we observe in the NP control). Bottom performers do significantly react to 
the role assigned to them, but in a counterintuitive way, as being in a powerful role (as 
in the Low treatments) generates no significant productivity gains above the ones 
observed in the NP control. However, they do significantly better when they become 
                                                
26 We pol data to make the visual comparison easier. Results do not change if we present all treatments 
independently. Figures are available upon request. 
27 We do not include the 2nd tertile in the graph to make sure that A and participants B’ productivities are comparable. 
While participants A in the high (low) condition and participants B in the low (high) condition belong to the 1st (3rd) 
tertile.  
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powerless participants B (as in the High conditions): their productivity gain almost 
double the ones observed for participants A in the Low treatments (p-value = 0.0048) 
and almost triple the productivity in the NP condition (p-value = 0.0008).  
 
Figure 1.9 The effect of power on individuals’ productivity 
 
 
Figure 1.9 does not control for the rates chosen by Participants A, for whom we found 
some average evidence of egalitarianism (i.e. they rewarded less productive participant 
with higher rates and more productive participants with lower ones). Even when the 
egalitarian behaviour of participants A reduces the incentives for participants B to be 
more productive and does not invalidate figure 1.9, the connection between productivity 
and roles should be taken with extreme caution in this setting.  
We summarise our findings in the last result:  
Result 9: We fail to replicate the positive effect of power, control and authority on 
individual’s performance (as in Fehr et al 2013 or Falk and Kosfeld, 2006). Instead, we 
find that low-skilled participants B (controlled individuals) exhibit significantly higher 
productivity gains than low-skilled participants A (controlling individuals)  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The toxicity of power in daily life has brought us to this study. The aim was to 
understand the determinants of the value of power that are not driven by extrinsic 
benefits or strategic interactions. We recreate in the lab real-life features of power 
relationships based on an asymmetric distribution of rights that do not necessarily imply 
the possibility of getting pecuniary benefits from it.  We elicit the value of power and 
create a “market of power” by using contingent valuation methods from those who have 
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and have not being exposed to powerful positions i.e. the WTP (from participants B) 
and WTA (from participants B). 
 
We find that even though the WTP for the A-position is positive and non-negligible, 
over 90% of this value can be rationalised by other attributes, such as the material 
benefits of the A-role, participants’ risk attitudes, and the specifics of the experimental 
setting.  
 
The WTA value, on the other hand, cannot be explained by those components. On the 
contrary, participants A who have been in touch with power and have had the taste of 
exercising it, are willing to forgo the possibility of a profitable role exchange; even by 
conceding high levels of risk aversion, and controlling for material benefits and the 
potential noise of the setting and individuals’ priors. They develop a strong attachment 
to the experience of power that leads them to set a WTA value that is, on average, 3-
times the WTP. 
 
The results obtained in the NP condition suggest the existent gap between the WTA and 
WTP is not necessarily generated by the power asymmetry. Since, the WTP is the same 
in the No-power condition and in treatments with power asymmetries, the gap is 
entirely driven by the WTA value. Therefore, it is the experience of power what is 
leading the whole reaction of our participants when they are facing the possibility of a 
role exchange. Participants A, who have had the power during 10 rounds in a row, are 
more reluctant to give up their position and consequently, they ask for a compensation 
that exceeds 70% of participant Bs’ earnings in the block 2. This result prevails even 
after controlling for risk attitudes, the limited economic benefits of being appointed as 
A and the potential underbidding bias. 
 
It seems that the WTP-WTA gap here observed is partially mediated by an entitlement 
effect, as we find that the gap between them becomes significantly smaller in Low 
conditions. The status of power introduced in the legitimacy treatments generates no 
sizeable effect, as the WTA and the WTP are never significantly different when 
comparing LT-High and LT-Low treatments. 
 
We also find that the WTP and WTA variance is not explained by other attributes given 
to participants A such as the ability to enforce or their visibility at their group members. 
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Finally, we find that individuals exhibit a passive way of exercising power (45% were 
classified as symmetric), and if using it they would compensate participant B’s earnings 
(23% were classified as egalitarian).  power does not boost individual productivity and 
control does not reduce the subordinating party productivity when the decision right 
owners cannot control their efforts (as in Bartling et al 2014, and Charness et al 2012); 
even if they have the right to decide upon their rates. 
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Chapter 3. The Cost of Dissent28 
 
 
 
  
                                                
28 Co-authored with:Rachel T. A. Croson, Department of Economics, Michigan State University, crosonra@msu.edu, 
and Enrique Fatas, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, e.fatas@uea.ac.uk 
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1. Introduction 
 
Both coordination problems and teams’ interactions are ubiquitous in a variety of important 
economic contexts.  This observation has fuelled the large body of research in economics on 
coordination games in general (predominantly games with multiple, praetor-ranked equilibria), 
and on team decision-making.  However, it was not until the paper of Francesco Feri et al 
(2010) that researchers brought these two critical topics together. 
 
There are two main concerns when it comes to boost team performance: coordination and free 
riding. In this study, we study two polarised social composition functions (SCF) (Harrison and 
Hirshleifer, 1989) that have been widely studied in the team production literature: the weakest-
link (WLM) and the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). Our main objective is to 
compare these SCF with one hybrid mechanism through which we attempt to get closer to how 
companies or groups of teams actually organise their production process29.  
 
We study the underlying behaviour that differentiates individuals and teams whilst producing a 
public good with a WLM technology. To avoid any nominal confusion, hereafter we will refer 
to a team as the set of individuals that are jointly deciding on the team contribution to the public 
good production. Therefore, the set of contributors to the public good, either teams or 
individuals, will be appointed as a group30.  
 
The WLM is a SCF through which group production is in the end as good as the minimum 
contribution made by one of the group members. Each individual receives r/n times (r>1 and n 
the number of individuals) the amount produced by the group. As suggested by Harrison and 
Hirshleifer (1989), this SCF gives to each group member a kind of veto power over the extent of 
the collective achievement. Coordination failures may lead groups (or organisations, and 
society) to a disastrous result. By construction, free riding is impossible in the WLM, as low 
contributors do not benefit from the decisions made by cooperative individuals. 
 
The WLM addresses coordination problems as it incentivises all individuals to contribute as 
much as their group mates have contributed. Theoretically, the WLM is a multi-equilibria 
mechanism on all the strategy space. Hence, this mechanism could generate coordination at high 
and low levels of production, depending on the pathway followed by the teammates. The cost of 
coordination comes from the wasted effort exerted by individuals, as any contribution above the 
minimum is lost. 
                                                
29 Social Composition Function (SCF) (Harrison and Hirshleifer, 1989) refers to the mechanism through which 
individual contributions are alloyed into an available social aggregate of the public good  
30 Mind that this is only a nominal precision. Groups, in this context, are the social figure through which all 
contributions are computed. Thus, groups are what in the team production literature are known as a team. 
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Group production under the VCM, on the other hand, is the “democratic” result of the average 
of all contributions made by the group members. As for the WLM, Each subject receives r/n 
times the amount produced by the group. The VCM is a unique-equilibrium game on zero as 
individuals always have incentives to contribute a bit less than their group mates in order to take 
advantage of the group account. Thus, the VCM jeopardises the incentives for individuals to 
contribute to the public good, as it is more profitable to free ride. 
 
Here a real anecdote of how individual incentives might not be aligned to the team’s. The 28th 
of November 2016 an aircraft flying, from Bolivia faced a fuel emergency and crashed on 
Colombian ground generating 71 casualties. According to the news, the flight crew failed to 
adequately manage the airplane's fuel load, and did not use the protocol to report the emergency 
fuel situation to air traffic control. Apparently, by evading the protocol the captain was simply 
avoiding further investigations from the aviation authorities. 
 
In this study, we explore the performance of teams in a SCF that combines the VCM structure 
with the WLM. Our rationale for this combination of two well-known SCF comes from real-
life: organisations embed their production within a WLM structure between teams (the ones 
facing the coordination challenge) in which individuals still face a non-trivial VCM-like 
dilemma within each team (and team members face a social dilemma challenge).  
In our main setting, teams contribute to a group account. The minimum team contribution 
determines the joint production of the group, so each team has an incentive to contribute as 
much as other teams have contributed (and free riding is not profitable for teams). We employed 
the average of the team members’ contributions as the decision rule to compute the team 
contribution to the public good. Hence, individual team members still benefit from the 
contribution of other teammates (opening a back door for individual free riding).  
 
A close example of these types of organisations is the Continental Airlines’ crews. Several 
teams of an airline work together to make sure that the airplanes depart and land on time, and 
that the baggage is properly allocated. Each team yields the average effort of each team 
member, yet the airline production responds to the minimum effort exerted among the ground 
crew teams.  
 
We experimentally test the effectiveness of teams in this environment using a between-subjects 
design. Because our environment has elements of both the WLM SCF (between teams) and the 
VCM SCF (within teams), we use a double benchmark: a repeated team production game 
played by individuals with a WLM SCF (I-WLM hereafter) and a VCM SCF (I-VCM 
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hereafter). In our main treatment, teams jointly produce outcome using a WLM SCF, while 
individuals within teams still bear in full the cost of their contributions (T-WLM hereafter).  
 
The recent literature comparing teams versus individuals suggests that results are context 
dependant, and that groups may be more sophisticated that individuals with an open effect on 
social welfare (see lessons 1 and 3 in the excellent survey of Charness and Sutter, 2012). Feri et 
al (2010) impose unanimity as a team decision rule and eliminate free riding within teams (e.g. 
effort levels are always identical for team members). In their experiment, teams coordinate 
better and are more productive than isolated individuals. In our experiment, we find the opposite 
result, in line with the literature suggesting that teams may be more sophisticated and more self-
interested than individuals: individual contributions to the group account, and the overall team 
production, are significantly smaller in T-WLM than in the two individual benchmarks. 
However, wasted efforts (contributions above the minimum) are not significantly higher in 
teams. I-WLM exhibits a much larger variance of results, generating three different group 
categories: those who coordinate in a high-efficiency equilibrium, those who coordinate in a 
low-efficiency one, and those who try to coordinate, and fail. Groups of teams in the T-WLM 
condition are only outperformed by successful teams in the I-WLM treatment. In summary, 
teams do not coordinate worse than individuals in our setting, but they coordinate in a low effort 
equilibrium. 
 
Our design, however, does not consider other important elements of team interaction in real 
organisations. There is still room to investigate the effect of communication (without forced 
consensus), team identification, inter and intra team punishment, peer monitoring, leadership, 
gradual team integration and neighbourhood selection. All these other elements are left for 
future research comparing teams and individual performance. 
 
The rest of this chapter goes as follows: in the second section, we present relevant literature 
comparing teams’ and individuals’ behaviour; in the third section, we describe our experimental 
design and procedures; in the fourth section, we present our results; and, finally, in the fifth 
section we conclude.  
 
2. Related Literature 
 
The literature comparing team and individual decision-making suggests that the relative 
performance of teams and individuals is context dependant (‘lesson three’ in the excellent 
survey written by Charness and Sutter, 2012). The evidence surveyed in this paper cleanly 
supports the superiority of teams over individuals overcoming cognitive limitations (becoming 
its ‘lesson one’). As an example, Kocher and Sutter (2005) find that groups are more 
	 46	
sophisticated than individuals in beauty context games, as even though they both start with 
similar predictions, groups apparently are better at learning from their results in previous rounds 
and converge faster to the Nash equilibrium. In other words, teams are more sophisticated than 
individuals because they make more rational choices in a standard game-theoretic sense. 
 
The welfare implications of cognitive sophistication depend on the strategic environment. In a 
trust game in which senders and responders can be either teams (of three) or individuals, Kugler 
et al (2007) allow for communication within teams, imposing unanimity to reach a joint 
decision about how much to send or to return. Teams get closer to the equilibrium of the game 
and tend to send less (trust less), yet return roughly the same (equal trustworthiness), than 
individuals. As in trust games the second mover has a mere redistributing role, teams 
significantly reduce social welfare. 
 
‘Lesson 2’ in Charness and Sutter (2012) gives team a welfare enhancing channel, as peer 
effects may boost the performance of individuals when making decisions in teams. Peer and 
monitoring effects have been documented in the laboratory and the field. Falk and Ichino (2006) 
cleanly show that low productivity individuals perform better when paired with other 
individuals doing the same simple task (stuffing envelopes), even when their individual 
performance does not affect co-workers’ pay. High-productive supermarket cashiers have a 
similar positive influence in Mas and Moretti (2009). Even when customers can freely move 
from one slow cashier to a faster line, generating incentives to free-ride on the efforts of others, 
low-productive workers increase their performance when working with more productive peers 
(and the productivity of highly skilled workers is not hurt by the presence of low-skill co-
workers). The positive spillovers are observed only among cashiers when located close in the 
supermarket and when they frequently share the shift, suggesting that peer effects can be related 
to social pressure31. 
 
Paraphrasing Charness and Sutter, the lesson we learn from the literature review so far is that 
peer effects may boost team performance by increasing the productivity of low-ability workers, 
making it attractive for high-ability workers to engage onto group compensation conditions. 
Using data from a garment factory, in which individuals can choose the team they want to 
belong to, Hamilton et al (2003) find that peer monitoring reduces free riding, and group piece-
rates may generate large and significant productivity gains. Interestingly, the positive effects of 
peer monitoring may disappear when free riding is impossible. Guryan et al (2009) find no peer 
effects in randomly generated pairs of players competing in golf tournaments, in which players 
compete against all other participants in the tournament. 
                                                
31 Kato and Shu (2008) and Bandiera et al (2009) find similar results among Chinese textile workers and British fruit 
pickers, respectively. 
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Experimental studies investigating differences between teams and individuals in coordination 
environments are rare. Charness and Jackson (2007) use a Stag-Hunt game and teams of size 
two to compare teams and individuals decision-making in a coordination task by changing both 
the incentives and the decision-implementation mechanism (unanimity vs unilaterality). They 
find that the decision rule critically affects the results: while in the latter scenario (as in 
unilaterality) individuals choose Stag more frequently than individuals, the opposite results hold 
if both team members must vote Stag (as in unanimity) to implement it as their team choice. In 
other words, while individuals playing against other individuals follow an incentive-based logic, 
the decisions of teams playing against other teams is more likely to be driven by the voting rule 
mechanism. 
 
Feri et al (2010) follow van Huyck et al (1990) canonical design and compare teams and 
individuals’ performance. Decision makers (5 individuals or 5 teams of 3 individuals) choose a 
number (i. e. effort) between 1 and 7 in a coordination game with 7-pareto ranked equilibria. 
Teams could communicate and had to reach a unanimous decision before submitting a decision. 
Note that, by design, forced consensus excludes free riding within teams, as all individuals 
within each team exert the same effort level (i.e. identical payoffs are obtained by all three team 
members). In this free-riding free environment, teams coordinate more often than individuals 
(e.g. decision makers choose the same number), and they coordinate better (e.g. on higher 
numbers). Chaudhuri et al (2015) replicate Feri et al (2010) with teams of two players, and find 
that their results only hold when the composition of groups is kept constant along the 
experiment, and peer monitoring is possible. When group composition changes from round to 
round, individuals outperform teams.  
 
3. Experimental Design 
 
Our study contributes to the literature comparing teams and individuals’ behaviour in 
coordination tasks, allowing free riding situations within teams. Consensus is not imposed and 
individual payoffs within each team may or may not be identical. Following Chaudhuri et al 
(2015), the composition of teams does not change. As teams and individuals make anonymous 
decisions in a controlled laboratory environment, peer monitoring between the participants in 
our experiment is much weaker than among cashiers (as in Mas and Moretti, 2009), farm 
workers (as in Bandiera et al, 2009) or employees in the garment plant (as in Hamilton et al, 
2003). The feedback provided to the participants in our setting, however, allows for a weak 
form of peer monitoring, giving teams a fair chance to outperform individuals.  
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To examine the impact of the within-team decision-making process on the between-teams’ 
coordination outcomes, we present a new set of experiments focusing on the weakest link game.  
Contrary to Feri et al (2010), we compare individuals and teams without enforcing consensus on 
effort levels.  Instead, we allow individuals within each team to choose an effort level (much 
like the Continental Airlines’ ground crews in our example above). The team effort is 
determined by the average of the individual efforts of its members. In this sense, our design falls 
between the two treatments of Charness and Jackson (2007, 2008), as the team members 
decisions are all used to calculate the team effort.   
 
It is worthy to stress the attention on the boundaries of communication and unanimity on team 
performance. Teammates are normally allowed to communicate to each other. Yet, this 
communication does not necessarily happen in the very same moment when actions are taking 
place (the pilot do not talk to the flight attendant to consult a landing issue whilst landing). 
Individuals rather make decisions on their own even when those would affect the team 
performance. Besides, while it is true that teammates might commit with certain action 
beforehand, spoken commitments are not necessarily binding, and subjects can always deviate 
to a decision that represents a better deal for them. That is why we created a team-contribution 
aggregation rule that allows for self-interested decisions; but, at the same time, we imposed a 
group coordination challenge that should interfere in individuals’ incentives to free ride.  
 
We examine three games in which groups of individuals or teams produce a joint outcome with 
WLM and VCM SCF, and then we compare individual and team treatments.  In our individual 
treatments (I-VCM and I-WLM), four individuals made a group.  In our team treatment (T-
WLM), four teams of three individuals each made a group32.  So, decision makers were 
individuals or teams (of three individuals) depending on the condition.  
 
In each group, individuals or teams faced a simple WLM or VCM environment. Each 
participant received a 50-unit endowment at the beginning of each round, which they could 
assign to a group or a private account.  In both I-WLM and T-WLM treatments, the minimum 
contribution to the group account made by the decision makers (individual in the I-WLM or 
team in the T-WLM) determined the group production, and each participant received twice the 
minimum value. In the I-VCM the average contribution determined the group production, and 
each participant received twice the average contribution to the group account.  
 
                                                
32Although we used groups of size four rather than size five, this was held constant across the individual and team 
treatments.  Previous work has suggested that coordination is easier in smaller groups (e.g. Roberto Weber 2006), 
thus it was possible that our smaller-sized groups could have increased coordination success in both the team and 
individual treatment. However, we find no difference in effort or coordination among individuals between our study 
and Feri et al (2010) (and lower efforts and coordination among teams), thus we conclude that this was not a 
significant difference in the experimental design. 
	 49	
In the T-WLM treatment, the three-team members’ allocations to the group account were 
averaged to decide the team allocation. 33 Contrary to other studies (Kugler et al, 2006; Feri et 
al, 2010), we did not impose consensus within the team; all three team members independently 
entered their decisions, and paid the cost of their decision in full. T-WLM follows the 
Continental Airlines example used in the introduction, as the low performance of one team 
reduces the entire group’s outcome (e.g. if the ground crew delays the plane’s departure, then 
the plane will not land on time, regardless of the effort levels of the flight crew or the arriving 
ground crew). At the same time, unanimity is not magically imposed within each team (e.g. the 
ground crew), and individuals still face a non-trivial dilemma (e.g. members of the ground crew 
may free ride on the contribution of other ground crew members). 
 
The payoff functions of the two individual treatments are the following: '(GHIJKLM = 50 − O(GH + 2 ∙ O(GH123  (1) O(GH123 = O((ST(SU     (2) '(GHIJ:VM = 50 − O(GH + 2 ∙ O(GHW(G  (3) O(GHW(G = min	 OU, O., OZ, OT   (4) 
 
The payoff function for the T-WLM treatment includes a WLM SCF for the group account (as 
in the I-WLM): '(GH;J:VM = 50 − O(GH + 2 ∙ [\+1WW(G   (5) 
 
and a VCM SCF within each team (as in the I-VCM): [\+1WW(G = min [U, [., [Z, [T    (6)34 [] = ^_` O(GH = abbcdbceZ   (7) 
 
The I-VCM has a clear theoretical prediction in the stage game. The chosen parameters promote 
free-riding attitudes, assuming self-interested preferences. Whereas each unit of effort allocated 
to the private account yields one unit for the individual utility, each unit of effort allocated to 
the group account (effort) yields a half.  In other words, from any symmetric contribution 
profile, individuals can always unilaterally deviate reducing their contribution to improve their 
profits: if one subject reduces her individual contribution in one, she increases her individual 
payoff in half unit.  From the group’s perspective, full contributions are the efficient strategy as 
whereas each unit of effort allocated to group account earns a return of two (divided equally 
among four members), each unit of effort allocated to individual activity earns a return of one.  
                                                
33 As we aimed to use the VCM mainly as a theoretical control, and a team VCM production would be just 
as a 12-people-size VCM, we decided only comparing our results with the traditional VCM played by four 
individuals.  
 
34 Uppercases refer to teams contributions, and lowercases represent individual contributions.  
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The strategic problem of each participant in the I-WLM is the trade-off between the opportunity 
costs of exerting too little effort and the costs of wasted effort from exerting more than the 
minimum within her team. Each symmetric contribution profile (i.e. any allocation in which 
every participant makes the same effort) becomes a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the stage 
game. In other words, from any symmetric contribution profile, an individual should not 
unilaterally deviate at a profit. If she increases her contribution in one unit, she decreases her 
profit in half (without affecting the group minimum). If she reduces her contribution in one unit, 
she would decrease everyone’s individual payoffs (because the group minimum will be reduced 
in one unit, and in the group benefits in two units). Equilibria are Pareto-ranked in the sense that 
the pay-offs in an equilibrium is the same to all subjects and increases linearly in the minimum 
effort. The pay-off–dominant equilibrium is the one with maximum effort, and the zero-
contribution equilibrium is risk dominant (in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten, 1988, see Croson 
et al 2005 and Fatas et al 2006 for a discussion). 
 
The T-WLM is more interesting to analyse. Teams cannot profit by deviating from any 
symmetric team contribution profile, but individuals within teams in the T-WLM face a social 
dilemma, as in the I-VCM. Interestingly, even when the theoretical prediction for T-WLM, 
assuming self-interested, identical and rational individuals in a common knowledge 
environment, does not differ from the prediction described above for the I-VCM, the 
opportunity cost of exerting too little effort is very different than the one in the I-VCM. We 
describe the differences in some detail. 
 
Participants in the T-WLM and the I-VCM have incentives to reduce their contributions from 
any symmetric contribution profile, but the incentives are not the same. While in the I-VCM, a 
unilateral one-unit reduction of the individual contribution always generates a payoff increment 
of half-unit, in the T-WLM the net effect depends on the relative team position within the 
group, with three possible scenarios. 
a) If the team is contributing above the group provision (that is, [] > [\+1WW(G the minimum), 
a one-unit reduction pays a full unit back, as any contribution above the group 
minimum is lost. A one-unit increase generates a full unit loss for the very same reason. 
 
b) If the individual is in a team contributing the group minimum (that is, [] = [\+1WW(G ), 
reducing the individual contribution in one-unit only generates an individual benefit of 
one-third: it increases the private benefits in one unit, and it reduces the public benefits 
(that is, 2 ∙ [\+1WW(G = 2 ∙ []) in two thirds of a unit, as it reduces [] in one third ([] = UZ 	 ∙	 O((SZ(SU ). Interestingly, the cost of a one-unit increase is also one third, as it reduces the 
private benefits in one unit, at a benefit of two thirds. 
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c) In any symmetric contribution profile in which all teams are contributing the same 
amount, reducing the individual contribution still generates a moderate loss of one-
third,35 and a one-unit increase generates a full unit loss, as it does not increase the 
group minimum. 
 
To sum up, incentives to adjust downwards may be larger (if in a team above the minimum) or 
smaller (if in a team contributing the minimum) than in I-VCM. The cost of unilaterally 
increasing the contribution may also be larger (when in a team above the minimum, or in a 
symmetric contribution profile), or smaller than in the I-VCM (if in a team contributing the 
minimum). 
 
As the strategy maximizing social welfare is identical in all three conditions (full efforts), and 
the within team decision rule allows participants to compensate the low effort exerted by other 
team members, T-WLM gives a more realistic and interesting setting to explore the 
effectiveness of teams versus individuals because it reduces the cost of moving towards the 
social welfare maximizing solution (and it reduces the incentives to adjust down the individual 
contribution). 36  
 
The information provided to participants in our experiment did allow for signalling. After each 
round, participants learned the group provision (determined by an individual or a team, 
depending on the treatment), their individual earnings, and the average contribution in their 
team (only in the T-WLM treatment). As the team size was three, and participants were 
explicitly reminded of their individual decisions, they could compute in a relatively easy way 
whether someone else in their team was increasing (or decreasing) their contribution. 37 
 
The experimental procedures were quite similar to the ones used in other team production 
experiments. The composition of each team and group was randomly determined at the 
beginning of the experiment and remained stable across the 20 rounds of the experiment. 208 
subjects participated in the computerised experiment. In the I-WLM treatment 36 subjects 
generated nine independent observations (one per group); in the T-WLM treatment, 120 
subjects generated ten independent observations (ten groups of 12 subjects, in four teams of 
three participants each); in the I-VCM 52 participants generated 13 independent observations.  
                                                
35 Unless, of course the contribution is zero, and a decrease in the individual contribution is not possible. 
36 Colman et al (2008) document evidence in favour of team reasoning in two experiments in which individual and 
team reasoning are primed in different coordination games. As Colmin et al (2008) admit, team reasoning typically 
assumes that individuals pick out the profile that maximizes collective payoff if this profile is unique; if not unique, 
the theory is indeterminate. The team reasoning theory goes back to Loomes and Sugden (1992), and the evidence 
provided by Colman et al (2008) is disputed in Sugden (2008). 
37 We discarded the alternative of providing them with full information about each contribution within their team to 
keep the complexity of the experiment similar across the three conditions. 
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We used the zTree software (Urs Fischbacher 2007) to implement the computerized experiment.  
All experiments were run at the University of Valencia (Spain).38  No subject participated in 
more than one session and participants had no prior experience in similar games.  The sessions 
lasted 60 minutes on average, and participants earned an average of €14 (US$15).  
 
4. Experimental Results 
 
4.1. Individual effort 
We start by comparing contribution and provision (e.g. group production) in the individual and 
team treatments (I-WLM vs T-WLM vs I-VCM) in Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1. Figure 2.1 
represents the average contribution and provision across all treatments, being standard 
deviations computed using group data in all cases (and represented in parenthesis in Table 2.1). 
 
Figure 2.1: Contribution and provision by treatment 
 
 
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Contribution Provision 
I-WLM 
 
26.16 
(17.36) 
20.63 
(19.55) 
T-WLM 
 
10.86 
(2.54) 
5.57 
(2.12) 
I-VCM 
 
14.69 
(5.79) 
14.69 
(5.97) 
 
Contrary to Feri et al (2010), Figure 2.1 shows that teams do not outperform individuals in this 
setting. Individuals exert higher efforts than teams in the WLM (26.16 versus 10.86) and in the 
VCM environment (14.69 vs 10.86). More importantly, provision is significantly lower in the 
T-WLM than in the other two conditions (20.63 and 14.69 for individuals vs 5.57 for teams); 
being differences significant at the 1% and 10%, respectively (using to the Wilcoxon-Mann-
                                                
38 Complete instructions (translated from Spanish) are available in the appendix A.2.1. 
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Whitney test, with only one observation per group). Table 2.2 confirms these findings through 
different panel data estimations. 
Table 2.2: Contribution and Provision Estimations  
 Contribution Provision 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 1st round All rounds 1st round All rounds 
T-WLM -3.838 -3.830** -10.60*** -9.127*** 
 (2.387) (1.809) (2.375) (1.744) 
I-WLM 8.987*** 11.47* -9.263** 5.935 
 (2.515) (6.021) (4.018) (6.462) 
Period -- -0.564*** -- -0.378*** 
  (0.0695)  (0.0953) 
Constant 21.60*** 20.61*** 21.60*** 18.66*** 
 (1.929) (1.880) (1.985) (2.064) 
I-WLM vs T-WLM 12.82*** 15.50*** 1.33 15.06** 
 (2.14) (5.86) (3.73) (6.29) 
Observations 208 4,160 32 640 
R-squared 0.112 0.1856 0.319 0.214 
Number of subjects 208 208 32 32 
Note: the dependent variable in regressions 1 and 2 is the individual contribution, and in 
regressions 3 and 4 is the public good provision. Standard errors are clustered by group and the 
regressions control for random effects at individual level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. We use the lincom post-estimation test to calculate differences 
between the I-WLM and the T-WLM coefficients.  
 
The dependent variable in regressions 1 and 2 is the individual contribution to the group 
account, and in regressions 3 and 4 the group provision. The regressions report one observation 
per decision-maker (individual or team) and include random effects at the level of the decision 
maker and clustered standard errors at the group level. 
Table 2.2 confirms that teams do not do better than individuals. Whereas in the first round 
(Model 1) effort (or contribution) in I-WLM is higher than in I-VCM, T-WLM is not 
significantly above the I-VCM and it is significantly below the I-WLM by a massive margin of 
12.82 endowment units. Across the 20 rounds (Model 2), T-WLM does significantly worse than 
I-VCM and I-WLM, and the differences between I-WLM and I-VCM are only marginally 
significant, even when the magnitude of the difference (and the coefficient) goes up; we will 
come to this below. 
 
Differences observed in provision in the first round (Model 3) come from the WLM SCF 
complex strategic environment. Provision is significantly and substantially lower in the I-WLM 
and T-WLM than in the I-VCM in the first round; interestingly, no significant differences are 
observed between I-WLM and T-WLM in the first round. Model 4 suggests that, once all 
rounds are included, that teams have a negative effect on the provision levels, but the provision 
of individuals’ treatments are not significantly different to each other.  
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By inspection, Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1 suggested that the I-WLM exhibited a much higher 
dispersion than in the other two treatments. Table 2.2 shows that the coefficient capturing 
differences in contributions between I-WLM and I-VCM go up, as well as its standard 
deviation. Maybe not surprisingly, this larger dispersion could be linked to the very different 
occurrence of symmetric contribution profiles: while individuals coordinate in one equilibrium 
35% of the times in the I-WLM condition, participants never reached a symmetric contribution 
profile in the T-WLM (more on this below). We explore the heterogeneity of results within each 
treatment in Figure 2.2 and Table 2.2 below. 
Figure 2.2: Contribution versus provision by group and treatment 
 
 
Figure 2.2 illustrates a two-dimension diagram of decisions (group contributions) on the x axe, 
and provisions on the y axe. All I-VCM groups are over the 45 degrees line (green circles), as 
by construction, every contribution to the group account counts and the average contribution 
and the provision are always identical. Solid black and hollow circles represent the I-WLM and 
the T-WLM groups, respectively. By inspection, the polarisation in I-WLM groups is apparent. 
Almost half of them are trapped in the bottom left quarter (with low contributions and low 
provision levels), while the other half manage to stay in the right and top quarter (high 
contributions and high provision levels). 
 
Figure 2.2 allows us to identify at least two interesting features of the T-WLM treatment 
performance. First, the horizontal distance between each point in Figure 2.2 and the 45-degree 
line represents a rough measure of wasted effort (in other words, how far the average 
contribution is from the average provision, or how above contributions are from the minimum). 
Before analysing this pattern more rigorously, Figure 2.2 also reveals that teams in T-WLM do 
not waste more effort than individuals in I-WLM. Second, the distribution of T-WLM dots 
overlaps with the low performance groups in I-WLM.  
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How do teams get trapped in the left-bottom space of low contribution and provision? Figures 
2.3 and 2.4 below illustrate the distribution of contributions by decisions makers across all 
periods. Beyond the massive dispersion of I-WLM (left panel), contributions to the group 
account in the T-WLM condition are more compact and exhibit a decline similar to the one 
observed in the I-VCM. Yet, they are slightly further from zero than in the other two treatments.  
 
Figure 2.3: Contribution by decision makers over time 
 
 
Figure 2.4 below confirms that individual contributions get polarised over time only in the I-
WLM, while both I-VCM and T-WLM follow similar patterns. These two figures together show 
that even when provision in round 1 is not significantly lower in teams than in individuals when 
the experiment starts, the decline and lack of success in increasing contributions starts 
immediately after. 
Figure 2.4: Distributions of individual contributions over time 
 
 
Table 2.3 documents the polarisation in the I-WLM, and how teams in the T-WLM condition 
are indistinguishable from the low performing teams in the I-WLM treatment: 
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Table 2.3: Contribution Estimation by Nash Scenario 
 (1) 
T-WLM -3.830** 
 (1.810) 
I-WLM*  
Non-Nash 9.732* 
 (5.151) 
Zero Nash 1.996 
 (4.478) 
Non-Zero Nash 21.98*** 
 (5.141) 
Period -0.556*** 
 (0.0633) 
Constant 20.54*** 
 (1.861) 
Observations 4,160 
R-squared 0.2900 
Non-Nash versus T-WLM 13.56*** 
 (4.95) 
Zero Nash versus T-WLM 5.83 
 (4.28) 
Number of subjects 208 
Note: the dependent variable in this regression is the individual contribution. The I-
WLM contributions were divided per the NE scenario they belong to. Standard errors 
are clustered by group, and the regressions control for random effects at individual 
level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. We use 
the lincom post-estimation test to calculate differences between the Non-Nash and 
Zero-Nash I-WLM and the T-WLM coefficients. 
 
In Table 2.3 we disaggregate I-WLM in three categories: not in equilibrium, zero equilibrium 
(all participants in one group contribute zero in that period) and non-zero equilibrium (all 
participants in one group contribute the same positive quantity). Two main results come up 
from this table: First, that participants in I-WLM contribute significantly more than participants 
in the T-WLM as long as they are not trapped in the zero-equilibrium; by construction, a 
symmetric profile of zero contributions is an equilibrium in all three conditions. Second, while 
I-WLM groups coordinated in zero are not significantly different to individuals in the I-VCM 
and T-WLM conditions, participants in the T-WLM still contribute significantly less than those 
in the I-VCM, probably suggesting that by seeking coordination, we have creating an underling 
mechanism pressing down the teams’ contributions, other than the individual incentive for free-
riding.  
 
In summary, when the experiment starts in round 1, the mechanisms work transparently for 
which provision is not different in the T-WLM and the I-WLM, and contribution in T-WLM 
and I-VCM are not significantly different. Polarisation starts immediately after in the I-WLM, 
and the VCM-like decline drags teams into low levels of contribution and provision. Even out 
of equilibrium, groups in the I-WLM contribute more than teams in the T-WLM condition. 
Teams fail to address the challenging environment, and following the graphical in Figure 2.2, 
we explore now to what extent wasted effort is driven by the incentives to free ride within teams 
	 57	
in the T-WLM.  We provide further evidence in the next subsection. 
 
4.2. Wasted Effort 
 
We measure wasted effort as the absolute deviation of each effort level chosen by individuals 
from the minimum in her group every period (i.e. provision). Effort is wasted because it comes 
at an individual cost and does not generate any group surplus. Following Feri et al (2010), we 
also investigate the adjustment dynamics, defined as the absolute distance between the 
individual (or team) chosen effort in a round and the group minimum in the previous round.  
Table 2.4 presents the results of three different models, being the dependent variable of models 
1 and 2 wasted effort (in round 1 and all rounds, respectively) and the dependent variable of 
model 3 the adjustment in contributions. The method is identical to the one described above in 
Table 2.3, and the regressions only include data from the I-WLM and the T-WLM treatments, 
as no wasted effort is generated in the VCM.	
 
 
Table 2.4: Wasted Effort and adjustment (I-WLM versus T-WLM) 
 Decision Makers 
 Wasted Effort Adjustment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 1st round All rounds All rounds 
T-WLM -8.045 1.974 1.289 
 (6.263) (1.858) (1.927) 
Period -- -0.304*** -0.356*** 
  (0.0668) (0.0716) 
Constant 16.11*** 8.458*** 9.792*** 
 (4.543) (1.520) (1.605) 
Observations 19 380 361 
R-squared 0.088 0.0562 0.0582 
Number of groups 19 19 19 
 
Note: the dependent variable in regressions 1 and 2 is the difference 
between the team/individual contribution and the public good provision; 
also, known as the wasted effort. The dependent variable in regression 3 is 
the difference between the current contribution and the public good 
provision in the last period namely the adjustment. Standard errors are 
clustered by group, and the regressions control for random effects at 
individual level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
Table 2.4 shows the lack of significant differences between individuals and teams for both 
wasted effort and adjustment. In other words, teams contribute less than individuals in the 
WLM SCF, but the magnitude of wasted effort generated and the adjustment process seem to be 
very similar, confirming the finding in Figure 2.2 i.e. despite the differences in contributions, 
team are only outperformed by trapped (in a bad equilibrium) individuals.   
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4.3. Conditional Contribution Adjustment 
 
Croson et al (2005) show that conditional contribution as a behavioural driving force is context 
specific. While participants react to the average contribution of others in the VCM, they react to 
the minimum in the WLM, being the average and the minimum contribution imposed by the 
team production technology. In our T-WLM treatment, the joint production of teams is 
determined by the minimum contribution made by the four decision-makers (teams), while the 
contribution of each team is the average contribution of all three team members. The conditional 
contribution pattern could set the reference point at the group (the minimum contribution made 
by any team in the group) or the team level (the average contribution in the team).  
 
The characterization of the within group dynamics goes well beyond the purely academic 
exercise, as it could help us to understand why teams fail to coordinate without forced 
consensus. 
 
Model 1 in Table 2.5 shows how decisions made by individuals (first two columns) and 
decision-makers (individuals or teams, depending on the treatment, last column) follow the 
public good provision in the previous round, using interaction terms (treatments’ dummies 
times lagged provision). The large, positive, and significant coefficients show that conditional 
cooperation is a strong behavioural force in all three treatments. 
 
As participants in the T-WLM may follow the team or the group performance, the positive 
coefficient of “T-WLM group-prov [t-1]” could be an expression of conditional contribution 
towards the group or the team. Model 2 disentangles between these two levels incorporating the 
(lagged) average contribution within the team. Results clearly indicate that individual actions 
are mainly driven by the within team dynamics: even though, they do not significantly follow 
the lagged public good provision made by the group, they are positively affected by their 
teammates behaviour. Results are confirmed by Model 3 that is a similar regression run with 
decision makers (again, the coefficient for T-WLM group-prov [t-1] is not significantly 
different from zero). In other words, by following decisions at the team rather than the group 
level, individuals are willing to either waste effort (if contributing more than other teams) or to 
drag down group performance (if contributing less).   
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Table 2.5: Conditional Contribution 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Individuals Individuals Decision Makers 
    
Period -0.420*** -0.388*** -0.464*** 
 (0.0508) (0.0527) (0.0680) 
I-WLM group-prov [t-1] 0.681*** 0.706*** 0.667*** 
 (0.0811) (0.0782) (0.0892) 
T-WLM group-prov [t-1] 0.334*** 0.0931 0.206 
 (0.0675) (0.0600) (0.146) 
T-WLM team-cont [t-1]  0.252***  
  (0.0525)  
I-VCM group-prov [t-1] 0.418*** 0.455*** 0.376*** 
 (0.0502) (0.0516) (0.0564) 
Constant 13.58*** 12.20*** 15.26*** 
 (1.084) (1.209) (1.645) 
Observations 3,952 3,952 2,242 
Number of subjects 208 208 98 
Note: the dependent variable in regressions 1 and 2 is the individual contribution. The dependent variable in 
regression 3 is the decision maker contribution (individual/team). All the explanatory variables, but the period, 
are lagged one round. Variables referring to provision are basically the group provision; those referring to team 
contribution consider the decision maker contribution in the previous round, individual or team. Standard errors 
are clustered by group, and the regressions control for random effects at individual level. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
In Table 2.6 we study positive and negative conditional contribution patterns by analysing the 
decisions’ adjustment – the difference between the current and the previous contributions, [\ −[\JU– of those whose contributions deviated from the group provision, or the team contribution 
(only for the T-WLM). The coefficients should be interpreted as the effect of the explanatory 
variables on the contribution adjustment (contribution change). We find that individuals reduce 
their contributions, make a negative adjustment, when they are above the group provision in all 
three treatments (models 1 to 4). However, when contributing below the group, individuals 
adjust up their effort levels only when making decisions individually (as in I-VCM model 1), 
and not when they are teamed up (model 4).  
 
The conditional cooperation adjustment is asymmetric in all three experimental conditions (as 
the different values of the above and below coefficients suggest). While for the I-VCM (model 
1) and the I-WLM (model 2) the results are pretty much consistent with previous empirical 
results on peer effects (Mas and Moreti, 2009; Kato and Shu, 2009, Bandiera et al 2009) i.e. 
individuals respond by adjusting their decisions towards their peers, the same logic does only 
partially hold for the teams’ condition. The coefficient of upwards adjustments is not 
significantly different from zero in the T-WLM, neither at teams or group level (models 3 and 
4).  
 
From Table 2.5 we know that individuals looked more closely their peers’ behaviour rather than 
the group performance to make decisions on their contributions. However, we find a different 
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pattern for their contribution adjustment. As model 5 in Table 2.6 suggests, when we control for 
both the team and the group reference points, downwards adjustments strongly follow the group 
(the provision), and it is only marginally affected by the team (their immediate peers). This 
probably means that teams eventually learn how their payoffs are actually determined.  If any, 
the team performance would generate a negative effect on the contribution change, reinforcing 
the tendency for teams get trapped in the bad equilibrium.  
 
Table 2.6: Conditional Contribution Adjustment 
 
Note: the dependent variable in these regressions is the difference between the contribution in the current round and the 
contribution in the previous one. The explanatory variables represent the absolute distance between the individual 
contribution and the group provision or the team contribution. The variables are divided in those who contributed above 
and below the group/team. Standard errors are clustered by group, and the regressions control for random effects at 
individual level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
4.4. Efficiency 
 
We measure now earnings in the three treatments as a synthetic indicator of the relationship 
between institutions, decisions and efficiency. As very different levels of wasted effort are 
compatible with the same contribution and provision profiles, neither contributions nor 
provision are enough to characterize efficiency in coordination games. Table 2.7 presents the 
results of three regressions in which the dependent variable is individual earnings, as defined by 
the payoff functions used in section 3. 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 I-VCM I-WLM T-WLM T-WLM T-WLM 
      
Period 0.0170 -0.351*** -0.0124 -0.0699** -0.0613** 
 (0.0302) (0.0863) (0.0231) (0.0305) (0.0279) 
Distance above group [t-1] -0.537*** -0.495***  -0.550*** -0.430*** 
 (0.106) (0.106)  (0.0346) (0.0609) 
Distance below group [t-1] 0.103**   -0.0611 0.0418 
 (0.0439)   (0.0899) (0.107) 
Distance above team [t-1]   -0.815***  -0.219* 
   (0.0742)  (0.125) 
Distance below team [t-1]   -0.0158  -0.0735* 
   (0.0338)  (0.0415) 
Constant 1.018* 5.993*** 2.360*** 3.867*** 3.846*** 
 (0.563) (1.064) (0.386) (0.521) (0.422) 
      
Observations 988 684 2,280 2,280 2,280 
Number of subjects 52 36 120 120 120 
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Table 2.7: Earnings Estimations 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 1st round All rounds All rounds 
Period -- -0.221*** -0.303*** 
  (0.0794) (0.0602) 
T-WLM -17.55*** -14.69*** -14.69*** 
 (2.441) (1.725) (1.725) 
I-WLM -27.71*** 0.131 -- 
 (6.263) (6.999)  
I-WLM *  
Non-zero Nash 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
21.41*** 
   (5.139) 
Zero Nash -- -- 0.136 
   (4.663) 
Non-Nash -- -- -7.145 
   (5.371) 
Constant 71.79*** 67.28*** 68.15*** 
 (1.945) (1.923) (1.850) 
Non-Nash versus T-WLM -- -- 7.549 
   (5.15) 
Observations 208 4,160 4,160 
R-squared 0.281 0.191 0.351 
Number of subjects 208 208 208 
Note: the dependent variable in these regressions is the individual profits per round. The I-WLM contributions were 
divided according to the NE scenario they belong to. Standard errors are clustered by group and the regressions 
control for random effects at individual level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
We use the lincom post-estimation test to calculate differences between the Non-Nash I-WLM and the T-WLM 
coefficients.  
 
Our results again depart from the ones obtained by Feri et al (2010) when comparing 
individuals and teams.  Participants in T-WLM earn significantly less than individuals in I-
WLM and I-VCM (with the only exception of the first round, in which a Lincom test shows a p-
value of 0.108 when comparing earnings in I-WLM and T-WLM). Model 3 reveals that 
participants in T-WLM teams earn less than individuals in the I-WLM condition only when they 
reach an equilibrium other than the inefficient zero-equilibrium. While Table 2.3 confirmed that 
off-equilibrium groups did contribute significantly more than teams in the T-WLM condition, 
Table 2.7 suggest that they do not earn more, due to the efficiency losses associated with an off-
equilibrium position.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
These results together support the observation that institutions are critical to assure better 
performed teams.  In Feri et al (2010), when teams needed to reach consensus, teams 
significantly outperformed individuals in effort levels, earnings, and wasted efforts.  In our 
study, when consensus was absent from the process of team decision-making, teams contributed 
and earned less but did not necessarily miss-coordinate more. Across all rounds, participants in 
the T-WLM contributed less than in the I-VCM but just as much as I-WLM coordinated in zero.  
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The pivotal and innovative paper of Feri et al (2010) combines two important but previously 
independent streams of literature:  coordination games and team decision-making.  They show 
convincingly that when team members are forced to reach consensus on their effort decisions, 
teams outperform individuals. However, the reliance on consensus seems an important one.  We 
report results on a similar weakest-link game using both teams and individuals but without 
requiring consensus on the part of the teams.  We find the opposite result as Feri et al (2010):  
without consensus teams do worse than individuals.  
 
In our setting teams do not necessarily waste more efforts than individuals. They get trapped 
hanging around the bad equilibrium, probably because of the free riding incentives, their 
inability to make upward adjustments, or the combination of both. Even though extensive 
previous research demonstrates that communication helps coordination (e.g. Russell Cooper et 
al. 1992, Gary Charness 2000, John Duffy and Nick Feltovich 2002, Andreas Blume and 
Andreas Ortmann), these papers typically examine communication between the coordinating 
parties (here, the groups of four [or five] teams or individuals) rather than communication 
within the decision-maker (the team or the individual).  In our study, neither teams nor 
individuals engaged in explicit communication.  We replace communication with an 
aggregation rule i.e. the average of the teammates contributions. While it could be reprehensible 
that teammates do not get any communication, it is also quite implausible that they would 
consult other team members in the precise moment where the action is taking place. Any 
interaction between teammates might come either before or after the decision-making moment. 
 
Another matter is whether the lack of explicit communication affects or not the behaviour in the 
individual treatments.  In strategic settings, a few papers have used a “think-aloud” protocol in 
order to gain insight into the decision-making process, although they generally do not directly 
compare decision-making outcomes with and without self-communication (e.g. Uri Gneezy et 
al. 2007, Ondrej Rydval et al. 2009, Monica Capra 2009).  However, two recent papers 
demonstrate differences in decision-making in games when individual players are required to 
explicitly communicate with themselves.39 Bjorn Frank (2009) examines the impact of enforced 
reflection in different games by asking subjects to write a message to themselves. He finds that 
self-communication significantly increases the probability of winning in beauty contest games, 
the amount given in the solidarity game and the proportion of equitable offers in ultimatum 
games. Scott Rick and Roberto Weber (2010) report evidence on learning in different games, 
including a coordination (stag-hunt) game. They find that the effect of thinking aloud before 
                                                
39 The idea is far from new in cognitive psychology; it is associated with the ‘thinking aloud’ protocol of K. Anders 
Ericsson and Herbert Simon (1984). The intuition is that when subjects are forced to ‘talk to themselves’ about a 
problem, the solution is easier to find. Michelene Chi et al. (1994) found that participants who communicate aloud 
with themselves were able to perform better in a variety of individual decision-making settings. For example, 
Elizabeth Jefferies et al. (2004), show that ‘thinking aloud’ enhances the capacity of working memory. Alexander 
Renkl et al. (1998) show that it helps subjects better calculate compound interest, Yair Neumann and Baruch Schwarz 
(1998) show that it helps subjects to solve analytic reasoning problems. 
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deciding promotes learning of the strategic nature of games, allowing for a greater transfer of 
learning across games.   
 
In summary, we believe that the question of teams and individuals in coordination decisions, 
and in economic and game-theoretic decisions more generally, is still critical and understudied.  
We hope that the results of this study highlight the importance of studying not only the 
outcomes of team versus individual decision-making, but also the process by which teams (and 
individuals) make their decisions.  Here we argue that teams outperform individuals per se. 
They require a proper combination of incentives and institutions to put the coordination 
challenge on top of the self-interested bias. Further work is required to identify other factors that 
cause teams to outperform or underperform individuals in a variety of economically relevant 
settings. 
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Chapter 4. Leadership and Team 
Performance: A Comparison between 
Northern and Southern European Soccer40  
  
                                                
40 Co-authored with: Peter Dawson, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, peter.dawson@uea.ac.uk 
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1. Introduction 
“The strength of the group is the strength of the leaders.” 
– Vince Lombardi 
 
Leadership is, according to Calvert (1992), an institution created to overcome coordination and 
cooperation problems within groups. Northouse (2001) defines it as a process whereby a group 
is influenced by an entitled individual in order to achieve a common goal. Even though leaders 
do not always have the means to enforce or to reward others’ demeanour, they have charisma 
and prestige to encourage individuals make coordinated decisions.  
 
Leaders apparently play a non-negligible role in sport teams’ performance. They are appointed 
or elected by the coach or the team members ((Gould, Hodge, Peterson, and Petlichkoff, 1987; 
Glenn and Horn; 1993) to guide the team in motivational, task-related, social and external 
aspects (Loughead et al. 2006; Fransen et al. 2014a; Fransen et al. 2014b). Studies conducted by 
Cotterill (2013), Dupuis, Bloom and Loughead (2010), Holmes, McNeil, and Adorna (2010) 
and Apitzsch (2009) have highlighted the relevance of having an effective athlete leadership to 
encourage team members and to improve the on-field experience.  
 
Besides the players’ talent, sport team production is directly affected by the team members’ 
emotions, expectations and their interaction with powerful Figures. Caliendo and Radic (2006) 
and Mechtel et al (2011) studied the motivational effect of player dismissals. Dawson et al 
(2000) estimated the effect of the interaction between team members and coaches from the 
production function perspective. Finally, several sport psychologists have approached the roles 
of the team leaders (i.e. the captain) and the team members’ perceptions (Loughead et al. 2006; 
Fransen et al. 2014a; Fransen et al. 2014b) to recognise their effects on team performance. 
Nevertheless, the actual effect of the leaders on the field on team attainments has, to our best of 
knowledge, not been previously estimated empirically.  
 
This study aims to connect our learning in both sport team production and sport psychology in 
order to disentangle the indirect effect of the regular captain on football team performance. To 
do so, information of captains’ and teams’ performance in six European leagues during 2012 – 
2015 has been collected. We studied the captain influence in a quasi-natural experiment 
environment in which the presence or absence of the captain, due to a red card, is assumed as an 
exogenous event. A combination of econometric methods and the methodological manipulation 
of a natural experiment allowed us to recognise whether the presence (absence) of the captain 
enhances (reduces) team performance.   
 
We find that home teams in Southern leagues (Ligue 1, Serie A and La Liga) appear to benefit 
from dismissed away captains. No such result however is found for Northern leagues (Premier, 
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Bundesliga and Eredivisie). Our results for non-captains suggest that red cards typically reduce 
team performance (Ridder et al 1994; Bar-Eli et al 2006) and, contrary to Carmichael and 
Thomas (2005), we find that this negative effect is not necessarily smaller for away teams. Our 
results are also consistent with Caliendo and Radic (2006) and Mechtel et al (2011), in that 
controlling for the time to go, red cards do not always have the negative expected effect on the 
away team performance. When issued to the away team, red cards can increase the team morale 
and reduce the goal difference.  
 
The remaining of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section describes the relevant 
literature on the determinants of sport team production and team performance, as well as the 
role of leadership in sports. A background of Northern and Southern European leagues is also 
provided in the third section. The fourth section describes the methodology. The fifth section 
illustrates the econometric approach and the results. Section six concludes.  
 
2. Related Literature 
 
We focus on the literature linked to sport team production function and the effect red card on 
teams performance, on one hand; and the effect of leadership on teams’ performance, on the 
other. 
 
v Sporting Production Literature 
The seminal contribution of the idea of a sporting production function was introduced by Scully 
(1974) and followed by several authors that have estimated the production function in different 
sports such as baseball, basketball, American football, cricket, rugby and football (Zech, 1981; 
Scott et al., 1979; Atkinson et al., 1988; Schofield, 1988; Carmichael and Thomas, 1995; 
Carmichael et al. 2000; Carmichael et al 2001; Lee and Berri, 2008).  
 
These studies analyse sport teams as firms or market organisations41. As such, they study the 
marginal and joint effects of a set of the inputs (players, talent, abilities, managers, etc.) on the 
generation of outputs (goals, tournaments, points, ranks, etc.). Over time, the production 
function studies in football have significantly improved in quality after the appearance of Opta 
Index, which has provided access to match-based data (Carmichael et al 2000; Carmichael et al 
2001) such as individual playing talents, and the players’ ability to win duels, recover the ball, 
                                                
41 Another approach to the production process in sport teams is the frontier analysis, which directly studies the 
production factors’ efficiency (Porter and Scully, 1982; Dawson et al 2000). Dawson et al (2000) model and estimate 
the indirect coaching effect on team performance by including ex-ante measures of the playing talent. By 
implementing time-variant and time-invariant procedures, the authors found that coaching efficiency is not strongly 
correlated with team outcomes, but it has more to do with the playing talent. They conclude suggesting that coaching 
evaluation should be mediated by the outcomes obtained relative to the available playing talent. 
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attack, defend and finally to score42. The interactions of both playing talents and player’s actions 
have been also included in the analysis of the determinants of team performance.   
 
Carmichael et al (2000), for instance, estimated the production function for English Premier 
League using match-performance as the unit of observation. Their estimation lies on the 
assumption that the production function is linearly explained by the production factors, which 
are the play and team characteristics. They utilise the goals difference as outcome variable and 
found that while players’ effectiveness to attack positively affects the goals difference, 
indiscipline and pressure on the field (red cards and send-offs decisions) have a negative effect.  
 
Carmichael et al (2001) studied the efficiency and inefficiency sources of match plays for the 20 
Premier League clubs in the 1997 to 1998 season by computing residual-based models. The 
authors estimated models for the cumulated points by the end of the league, the goals conceded, 
the goals scored and ball possession. The residuals of those estimations were ranked and utilised 
as proxies for the relative efficiency of the 20 Premiership clubs by calculating the difference 
between the estimated and the true values for each club. The computation of the residuals 
showed that the ball possession might increase team efficiency as it reduces the chances of the 
opposition to score and increase the probabilities to attack. However, whereas possession is the 
basic determinant of goals, it does not determine team output. It is the players’ skills and their 
team-working relationships what determines teams’ efficiency and their ability to convert 
opportunities into goals.  
 
Findings regarding the impact of red cards have been controversial. Ridder et al (1994) analyse 
matches of the Eredivisie League (Dutch league) from 1989 to 1992 by estimating and 
comparing the results of both a time-homogeneous Poisson model and an OLS regression. Bar-
Eli et al (2006) conducted an analysis of the effect of players’ dismissals on team performance 
in German football clubs between 1963 and 2003. Non-parametric statistics as well as 
Multinomial logistic regressions were used to estimate regression weights and the odds ratios of 
red-card related variables and the match outcomes.  These two studies found that red cards 
always have a negative effect on the punished team performance43. The later study also suggests 
that, relative to the away team, home teams might have a natural advantage as their probability 
of receiving a red card is lower, and therefore are less likely to get trapped in the behavioural 
downward spiral of crisis. 
 
Carmichael and Thomas (2005), Caliendo and Radic (2006), Merchtel et al (2011) found that 
the impact of a dismissal is not necessarily the same for home and away teams. Carmichael and 
                                                
42 We also rely on betting data as they provide a good proxy for team quality. 
43 the effect of match score, the team to which the red card was issued, and the time interval the card was issued on 
immediate (i.e. first goal after the issue of the card) and final match outcomes 
	 68	
Thomas (2005) estimated a match-based production function by using cross-sectional data for 
380 matches of 20 English Premiership clubs. The authors estimate linear regressions of the 
goals scored and shots at goal for both home and away teams. While red cards are always 
detrimental for English teams’ performance, away teams are better at accommodating their 
strategy after a player dismissal. Thus, the effect of a red card is stronger for home than away 
teams.  
 
Caliendo and Radic (2006) used World Cup data between 1930 and 2002, following Ridder et al 
(1994). Their econometric strategy consisted of a conditional maximum likelihood estimation in 
which they obtained the impact of a red card on the punished team by looking at the difference 
between goals scored before and after a red card. Red cards negatively affect team performance, 
but if issued after the first half of the match, teams do not necessarily do worse.  
 
Merchtel et al (2011) analyse the German Bundesliga from 1999 to 2009 by implementing both, 
a goals-based (goal difference) and a result-based (win, draw and lose categories) approach. 
They found that although red cards issued against home teams dramatically reduces their 
chances of winning, late dismissals of away teams’ players (issued after the 70th minute) might 
have a positive motivational effect on the away team.  
 
Finally, Lago-Peñas et al (2016) carried out a descriptive analysis of 75 matches of the top-five 
professional football leagues in the 2015/2016 season44. They calculated a set of relative indexes 
regarding the team performance (ball possession, shots, total passes, long passes, short passes, 
successful passes, touches and defence) before and after a red card was issued. They found that 
while the disadvantaged team reduces performance in all dimensions, the advantaged team 
improves in all areas except for defence. 
  
                                                
44 Premier League (n=9), French Ligue 1 (n=16), Spanish La Liga (n=19), Italian Serie A (n=21) and German 
Bundesliga (n=10)  
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v Team Leader Effect 
The studies identified above look at team performance and player dismissal in general. Analyses 
on the team leader have generally been conducted in psychology studies by implementing 
survey methods. Sport psychologists have expanded these analyses to show that professional 
team members are not behaviourally immune leadership on the field.  
 
According to Northouse (2001) leadership is "a process whereby an individual influences a 
group of individuals to achieve a common goal". Coaches have positively valued this 
motivational effect, and this is the reason why formal leader (i.e., captains) elections or 
appointments are carried on (Gould, Hodge, Peterson, and Petlichkoff, 1987; Glenn and Horn; 
1993).  
 
Loughead et al (2006) studied how rugby, football, field lacrosse, volleyball, field hockey, ice 
hockey and basketball team members play a leadership role. Roles were categorised in task 
(tactics, individual responsibilities, goal focus), social (harmony, communication, support) and 
external (promotion, needs representation). Team members were asked to list the team leaders 
fitting within the three categories and they also participated in a two-waves-survey study. The 
authors found that both captains and regular teammates are sources of leadership, and formal 
leaders (e.g., captains) were more likely to be identified as team leaders by their teammates.  
 
Fransen et al. (2014a) have pointed out that motivational leadership should be acknowledged as 
a distinct role besides the other three already mentioned by Loughead et al (2006) (task, social 
and external). They conducted an online survey asking both coaches and players to allocate 
within each of the four leadership categories the one team player that best fit in each role. 1,258 
coaches and 3,193 players within nine different team sports in Flanders (Belgium) participated 
in the survey (i.e., basketball, volleyball, soccer, handball, netball, hockey, rugby, water polo, 
and ice hockey). In contrast to Loughead et al (2006), the authors found that 44% of the 
participants did not perceive their captain as the principal leader on any of the four roles, and 
they explained this result by claiming that instead of being experts just at one role, leaders 
should comply with a combination of characteristics that allow them to exercise their 
leadership.  
 
Fransen et al. (2014b) used the same study described above to understand the effect of 
leadership on group/team identity. They examined the quality of the four athlete leader 
categories (i.e., the task, motivational, social, and external leader) and explored the impact of 
athlete leaders’ quality on collective efficacy (team members’ shared belief in their conjoint 
ability to achieve an outcome) and team outcome confidence (group’s shared belief of their 
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ability to outperform the opposition and to obtain a goal). The authors utilised a Structural 
Equation Modelling (SEM) with AMOS to connect the leadership quality and group identity 
with the both kinds of team identity variables (efficacy perception and confidence).  They 
concluded that both formal and informal leaders play an important role in team performance as 
they can optimize teams’ collective efficacy and team outcome confidence.  
 
We are aware that formal and informal leaders normally coexist within teams. However, here 
we study the effect of formal leadership on team performance i.e. the regular (first) captain. We 
are interested in disentangling and estimating the effect of the regular captain on match 
outcomes. Our main assumption is that besides their own performance, captains play a 
behavioural role that affects the performance of team partners (Gould, Hodge, Peterson, and 
Petlichkoff, 1987; Glenn and Horn; 1993). Moreover, even though captains are not entitled to 
make tactic decisions and they have no voice to recruit or include players in a match, their role 
is still prominent with respect to the other team members. As a matter of fact, there is always 
one captain on the field who has been elected or appointed by the coach or the team.  
 
Empirical studies looking at the impact of the captain on team performance on the field are rare. 
The majority of these studies are survey-based analyses focused on the effect of leadership on 
team members’ perceptions. To complement these, this chapter focuses on the effect of formal 
leadership on football teams’ performance. We use an adaptation of the sport production 
function methodology in an attempt to disentangle the effect of the regular team captain on team 
performance. Our analysis differs conceptually with respect the team coach leadership in that 
captains are horizontally positioned regarding other on-the-field players, but are vertically 
different in terms of status. We depart from studies already carried out by sport psychologist in 
that we use actual team outcomes rather than individual perceptions.   
 
3. Northern and Southern Leagues Background 
 
We acknowledge that leadership is an attribute that can vary across cultures and regions. 
Therefore, we included a geographical dimension into ours. We consider six European football 
leagues, including the top five leagues in the UEFA ranking for club competition, and the 
Netherlands (currently ranked 13 in the same list). The geographical location of those leagues is 
illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 Southern and Northern Leagues Geographical Distribution 
 
i. Northern Leagues (in green): The Premier 
League (1. England and Whales), Bundesliga (2. 
Germany) and Eredivisie (3. The Netherlands).  
ii. Southern Leagues (in yellow): Serie A (4. Italy), 
Ligue 1 (5. France) and La Liga (6. Spain). 
 
In the Northern leagues, there is one main club that accounts for approximately half of the 
trophies since the League foundation (Manchester United, Ajax and Bayern Munich). In 
Southern leagues, there are typically more than one star clubs. However, by looking at the 
distribution of the trophies, some heterogeneity in terms of the teams’ quality is observed: the 
Ligue 1 awards are pretty much distributed between 19 clubs; 79% of the Serie A awards have 
been earned by 3 teams (Juventus, Inter de Milan and Milan); and 64% of the La Liga 
tournaments were earned by two teams (the Real Madrid and Barcelona) (See Table 3.1 for 
more details). 
 
European Leagues operate within a meritocracy (“open” leagues) compared to the American 
sports which operate closed leagues. Relegations are automatic for the three-least-ranked clubs 
playing in the Premier League, but the promotion is only automatic for the top two clubs in the 
Football League Championship. Promotion and relegation (P/R) is automatic for two clubs in 
the Bundesliga (a the 2. Bundesliga) and one club in the Eredivisie (and the Eerste Divisie). In 
Southern Leagues P/R is automatic for three teams, except for La Liga in which the promotion 
is automatic just for two teams. In all leagues, non-automatic P/R is determined after a series of 
play-offs with top clubs competing in the second division. 
Football clubs/leagues operate in very different economic and social environment. Northern 
leagues receive 15% more revenues from broadcasting than the Southern leagues, and the 
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relative attendance to football matches is over 45% higher in the north.  Thus, we can state that 
Northern leagues face larger levels of social “pressure” (See Table 3.1 for more details)45. 
 
Financially, Northern leagues receive 24% more revenues and pay 12% more to their players 
than Southern leagues. Moreover, both revenue and wages seem to be more unequal within the 
Northern leagues (headed by the English Premier League) than within the Southern ones (see 
Table 3.1). 
 
Northern tournaments have increased in popularity relative to Southern contests for two main 
reasons: wide broadcasting and football quality. The Premier League is one of the most popular 
football events in the world, not only because it is competitive, but also because it is very well 
broadcasted around the world. The Bundesliga is one of the most-supported leagues and 
perceived as a teamwork spectacle in which players are well paced and are always ready to 
exercise more physical pressure on the opposition; or as they call it, ‘gegenpressing'. The Dutch 
football clubs have developed a style that mixes up the triangular-ball flow to elevate the rate of 
ball possession, with the German 'gegenpressing' to keep a fluent and permanent attack on the 
opposition. In general, Northern teams’ styles consist of attacking, keeping possession and 
overwhelming the other team with numbers on the offence. It is not necessarily a stylish 
strategy, but it is efficient and effective.  
 
Northern and Southern leagues share similar players’ formation on the field, but they exhibit 
different philosophies in teams style. The 4-4-2 formation is the most popular across clubs. 
Other systems such as the 3-5-2 and the 4-3-3 tend to be more popular in Northern leagues 
(especially in German and Dutch leagues) as they engage in a more aggressive, effective, fast 
and organised style.  
Southern leagues appear to be more confident with the ball, good dribblers, and innovative. 
However, there are not many style elements in common between them. Firstly, The Italian clubs 
are perceived very cautious with respect to attacking strategies; thus, the Serie A is one of the 
lower scoring leagues in Europe. It also presents a declining pattern that has been attributed to 
the lack of competition after becoming a 20-teams contest (as it used to be 16-teams 
tournament) and the doping and referee corruption scandals. Secondly, la Liga is one of the 
main exponents of the Tiki-taka game. It is possession oriented and technically impressive. 
                                                
45 The effect of the crowd on referees’ behaviour has been studied in sports psychology. Nevil et al (2002) found that 
relative to matches in silence, referees viewing the challenges with background crowd noise were more uncertain in 
their decision making and tend to issue significantly fewer fouls (15.5%) against the home team. Downward and 
Jones (2007) studied the effect of the crowd size and found a non-linear and negative correlation between the crowd 
size and the probability of a yellow card being awarded against the home team. Thus, we cannot rule out that social 
exposure is also affecting teams’ performance. 
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Nevertheless, the financial inequality between the Spanish clubs have induced to a quality 
imbalance. Thus, there are only two teams that concentrate the best players and awards i.e. the 
Real Madrid and the FC Barcelona; situation that has probably weaken the Spanish football 
audience. Finally, the French league, Ligue 1, lacks a general attribute that describes the league 
style. It seems, however, that French football clubs are lately emphasising more on physical 
strength rather than on technical quality.  
 
Table 3.1 Southern and Northern League’s Characteristics 
Leagues Premier Bundesliga Eredivisie Serie A Ligue 1  La Liga 
Foundation  1992 1962 1956 1929 1932 1927 
Promotion and 
relegation 3 2 + 1 1 + 2 3 3 3 
Clubs 20 18 18 20 20 20 
Matches per team 38 34 34 38 38 38 
Broadcasting 
revenue46 £1.97b £0.69b  £0.07b £0.94b £0.51b  £0.86b 
League revenues £3.77b £2.06b £0.15b £1.54b £1.20b £1.80b 
Average player 
wage a year47 
£2.3m 
 
£1.5m 
 £0.2m 
£1.3m 
 
£1m 
 
£1.2m 
 
Average 
attendance48 36,461 43,300 19,387 22,162 20,896 28,568 
Attendance per 
100 thousand 
inhabitants 
68.8 52.7 114.0 36.5 31.3 61.5 
Seasons 23 53 59 86 83 88 
Competing teams 47 54 53 66 76 60 
 
Notes: The Premier League was created by the Football League First Division to break away 
from the Football League, which was founded in 1888.  The system of promotion and relegation 
of the Premier League exists between the Premier League and the Football League 
Championship. The three lowest placed teams in Premier League are relegated to the Football 
League Championship, and the top two teams from the Football League Championship 
promoted to Premier League, with an additional club promoted after a series of play-offs 
involving the third, fourth, fifth and sixth placed clubs.  
The Bundesliga was initially called the Oberliga DFV and it was created in 1958. For the 
promotion and relegation, the bottom two finishers in the Bundesliga are automatically 
relegated to the 2. Bundesliga, with the top two in the 2. Bundesliga taking their places. The 
third-bottom club in the Bundesliga will play a two-legged tie with the third-place team from 
the 2. Bundesliga, with the winner taking up the final place in the following season's Bundesliga 
In the Eredivisie, the club at the bottom is automatically relegated to the second level of the 
Dutch league system, the Eerste Divisie (First Division). At the same time, the champion of 
the Eerste Divisie will be automatically promoted to the Eredivisie. The next two clubs from the 
bottom of the Eredivisie go to separate promotion/relegation play-offs. The play-offs are played 
in two groups. Each group has one Eredivisie club and three high-placed clubs from the Eerste 
Divisie. 
                                                
46 According to the Deloitte UK annual footbal finance report (2016), other sources or revenues are the Matchday 
tickets, sponsorship and comercial, and other commercial activities. Figures are presented in billions. 
47 The average wage was obtained from https://fourfourthreefootball.wordpress.com/2014/11/14/average-salaries-
from-major-world-football-leagues-revealed/. Figures are reported in millions.  
48 This information corresponds to the average attendance in the 2015 season according to the European Football 
Statistics Web Site.	
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The relegation in the Italian, French and Spanish leagues work similarly i.e. The three lowest-
placed teams are relegated to Serie B, Ligue 2 and the Segunda División, respectively. The 
promotion works a bit different. Whilst the French league directly promotes the tow three 
teams, the Spanish and the Italian leagues directly promote the top two and create a play-offs 
tournament to decide the third promotion. 
 
4. Methodology 
 
We estimate the effect of the regular captain on team outcomes of six European Football 
leagues. We understand that the marginal and collective contribution of players to team 
performance is not trivial. However, football matches can be exploited as a quasi-natural-field 
experiment that provides with sufficient information to disentangle the effect of any particular 
player, including the captain, on team performance. 
 
In an absolute controlled environment, we would evaluate the effect of the absence of the 
captain relative to the effect of the absence of an equally productive player. Yet, this 
information requires a sophistication that is beyond the available dataset. Instead, we evaluate 
the effect on team outcomes of a red card issued to the captain relative to the effect of a red card 
issued to another player.  
 
Even though one could argue that red cards are the result of a series of endogenous interactions, 
they are statistically clean events that exogenously change the match conditions, and there are 
not reasons to make ex-ante (before the match) beliefs regarding players’ dismissal.  To make 
this study comparable with other references estimating the red card effect, and to more closely 
respond to our research question, we estimate the effect of the regular captain dismissal on team 
relative to other players’ dismissals. 49 
 
We collected data from specialised sources that are in turn based on the Opta database (i.e., 
Squawka.com and football-data.co.uk). We merged information relative to the match results, 
red cards, captain absences and the match odds for three seasons (2012-2013, 2013-2014 and 
2014-2015) of the six top European leagues that accounts for 144 teams, 6,328 matches i.e. 
12,656 individual teams’ performances. These leagues are: the Premier League (England), La 
Liga (Spain), Serie A (Italy), Eredivisie (Netherlands), the Bundesliga (Germany) and Ligue 1 
(France).  
In our dataset, observations are matches in which two teams A and B played against each other. 
To identify the red card effect, we control for time-invariant differences between matches that 
                                                
49	Injuries and substitutions of the captain, before and during the match, did not report significant effects on team 
performance. Results are available in Table 3.12 in the Appendix A.3.4	
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might be constant within seasons and leagues. That is why we implement fixed effect 
estimations in which the home-team is used as the panel variable. 50  
 
Prior studies that have analysed the impact of red cards have not assessed the role of the player 
being dismissed (apart from the playing position). We start with a simple model to compare the 
red card effect among European leagues divided by regions i.e. north and south. We control for 
team quality, season and the home team. 
 
The following equation describes the functional relationship of the goal difference and the 
covariates:  ghi =	∝U	+∝. klmni +	∝Z ko[i +	∝T D[[i +	∝p ko[?i +∝q Do[?i+	∝r ,s^tun + vi                            
          (1) 
Each match l is considered an observation. GDl represents the goal difference in match l. 
Although we focus the analysis on the goal difference as the main dependent variable, similar 
results are reported in the appendix A.3.3 in which regressions for the number of goals in a 
bivariate ordered Probit are presented.  Hwinl is a continuous variable that collects the average 
of the home team winning probability extracted from the odds provided by Ladbrokes, William 
Hill and Bet Brain. It is used as a proxy for the expected team performance.  ko[i and Do[i are 
dummy variables representing the red card event for both home and away teams, respectively. ko[?i and Do[?i are continuous variables representing the time to go after the red cards for 
home and/or away teams, if any, were issued. vl is the error term (the estimation results are 
displayed in Table 3.7).  
 
The second step consists of breaking down the red card effect into captain and non-captain. The 
regressions keep the same format as in (1). Nevertheless, this time we include new variables 
relative to the captain performance and his role in the team, which will allow us to estimate a 
cleaner effect on the goal difference. Equation 2 describes the functional relationship between 
the dependent and the independent variables: 
 ghi =	∝U	+∝. klmni +	∝Z k[o[i +	∝T D[o[i +	∝p kwo[i +∝q Dwo[i +∝r k[o[?i +∝x D[o[?i +∝y kwo[?i +∝Uz Dwo[?i +∝UU k[@{i +∝U. D[@{i +	∝UZ k[@@ +∝UT D[@@+		∝Up kw@@ +∝Uq Dw@@ +	∝Ur ,s^tun + vi   (2) 
 
HCRCl  and ACRCl  are dummy variables that take the value of one  if the home or the away 
captain received a red card, 0 otherwise, respectively. HORCl  and AORCl follow exactly the 
same logic, but now it takes the value of one if a non-captain player received the red card. 
                                                
50 Housman tests comparing random and fixed effects were conducted. The test suggests that the fixed effect 
estimation suits best for the data and the estimation purposes. We also estimate a bivariate probit model as robustness 
check. The results are in general consistent and are available in Table 3.11 in the Appendix A.3.3. 
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HCRCTl , ACRCTl , HORCTl and AORCTl  represent the time to go after the red cards were 
issued. The former two are related to the cards issued against the captains, and the latter two are 
related to non-captain players. HCPMl  and ACPMl  are continuous variables of the time played 
by the home and away captains. Finally, HCPPl, ACPPl, HOPPl, AOPPl are vectors of three 
dummy variables for the home and away captain (as for the former two) and non-captain (as for 
the latter two) playing position, being goalkeeper the baseline (Table 3.7 for more details). 
 
The third and last step consists of including individuals’ attributes that might differentiate 
Southern and Northern captain selection such as seniority (age) or nationality. 51 We estimated 
the following model: 
 gh\ =	∝U	+∝. klmni +	∝Z k[o[i +	∝T D[o[i +	∝p kwo[	i +∝q Dwo[i +∝r k[o[?i +∝x D[o[?i +∝y kwo[?i +∝Uz Dwo[?i +∝UU k[@{i +∝U. D[@{i +	∝UZ k[@@ +∝UT D[@@+∝Up kw@@ +∝Uq Dw@@+	∝Ur k|w[D| +∝Ux D|w[D| +∝Uy kDg} +∝.z DDg} +∝.U k[o[i ∗ k|w[D| +∝.. k[o[i ∗ kDg} +∝.Z D[o[i ∗ D|w[D| +∝.T D[o[i ∗ DDg} +	∝.p ,s^tun + vi                                 (3) 
 k|w[D|i and D|w[D|i are dummy variables for home and away teams that take the value of 1 
if the nationality of the captain coincides with the league country. kDg}i and	DDg}i are 
continuous variables for the home and away captain age. 
 
Table 3.2 presents the variables from the equations with a short description for each of them. In 
the third and fourth columns, we provide the code used in the estimations and the prior 
(expected) effect, respectively. 
  
                                                
51	Other variables such us charisma, market value and moral solvency would be interested to include in a follow up of 
this study	
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Table 3.2 Variables’ Definitions 
Variable Name Definition Code Expected 
Goal Difference It is the difference between the home and the away teams’ 
score. It is the main dependent variable.  
GD --- 
    
Home team 
winning 
probability 
Calculated by using the average of the odds reported by 
Ladbrokes, William Hill and Bet Brain: (h_odd_av-
1)/h_odd_av 
h_win_pro
b 
+ 
    
Home team red 
card 
Dummy variable that takes de value of 1 if, or a given match, 
a red card is issued to the home team and 0 otherwise. 
home_red - 
Away team red 
card 
Dummy variable that takes de value of 1 if, for a given 
match, a red card is issued to the away team and 0 otherwise. 
away_red + 
    
Remaining time 
home red card 
Time to go after the home team has received a red cart.  home_red
_time 
+ 
    
Remaining time 
away red card 
Time to go after the away team has received a red cart.  away_red_
time 
- 
    
Home captain 
red card  
This variable takes the value of one if the red card was issued 
to the home team captain.  
home_capt
_red 
- 
    
Away captain 
red card  
This variable takes the value of one if the red card was issued 
to the away team captain.  
away_capt
_red 
+ 
    
Home non-
captain red card  
This variable takes the value of one if the red card was issued 
to a non-captain of the home team.  
home_noc
apt_red 
_ 
    
Away non-
captain red card  
This variable takes the value of one if the red card was issued 
to a non-captain of the away team. 
away_noc
apt_red 
+ 
    
Time to go 
home captain 
red card 
Time to go after the home team captain has received a red 
cart.  
home_capt
_red_time 
+ 
    
Time to go away 
captain red card 
Time to go after the away team captain has received a red 
cart.  
away_capt
_red_time 
_ 
    
Time to go 
home non-
captain red card 
Time to go after the home team non-captain has received a 
red cart.  
home_noc
apt_red_ti
me 
+ 
    
Time to go away 
non-captain red 
card 
Time to go after the away team non-captain has received a 
red cart.  
away_noc
apt_red_ti
me 
- 
    
Home captain 
played time 
Minutes played by the regular captain of the home team. home_capt
_time 
+ 
    
Away captain 
played time 
Minutes played by the regular captain of the away team. away_capt
_time 
- 
    
Home captain 
local 
Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the home 
captain nationality corresponds to the league nationality. 
home_loca
l_capt 
+/- 
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Home red-
carded captain 
local 
Interaction term of home_local_capt & home_capt_red home_capt
_local_red 
+/- 
    
Away captain 
local 
Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the away 
captain nationality corresponds to the league nationality. 
away_loca
l_capt 
+/- 
    
Away red-
carded captain 
local 
Interaction term of away_local_capt & away_capt_red away_capt
_red_local 
+/- 
    
Home captain 
age 
Home captain age at the beginning of a given season home_capt
_age 
+/- 
    
Home red-
carded captain 
age 
Interaction term of home_capt_age & home_capt_red home_capt
_red_age 
+/- 
    
Away captain 
age 
Away captain age at the beginning of a given season away_capt
_age 
+/- 
    
Away red-
carded captain 
age 
Interaction term of away_capt_age & away_capt_red away_capt
_red_age 
+/- 
    
Home captain 
defender 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the home captain 
plays a defender position and 0 otherwise 
home_capt
_defender 
+/- 
    
Home captain 
forward 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the home captain 
plays a forward position and 0 otherwise 
home_capt
_forward 
+/- 
    
Home captain 
midfield 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the home captain 
plays a midfield position and 0 otherwise 
home_capt
_midfield 
+/- 
    
Away captain 
defender 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the away captain 
plays a defender position and 0 otherwise 
away_capt
_defender 
+/- 
    
Away captain 
forward 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the away captain 
plays a forward position and 0 otherwise 
away_capt
_forward 
+/- 
    
Away captain 
midfield 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the away captain 
plays a midfield position and 0 otherwise 
away_capt
_midfield 
+/- 
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5. Results 
 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
There are 88 teams that participated in all three seasons’ championships; 30 were present in two 
seasons, and 26 appeared in a single season. As presented in Table 3.3, home teams score 
significantly more goals than away teams (1.45 vs. 1.13 goals), are less likely to receive a red 
card (9.8% vs 13.1%) and their expected probability of winning is significantly higher (45.8% 
vs. 29.1%). These general statistics support the home advantage hypothesis that has been 
broadly studied in sport economics (Boudreaux et al 2015; Lago-Peñas et al 2016). 52 
Additionally, the proportion of red cards issued to captains, and their played time with and 
without expulsion, is not significantly different between home and away teams. 
 
Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics of home and away teams 
 
Home Away t-test (p-value) 
Goals 1.451802 1.130057 0.0000 
 
(0.0133254) (0.0127121)  
Winning probability  0.4581226 0.2910872 0.0000 
 
(0. 4982826) (0 .4542995)  
Red cards 0.0979772 0.1314791 0.0000 
 0.3148639 0.3627619  
Captain red cards  0.0063211 0.0075853 0.3922 
 
(0.07926) (0.0867697)  
Non-captain red cards  0 .0916561 0.1238938 0.0000 
 
(0.3040321) (0.3539984)  
Captain played time (minutes) 57.72685 56.59246 0.1360 
 (42.45859) (40.99365)  
Captain red card time (minutes) 64.925 61.5 0.4959 
 (20.96932) (25.23254)  
Non-captain red card time (minutes) 65.54159 65.42319 0.9283 
 (22.98855) (22.35102)  
Note: we represent means and standard deviation in parenthesis. 
 
As Table 3.4 indicates, 80% of matches did not involve red cards. Complementary, 1,367 red 
cards were issued across the three seasons and the six leagues, 88 of those were delivered to a 
captain (6.4%). In general, away teams account for 57% of the dismissals and the distribution of 
red cards issued to home and away teams is significantly different according to the Fischer 
Exact Test (p-value = 0.000). This result goes in line with Thomas et al (2006) and Glamser 
(1990) who found that the home team crowd might affect officials’ judgement in favour to the 
home team, which in turn leads to aggressive acts from the away team.   
                                                
52 Lago-peñas et al (2016) found that home teams scored first 57.8% of the matches; and those who scored first ended 
the games scoring an average 1.88 goals more than their opponents 
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Table 3.4 Home vs. Away Red Cards53 
 
 
Away red cards 
  
 
0 1 2 3 Total 
Home red 
cards 
0 5,083 624 34 1 5,742 
1 439 102 9 2 552 
2 25 8 0 1 34 
 Total 5,547 734 43 4 6,328 
 
Table 3.5 displays a comparison of the captains’ individual characteristics between Northern 
and Southern leagues. The average team captain in Southern leagues is significantly older than 
in Northern leagues (31.5 vs. 29.0 years old). The captain playing position is also significantly 
different between regions (Fischer exact test = 0.000): 37.2% (53.6%) of the Southern 
(Northern) captains played at the defender position; 45.6% (36.1%) are midfielders, 8.3% 
(6.0%) are goalkeepers and 8.9% (4.2%) are forwards. Southern leagues exhibit a significantly 
larger proportion of captains that were originally born in the league country, 82%, than 
Northern leagues, 61%.   
 
In general, we find significant differences between the attributes of Northern and Southern team 
captains, for the playing position, the age and the proportion of locals that were appointed as 
leaders. The age and the playing position differences can be attributed to the playing style that 
seems to be more physical in Northern leagues. The local proportion is consistent to the 
distribution of national and international players in the teams, as according to The CIES 
Football Observatory in Switzerland (2014), Northern leagues exhibit a larger proportion of 
international players than Southern leagues. This proportion was for the Premier League 42.5% 
(the highest in Europe), followed by the Bundesliga with 35.6%. The Dutch League ranked 9th 
with 15.7%. In Southern leagues the figures are: 30.1% for The Serie A, 22.3% for Ligue 1 and 
20.7% for La Liga.  
 
Captains played full time games around 57% of the time and did not play at all in 28.4% of the 
matches (3,575 times, either for pre-match substitutions54, 20% of the cases, or injury reasons, 
8.4%). They were substituted 14.3% of the time (1,807 times), received a red card 7% (88 
times) and were injured during the match in 3% of the games (39 times). Regarding their 
performance, the Squawka index suggests that captains and the average player do not differ 
between regions. Nevertheless, captains outperform the average player, and this captain 
                                                
53 A detailed table of all red cards is provided in Table 3.13 at Appendix A.3.5 
54 Strategic substitutions are those that do not respond to an injury but are related to tactical reasons.  
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premium is significant for both Southern and Northern leagues (p-value<0.01), yet not different 
between regions (p-value = 0.3050)  (Table 3.5). 55 
 
Table 3.5 Captains and Non-Captain Characteristics 
 
Southern Northern p-values 
Captain Performance per minute 0.1984982 .2223963 0.3164 
 
(0.2073548) (0.219926)  
Non-captain performance per minute 0.1675356 0.1701271 0.8329 
 
(0.1103398) (0.1095284)  
Captain premium 0.0300107 *** 0.0522692 *** 0.3050 
 (0.1836322) (0.2055409)  
Captain age 31.47778 29.0241 0.0000 
 (3.506507) (3.465766)  
Captain BMI 23.015 22.6988 0.2884 
 (2.008376) (3.39811)  
Captain local 82.22% 61.44% 0.0000 
Defender 37.22% 53.61% 0.0000 
Midfielder 45.56% 36.14%  
Forward 8.89% 4.22%  
Goalkeeper 8.33% 6.02%  
Note: The captain premium is the difference between the captain and the average 
player performance. We tested the difference between these two with the 
Wilcoxon Match Pair Signed test and we find that the captain performance is 
significantly higher than the average player at p-value<0.01, for which we placed 
three stars *** in the premium variables. We compared Southern and Northern 
leagues by using the t-test for continues variables, and the Fischer Exact test for 
proportions (local captains and playing position).  
 
Home and away captains do not exhibit differences in the time played within Southern and 
Northern leagues. Northern and Southern captain time does not have major differences except 
for the case of the non-red-carded-away captains. In the absence of red cards, away captains 
tend to play longer in Northern teams relative to Southern (Table 3.6). Red cards, on the other 
hand, tend to be delivered to captains roughly at the same time between regions (approximately 
1.15 red cards per season, after the minute 60), and team types (home or away). 
  
                                                
55 Squawka index details are provided in the appendix A.3.1. The average player index is obtained by dividing over 
ten players, the difference between team performance and the captain performance. 
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 Table 3.6 Red Card Events and Time Played by Captains 
 
Southern Northern 
 
Home Away Home Away 
Captain red card events 25 29 15 19 
Non-captain red card events 348 441 169 249 
No red card time 77.27969 77.94384a 83.06151 81.56925a 
 
(15.44847) (15.42137) (9.270077) (10.67747) 
Red card time 62.25 66.13636 61.29412 65 
 
(27.29079) (22.88126) (20.80494) (17.70795) 
Note: We used the Fischer exact test to test differences in the red card 
proportions between Northern and Southern leagues, whilst teams were playing 
home or away. Nonetheless, we find no significant differences between regions. 
We tested the difference in the number of minutes played by the captains in 
Southern and Northern leagues by using the t-test. We placed a superscript at the 
values that reported significant differences. We only found significant differences 
at 1% between Southern and Northern leagues (a-superscript) in Non-red carded 
away teams (a-p-value = 0.000).  
 
On average, a football team receives between four and five red cards each season. As Figure 3.2 
indicates, the distribution of red cards is significantly different between Northern and Southern 
teams (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test p-value = 0.000). Specifically, Southern captains received 
significantly more red cards across the three seasons (54) compared to Northern captains (34) (t-
test p-value = 0.0046). 56 
 
The difference in the red cards’ distribution probably responds to differences in the football 
style and/or to the leagues’ social exposure. As stated above, Southern leagues are more ball-
possession oriented and often exhibit defensive kind of games. This strategy, combined with 
cultural preconceptions, might lead players to engage in more aggressive actions. Moreover, as 
Northern leagues are more socially exposed in terms of broadcasting and match attendance, it is 
possible that they feel higher levels of pressure to behave appropriately on the field.   
  
                                                
56 Leagues are all significantly different to each other, except for the Premier League and Bundesliga which t-test p-
value is 0.2940 
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 Figure 3.2 Histogram of the Red Card per Match by Region 
 
Note: The histogram illustrates the percentage of red card 
events during one season. On the x axis we have the average 
number of red cards received by one team of 
Southern/Northern leagues across the three seasons; and on 
the y axe we have the percentage of occurrence. The 
probability of receiving less than four red cards during a 
specific season is 2.6 times larger for Northern leagues. 
Complementary, the probability of receiving more than five 
red cards is four times larger in Southern leagues than in 
Northern leagues. 
 
 
5.2. The Relative Effect of a Red Card 
The first three columns of Table 3.7 represent the estimation results of Equation (1). We present 
the coefficients for the full model in the first column, and the Southern and Northern leagues in 
the second and third columns, correspondingly. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. As 
expected, we find that the home team quality positively (h_win_prob) affects the goal difference 
in favour to the home team and this coefficient is significant in all regressions. Red cards issued 
to the away (away_red) team increase the goal difference in around 0.9 goals, and expulsions 
against the home team (home_red) reduces it in around one goal. 
 
We find that the time to go after a red card time (home_red_time) has no effects when it is 
issued to the home team, but it increases the goal difference when it is given to the away team 
(away_red_time) in Northern leagues, meaning that the longer the remaining time after a red 
card, home teams are more able to take advantage of the away team weakness. We break down 
the red card effect into captain (hom_capt_red and away_capt_red) and non-captain 
(hom_nocapt_red and away_nocapt_red) dismissals in the other models. We include several 
explanatory variables related to the captain participation to capture his relevance for teams’ 
attainments.  
The coefficients corresponding to Equation (2) for the full, Southern and Northern estimations 
are presented in columns 4, 5 and 6 of the Table 3.7. When it comes to non-captains, our results 
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are consistent with Ridder et al (1994) and Bar-Eli et al (2006). We find that for all cases, red 
cards issued against home (away) teams reduces (increases) the goal difference of the home 
team, and these coefficients are not significantly different between regions. 57 For home and 
away teams, the red card time (home_nocapt_red_time and away_nocapt_red_time) has a 
small but significant effect on goal differences. Specifically, the earlier a non-captain of the 
home (away) team gets penalised, the lower (higher) the home advantage in each region and in 
both regions pooled. Also, we partly support the relative red card time effect in away teams’ 
performance found by Caliendo and Radic (2006) and Mechtel et al (2011) namely that later red 
cards on the away teams might have a boost on their morale which eventually has a positive 
effect on team performance. 
 
The playing position for home team captains is insignificant for the full (model 4) and regional 
specifications (models 5 and 6).  Nonetheless, forward away captains (away_capt_forward) 
may significantly increase the goal difference in Northern leagues, and midfield away captains 
(away_capt_midfield) may have the same (marginally) effect in Southern leagues58. This 
finding is probably a reflection of the game style of Northern leagues. We pointed out above 
that Northern leagues exhibit an attacking and organised style. When in Northern matches the 
leadership of the away team is appointed in the attacking role, it probably weakens the defence 
area and rises the opportunities for increasing the goal difference.  
 
As Table 3.7 suggests, the effect of home captain dismissals (home_capt_red) on goal 
differences is similar across regions. However, Southern teams seem to be better at exploiting 
the lack of leadership of the away teams. More specifically, away captain dismissals 
(away_capt_red)  increase in almost two the goal difference in favour to the home team. This 
effect is 36% greater, yet not significantly different, than the non-captain’s. Interestingly, the 
red card time accounts for goal differences only for away captains’ dismissal at Southern 
leagues (away_capt_red_time), probably meaning that the motivational effect already 
suggested by Mechtel et al (2011) is reinforced when the captain is the one being sent off. 59  
Southern home teams take advantage of away team the leader disadvantage, and La Liga seems 
to be driving a large part of this effect (as presented in Appendix A.3.2). Few questions appear 
to be relevant to understand this phenomenon. Why away-captain dismissals seem strengthen 
Southern home teams and are insignificant for Northern teams? Why Southern teams are better 
                                                
57 Even though, the results here presented control for the home team fix effects, we also estimated OLS regressions of 
the same model with the sole purpose of conducting the Suest test for equality between coefficients of independent 
regressions.	
58 We controlled for the playing positions of non-captain dismissals in models 4-9 and appeared insignificant. 
59 We also estimated the model in Equation No 2 for each league separately. We found that the coefficients obtained 
in the Southern leagues for the away captains are mainly driven by the results of La Liga, which is the Spanish 
professional football	league. The results are presented in Table 3.8 in the appendix A.3.2. Additionally, two tables 
with descriptive statistics and p-values per league are provided in Tables 3.9 and 3.10, respectively in appendix 
A.3.2.			
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at utilising the lack of leadership within their home advantage than Northern teams? To answer 
these questions, we estimate an additional regression including the captain attributes and their 
interaction with the red card event. Specifically, we include captain characteristics that, 
according to the descriptive analysis, accounted for differences between Northern and Southern 
leagues such as nationality (home_capt_red_local and away_capt_red_local) and age 
(home_capt_red_age and away_capt_red_age)  (Equation 3). 
 
The results of Equation (3) are presented in the last three columns of Table 3.7. The regressions 
suggest that the positive effect of the away captain dismissal on home score advantage is not 
only significantly higher than other player dismissal effect, but it is also a robust finding as it 
continue to hold even after controlling for captains’ attributes. However, captain characteristics 
such as the age and nationality seem not having a substantial role at explaining the goal 
difference60. 
 
The lack of effect on Northern leagues could be also influenced by their football style. As they 
are acknowledged for being more organised, team-synchronised and physical, the lack of 
leadership seems not to be an issue for ensuring results. Probably meaning that anyone in the 
field is capable of assuming the job of the dismissed leader (or the team is so well coordinated 
that there is no room for salient leadership). 61  
 
 
                                                
60 We estimated models 7 – 9 including the interaction of captain red cards and their playing position and we did not 
get different results to the ones here reported. Instead, few variables were dropped due to the number of red carded 
captains (88). 
61 We estimate three additional regressions that include captains’ injuries and substitutions. These types of absences 
appear to have no impact on the goal difference (see Table 3.12 in appendix A.3.4).  
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Table 3.7 Linear Regressions for Goal Differences, Standard errors in parentheses 
 Full Southern Northern Full Southern Northern Full Southern Northern 
 GD GD GD GD GD GD GD GD GD 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
h_win_prob 3.756*** 4.059*** 3.443*** 3.705*** 3.963*** 3.382*** 3.697*** 3.962*** 3.357*** 
 (0.151) (0.202) (0.229) (0.152) (0.210) (0.231) (0.152) (0.210) (0.231) 
home_red -1.074*** -1.157*** -0.850*       
 (0.249) (0.289) (0.470)       
away_red 0.897*** 0.880*** 0.924**       
 (0.234) (0.276) (0.422)       
home_red_time -0.00180 -0.00371 0.00241       
 (0.00256) (0.00301) (0.00472)       
away_red_time 0.00523** 0.00362 0.00864**       
 (0.00222) (0.00261) (0.00406)       
home_capt_red    -0.690 -0.783 -0.696 1.255 -1.506 5.939 
    (0.931) (1.109) (1.705) (2.201) (3.110) (5.676) 
away_capt_red    1.495** 1.974*** 0.551 1.319 6.251** -6.578 
    (0.609) (0.708) (1.156) (2.124) (3.024) (4.758) 
home_nocapt_red    -1.670*** -1.413*** -2.444*** -1.659*** -1.430*** -2.230*** 
    (0.337) (0.374) (0.726) (0.338) (0.374) (0.738) 
away_nocapt_red    1.480*** 1.264*** 1.819*** 1.479*** 1.264*** 1.821*** 
    (0.328) (0.395) (0.575) (0.328) (0.395) (0.575) 
home_capt_red_time    0.00226 0.00171 0.000625 -0.00126 0.00533 0.00179 
    (0.0131) (0.0152) (0.0251) (0.0136) (0.0174) (0.0267) 
away_capt_red_time    0.0140 0.0204** 0.000624 0.0118 0.0249** 0.0187 
    (0.00904) (0.0104) (0.0176) (0.00916) (0.0113) (0.0221) 
home_nocapt_red_time    -0.0107*** -0.0111*** -0.0109* -0.0105*** -0.0108*** -0.00982* 
    (0.00318) (0.00382) (0.00569) (0.00318) (0.00382) (0.00572) 
away_nocapt_red_time    0.0156*** 0.0131*** 0.0199*** 0.0156*** 0.0130*** 0.0199*** 
    (0.00277) (0.00339) (0.00474) (0.00278) (0.00339) (0.00474) 
home_capt_time 0.000841 0.00125* 0.000323 0.000879* 0.00135** 0.000348 0.000881* 0.00130** 0.000373 
 (0.000527) (0.000646) (0.000894) (0.000528) (0.000649) (0.000894) (0.000528) (0.000649) (0.000893) 
away_capt_time -0.000333 -0.000784 0.000443 -0.000170 -0.000686 0.000692 -0.000184 -0.000685 0.000700 
 (0.000507) (0.000638) (0.000831) (0.000508) (0.000638) (0.000838) (0.000508) (0.000638) (0.000837) 
home_capt_defender    -0.260 -0.108 -0.234 -0.251 -0.0905 -0.227 
    (0.206) (0.260) (0.377) (0.206) (0.260) (0.377) 
home_capt_forward    -0.230 -0.339 0.0142 -0.228 -0.329 -0.0138 
    (0.223) (0.254) (0.451) (0.223) (0.254) (0.450) 
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home_capt_midfield    -0.262 -0.0712 -0.274 -0.255 -0.0528 -0.279 
    (0.214) (0.280) (0.374) (0.214) (0.280) (0.373) 
away_capt_defender    0.140* 0.134 0.0895 0.142* 0.139 0.0872 
    (0.0829) (0.103) (0.146) (0.0829) (0.103) (0.146) 
away_capt_forward    0.290*** 0.174 0.500** 0.292*** 0.177 0.518** 
    (0.111) (0.132) (0.203) (0.111) (0.132) (0.203) 
away_capt_midfield    0.150* 0.181* 0.0495 0.148* 0.180* 0.0429 
    (0.0829) (0.102) (0.148) (0.0829) (0.102) (0.147) 
home_capt_local       0.0976 0.127 0.0947 
       (0.0943) (0.117) (0.173) 
away_cap_local       0.0285 -0.0172 0.0395 
       (0.0499) (0.0722) (0.0717) 
home_capt_age       -0.00886 -0.0274* 0.0400 
       (0.0127) (0.0152) (0.0255) 
away_capt_age       -0.00200 -0.000412 -0.00504 
       (0.00654) (0.00825) (0.0108) 
home_capt_red_local       0.578 -0.242 1.403 
       (0.524) (0.684) (0.938) 
away_capt_red_local       0.972* 1.074 0.620 
       (0.508) (0.672) (0.867) 
home_capt_red_age       -0.0835 0.0349 -0.257 
       (0.0725) (0.107) (0.164) 
away_capt_red_age       -0.0197 -0.152* 0.276 
       (0.0645) (0.0818) (0.187) 
Constant -1.762*** -1.552*** -2.371*** -3.254** -3.736** -2.149 -2.758* -4.503** -3.957 
 (0.312) (0.364) (0.583) (1.483) (1.718) (2.868) (1.528) (1.930) (3.238) 
Observations 5,977 3,379 2,598 5,977 3,379 2,598 5,977 3,379 2,598 
R-squared 0.126 0.142 0.113 0.133 0.149 0.124 0.134 0.151 0.127 
Number of id_home 141 75 66 141 75 66 141 75 66 
Season Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Home team FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Non-captain position No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Test hcrc = horc No signif. No signif. No signif. No signif. No signif. No signif. No signif. *** No signif. 
Test acrc = aorc No signif. No signif. No signif. No signif. No signif. No signif. No signif. *** ** 
Note: The dependent variable of these models is the goal difference between home and away teams. We estimated fixed effect regressions to isolate time-
invariant characteristics across matches. We also control for the season and the dismissed non-captain playing positions. We keep the home team as the 
panel variable. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We investigate the captain effect on team performance based on the relative difference of a 
captain send-off with respect to a regular player. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
study that focuses the analysis on dismissals issued to formal leaders.  
 
We find significant differences between geographical regions. Our results suggest that the effect 
of a captain dismissal on team performance is context dependant. Whilst in Northern leagues 
captains seem to play no significant roles, in Southern leagues they can affect the goal 
difference. However, this result requires another layer of specification in that only red cards 
issued to away captains of a Southern team positively affects the goal difference. Yet, red cards 
to home captains have no significant effects. Overall, the effect of an away captain dismissal 
probably suggests that the lack of leadership inside the away team could be an unexplored 
component in the literature of the home-team advantage. 
 
The lack of the captain effect on Northern leagues can be interpreted as a result of their football 
style. As they are acknowledged for their teamwork, it is possible that the captaincy is only a 
formal figure that does not play a substantial role in terms of team coordination. Thus, captain 
dismissals do not threaten team performance in a different way than a non-captain’s. 
 
Our results for non-captains are consistent to Ridder et al (1994) and Bar-Eli et al (2006), but 
contrast to Carmichael and Thomas (2005) as we find that red cards always deteriorate team 
performance and this effect is not necessarily smaller for away teams. Our results are also 
consistent to the work of Caliendo and Radic (2006) and Mechtel et al (2011) in that we found 
that by controlling for the time to go, red cards on the away team may generate a positive 
impact on the team morale that could lead to goal difference reductions.  
 
Our main drawback is that our database does not allow for comparisons with dismissals of 
players that are equally productive than the captain. However, we are able to disentangle the 
effect of a captain dismissal relative to a non-captain dismissal. New studies investigating how 
captains are appointed and the leadership effect in other sports, might contribute to the study of 
leadership for team performance.  
 
We have no formal information accounting for differences in the way captains are appointed in 
Southern and Northern leagues. Selection rules could partly explain why Southern leagues are 
better at exploiting the lack of leadership of the away teams, or why away teams in those 
leagues are more sensitive to captain dismissals.  We suggest this as the starting point for future 
work in this area. 
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Chapter 5. General Concluding Remarks 
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Three essays broadly relating to the political economy of organisations were presented in this 
thesis. We utilised organisations re-created in the lab as well as football teams to understand the 
behavioural implications of the interaction between social constructs, such us power, leadership 
and peer effects, with traditional economic concepts such us value, individual incentives and 
team production. 
 
The lack of control over the elements intervening on real-life interactions, as well as the 
implausibility of creating a systematised database to disentangle the intrinsic value of power, 
led us to approach power asymmetries in the lab in the first chapter. We differentiate the value 
of decision rights (Fehr et al 2014, Neri and Rommenswinkel, 2016) from the value of power as 
we remove any strategic incentive for holding the decision rights. Rather, we create an 
environment in which participants experience power by making decisions about others, but not 
about themselves.  
 
We conducted a 2x2 experimental design in which we manipulated the mechanism to assign 
individuals into powerful positions (high or low skilled individuals), and the awareness 
regarding how the assignation is done (legitimacy). We also conducted two further treatments 
manipulating the visibility of powerful individuals (centrality) and their ability to significantly 
reduce the group members' piece rates (enforcement). A control with no power asymmetries 
was also implemented. 
 
In the absence of economic incentives, we would have expected individuals to give up power 
for any positive value. However, we find that the experience of power make individuals letting 
go substantial economic earnings in order to keep their powerful position. The value of power 
does not depend upon the legitimacy, centrality or enforcement ability of the powerful, but 
seems to rely exclusively on the experience of power.  
 
This finding may change the way we approach political interactions, and political changes 
within organisations (teams, firms, countries, groups of countries, etc.). By acknowledging that 
the experience of power might change individual preferences by transforming power in an 
“intrinsically valuable” experience, organisations should create the political institutions that 
would help them to fairly share and distribute power, and to prevent power abuse and power 
attachment.  
 
Further research on the value of power could also manipulate the amount of power that one 
individual has, and his/her hierarchical position within an organisation. Additionally, second 
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order beliefs62 in further papers could provide us with information regarding the underlying 
social norms that make individuals demand a significant compensation for giving up the power, 
and that at the same time it prevents the powerless to paying for it.  
 
Another topic that calls the attention whilst managing the production within organisations, is 
how to create the proper incentives among individuals to maximise an organisation’s outcomes. 
While some activities are better carried out individually, there are other jobs that generate better 
outcomes when performed by teams. Comparisons between individual and team performance at 
coordination tasks have been studied both in the lab (Feri et al 2010 and Chaudhuri et al 2015) 
and in the field (Hamilton et al 2003). Whilst Feri et al (2010) and Hamilton et al (2003) 
documented that teams are more productive than individuals, Chaudhuri et al (2015) carried out 
a modification of Feri’s et al matching protocol, and found otherwise. We implemented a 
different protocol to Chauduri and Feri, yet we also aimed to understand to what extent teams 
may or may not exhibit certain heuristics that would lead them to outperform individuals in a 
weakest link public good game.  
 
In contrast to Feri et al (2010), and consistent to Chaudhuri et al (2015), we find that teams do 
not outperform individuals. Although, both teams and individuals experience similar 
coordination levels, the majority of teams get trapped in low levels of contributions to avoid 
high wasted effort. We find that in the absence of coordinating institutions (such as voting, 
unanimity, communication, etc.) between team members, teams might not reach high 
contribution levels. Moreover, since participants playing in teams do not consider the history of 
the total public good produced by the group of teams whilst deciding on their contribution, but 
only make downward adjustments with respect their teammates’ contribution, the low 
contribution cycle is reinforced after each round.  
 
The second chapter findings point out the challenge for organisations to create an appropriate 
political environment to aggregate the team members’ efforts, and to avoid free-riding 
incentives. Additionally, our results support the conditional cooperation and reciprocity 
evidence (Croson et al 2005). Specifically, our results suggest that even though the peer effect 
literature suggest that peers might generate social pressure in favour of team production 
(Hamilton et al 2003; Mas and Moretti, 2009; Bandiera et al 2009), when individual incentives 
are not necessarily aligned to the teams’, it might be important to avoid negative messages as 
they can evolve in a downside peer effect that could harm team performance. 
 
                                                
62 Through first order beliefs we might elicit positive and normative individual’s beliefs regarding the others’ 
behaviour. By using second order beliefs we would evoke positive and normative individual’s beliefs on how she 
thinks the others belief the average behaviour would/should be. Second order beliefs allow researchers to understand 
to what extent individuals are trying to conform with a social norm.  
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A follow up of this study could compare how different institutions affect individual and team 
coordination. For instance, the inclusion of leaders, voting rules, communication, punishment, 
among other possible manipulations, may affect teams and individuals differently. Further work 
on this topic might provide us with a better characterisation of the relative performance of teams 
and individuals that are facing coordination challenges. 
 
Finally, we studied the role of leadership on team performance in the third chapter. Like power 
in the first chapter, a minority of individuals become leaders in organisations. Nonetheless, 
unlike power, we study leaders as formal figures that do not have the ability to reward or punish 
other individuals, but have the status to behaviourally influence the team performance. 
Although, this topic could have also been addressed experimentally, there is public data 
available to explore it, which give us the opportunity to provide the literature with some insights 
regarding real-life interactions.  
 
We constructed a database for 144 real organisations namely teams belonging to the six major 
European leagues. Geographically, three of the leagues operate within Southern Europe, and 
three within Northern Europe: La Liga, Serie A and Ligue 1 belong to the former; The Premier 
League, The Bundesliga and The Eredivisie belong to the latter group. The information of team 
performance was obtained from the available data of football matches for each of the seasons 
between 2012 and 2015 (6,328 matches).  
 
We assess the effect of captain red card relative to a non-captain dismissal. Although players’ 
dismissal can be understood as an endogenous event, resultant of several technical and 
emotional interactions on-the-field, the impact of a captain dismissal can be studied as an 
exogenous event in the sense that we do not know prior to the match that there will be a red card 
offence. Thus, within each match, we characterised the red card events among captain and non-
captain dismissals, and this information was merged with the regular captain characteristics. We 
acknowledge that the captain is not necessarily the only leader on-the-field, but since they are 
formally appointed and their status is different, we expect them to have a behavioural effect on 
their teammates’ performance. 
 
We used a Sport Production Function framework (e.g. Ridder et al 1994; Dawson et al 2000; 
Bar-Eli et al 2006, Carmichael and Thomas 2005; Caliendo and Radic 2006; Mechtel et al 
2011) to disentangle the captain impact on team performance.  Even though the red card effect 
has been studied by using similar frameworks, from the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
time that it is used to assess whether the impact of red cards differ between leaders and non-
leaders. 
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We find that the effect of leadership on team performance is context dependent. A captain 
dismissal is only significant for Southern leagues (mainly driven by La Liga). Moreover, it is 
only significant when the away captain is the recipient of the red card. Thus, it seems that the 
combination of the home advantage with cultural and technical heuristics make Southern teams 
playing in away from home round more vulnerable to the lack of leadership. Yet, individual 
characteristics appear not being affecting such vulnerability.  
 
These findings bring several insights regarding the role of formal leadership in organisations. In 
general, when teams are technically and tactically trained, as in football teams, formal leaders 
tend to have a secondary effect on team performance. Additionally, it is possible that well 
established interactions among teammates, favours the emergence of other leaders that have not 
necessarily been formally appointed. Leaders can be, however, relevant when the teams are 
facing a disadvantaged position. In this study, the disadvantage relies on the fact of playing as a 
guest team, but we can extend this situation to non-sport related teams starting an innovation 
project, realising a new product, or moving into a new market.   
 
The team (playing) style also might determine how indispensable the leader is. Well-paced 
teams are less leader dependent (as the Northern leagues); yet, teams that innovate on-the go (as 
the Southern leagues), might require a front-runner to elevate the teammates morale when the 
environment turns against them.  
 
We concede that further research on this topic, analysing how captains are appointed, and the 
effect of regular captains in other sports will enrich the discussion, and generate conclusions 
that can be extended to different types of organisations. 
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A.1.1. Complementary figures and tables chapter 1 
 
Table 1.9 The WTP and WTA for the A position and the Gap by treatment (control)63 
   Mean (SD) 
NP 
A 103.3 (96.7) 
B 103.3 (83.6) 
Gap 0 (116.6) 
BL - High 
A 415 (117.3) 
B 135 (113.1) 
Gap 280 (149.3) 
EN - High 
A 565.5 (532.6) 
B 130.8 (112.4) 
Gap 431.7 (484.2) 
CT - High 
A 422.9 (182) 
B 157.9 (117.2) 
Gap 265 (266.2) 
 
Figure 1.10 Rates Distribution across all treatments 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
63 Only significant differences are reported: p-value WMW test between treatments within roles 
A – NP vs. EN= 0.0013; A – NP vs. CT = 0.0006; B – NP vs. CT= 0.0827; 
p-value WMW test between roles within treatments, A vs. B 
EN = 0.0022; CT = 0.0024 
p-value WMW test of the gap between treatments 
NP vs. EN =  0.0016 
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Figure 1.11 Average assigned rates by productivity quintile per treatment 
 
 
 
Table 1.10 Participation of the components in the actual value of power by treatment 
(controls) and role 
 BL EN CT 
 A B A B A B 
Noise (mean) 82.50 104.78 82.50 103.06 82.22 103.06 
% actual 19.9 77.6 14.7 78.8 19.4 157.9 
Extrinsic (mean) 30.2 3.7 7.9 8.8 -6.0 1.0 
% actual 7.3 2.8 1.4 6.7 -1.4 0.65 
Risk (mean) 39.58 28.00 33.42 21.25 36.58 25.29 
% actual 10 21 6 16 9 16 
 
 
Figure 1.12 Ruling category by treatment (controls) 
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Table 1.11 Individual ruling categories by categorisation method 
Treatment indiv  Scoring rule  frequency rule Final Gender WTA 
BL - High 116 Egalitarian Egalitarian Egalitarian Female 450 
BL - High 117 Symmetric Symmetric Symmetric Male 500 
BL - High 151 Symmetric Symmetric Symmetric Male 300 
BL - High 152 Symmetric Symmetric Symmetric Male 350 
BL - High 153 Symmetric Symmetric Symmetric Male 450 
BL - High 1112 Egalitarian Symmetric Other Male 490 
BL - High 1113 Egalitarian Egalitarian Egalitarian Male 600 
BL - High 1116 Symmetric Symmetric Symmetric Female 150 
BL - High 1118 Egalitarian Symmetric Other Male 500 
BL - High 1510 Egalitarian Egalitarian Egalitarian Male 450 
BL - High 1511 Egalitarian Egalitarian Egalitarian Male 340 
BL - High 1513 Meritocratic Meritocratic Meritocratic Male 400 
LT - High 443 Symmetric Symmetric Symmetric Female 500 
LT - High 445 Symmetric Symmetric Symmetric Female 501 
LT - High 449 Symmetric Symmetric Symmetric Male 600 
LT - High 481 Egalitarian Symmetric Other Male 300 
LT - High 484 Meritocratic Meritocratic Meritocratic Male 500 
LT - High 4411 Symmetric Symmetric Symmetric Male 375 
LT - High 4412 Symmetric Symmetric Symmetric Male 300 
LT - High 4414 Symmetric Symmetric Symmetric Female 350 
LT - High 4810 Egalitarian Egalitarian Egalitarian Female 450 
LT - High 4813 Egalitarian Egalitarian Egalitarian Female 500 
LT - High 4814 Meritocratic Meritocratic Meritocratic Male 70 
LT - High 4816 Symmetric Symmetric Symmetric Male 400 
BL - Low 592 Symmetric Symmetric Symmetric Male 500 
BL - Low 594 Symmetric Symmetric Symmetric Female 300 
BL - Low 597 Symmetric Symmetric Symmetric Female 300 
BL - Low 598 Symmetric Meritocratic Other Male 50 
BL - Low 5102 Symmetric Symmetric Symmetric Male 299 
BL - Low 5105 Symmetric Symmetric Symmetric Male 500 
BL - Low 5107 Symmetric Symmetric Symmetric Female 250 
BL - Low 5911 Symmetric Symmetric Symmetric Female 120 
BL - Low 5918 Egalitarian Symmetric Other Female 450 
BL - Low 51012 Egalitarian Egalitarian Egalitarian Male 500 
BL - Low 51016 Egalitarian Egalitarian Egalitarian Male 100 
BL - Low 51018 Symmetric Symmetric Symmetric Male 300 
LT - Low 6111 Meritocratic Meritocratic Meritocratic Male 100 
LT - Low 6112 Meritocratic Meritocratic Meritocratic Male 500 
LT - Low 6114 Symmetric Symmetric Symmetric Female 300 
LT - Low 6119 Meritocratic Meritocratic Meritocratic Female 60 
LT - Low 6131 Egalitarian Egalitarian Egalitarian Male 500 
LT - Low 6138 Symmetric Meritocratic Other Female 350 
LT - Low 61111 Meritocratic Meritocratic Meritocratic Male 450 
LT - Low 61118 Egalitarian Egalitarian Egalitarian Male 650 
LT - Low 61313 Egalitarian Egalitarian Egalitarian Male 150 
LT - Low 61315 Egalitarian Symmetric Other Male 450 
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LT - Low 61316 Symmetric Egalitarian Other Female 290 
LT - Low 61317 Symmetric Symmetric Symmetric Female 500 
 
 
Figure 1.13 Real and Corrected Bids Distribution 
 
  
  
Note: The Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions suggest that while the Normal 
and the Poisson corrected bids’ distributions are not significantly different to the actual bids’ distribution, the 
corrected distributions using the WTA values and the Uniform density function are both significantly different to the 
actual bids at 1%.  
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A.1.2. Risk aversion analysis 
We find the bids making the utility level of being B above the utility of being A i.e. u(B) > 
u(A). For our purpose, we use the following utility function suggested in Holt and Laury (2002):  ! " = 	 %&'()*+ , for	" > 0	  (3) 2 is the constant relative risk aversion parameter that we assumed equals to 0.9764. The equation 
suggests that for 2 =0, subjects value each unit of money by itself and do not experience neither 
benefits or loses associated to the certainty through which that money is obtained. If 2 <0, 
individuals are categorised as risk loving, which means, the higher the risk, the more utility is 
reported by the same unit of money. Finally, if 2 >0, subjects belong to the risk averse category. 
They experience disutility when the same amount of money is obtained under higher levels of 
uncertainty. 
Replacing the earnings of A and B participants in block 2 into the utility function, we obtain the 
following equations: ! 3 = (56789:;	<∗>?)&'()*+      (4) ! A = (BC∗ 56789:;	<∗D )EFGH &'()*+IDJ) , ∀	L = 1, … ,9     (5) 
yi: total productivity (the score) of the individual i in block 2, assumed constant. 
j: piece rate at which a B-subject might get paid at. j varies from 1 to 9 as participants A are not 
allowed to pay zero. 
pj: probability p of being paid at a rate of j. These values were extracted from the actual 
distribution of rates assigned by participants A along block 2 during the experiment. 2: Constant rate of risk aversion, assumed as 0.97. 
rA: rate paid to those in the A-position i.e. rA = 5. 
bid: WTP or WTA values. 
  
                                                
64 A CRRA of 0.97 is extremely high across similar experiments. As we did not control for individual levels of risk 
aversion in the experiment, we are just giving our findings the strongest test. Other experiments find much lower 
CRRA average values: Cox and Oaxaca (1996), Goeree et al (1999), Chen and Plott (1998), and Campo et al (2000) 
get similar values in different auctions (0.67, 0.52, 0.48, and 0.56, respectively). 
	 107	
 
A.1.3 Experimental instructions chapter 1 
 
Here we will present all experimental instructions. We provide a full package of the NP and BL-
High (which looks identical to BL-Low) experimental instructions to create an overview of 
what participants received. We only deliver blocks 1 and 3 instructions in the BL-High 
treatment as these blocks are identical for all conditions. Since block 4 is a reminder of the 
differences between participants A and B that have been already given to participants in block 
2, we only report the instructions of block 2.  
 
• No Power (NP) 
 
Welcome to our experiment. This exercise is part of a research project in which we are trying to 
understand how people make decisions. For attending today, you will receive £2. Additionally, 
you will be paid according to the decisions you make in the experiment. During the experiment, 
you will see your earnings as Experimental Currency Units (ECU). Your earnings will be saved 
in your experimental account and will be anonymously paid to you at the end of the experiment 
at the exchange rate of 150 ECU = £1.  
 
This experiment is divided in four blocks. You will get a new set of instructions at the 
beginning of each block. Please follow the instructions carefully. You will participate in a quiz 
before each block to make sure you have understood the instructions.  
 
After you read the information onscreen or complete a task as instructed, press the “OK” or 
“Continue” button to move forward. 
 
Please make sure you do not have anything on the desk. Food and drinks cannot be consumed in 
the lab. Electronic devices such as mobiles, tablets, laptops, iPods, etc. cannot be used whilst in 
the lab. Please switch them off and leave them under the desk.  
 
You are not allowed to talk to each other during the experiment. This includes laughing aloud 
and shouting. Please try to remain silent and do not attempt to communicate with other people. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand until the experimenter comes to your cubicle.  
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1st Block 
In the 1st block of this experiment you will add 2-digit numbers for three minutes. You will earn 
5 ECU per correct answer. Mistakes will not be taken into account. At the end of the block you 
will be informed of your score and earnings. Your earnings in this block will be paid to you at 
the end of the experiment.  
 
Please press the “OK” button to start the quiz about the instructions and the 1st block. 
 
If you have any questions whilst completing the quiz, please raise your hand and remain in 
silence until the experimenter comes to your cubicle.  
 
2nd Block 
In the 2nd block you will be randomly assigned with two others to form a group 
of three. Each group will consist of one Participant A and two Participants 
B. Participants A and B will be making exactly the same task, will be paid at 
exactly the same rate and you will be informed about your role (A or B) at the 
beginning of this block. The composition of the groups and your role will not change 
throughout this block. Groups are independent in that your earnings will be determined by your 
individual performance 
 
As in the 1st block, you and the other participants will add 2 digit numbers for one minute and 
will be paid at a rate of 5 ECU for correct answer. However, in this 2nd block you will do this 
task 10 times. We will call each repetition of the task a round.  
 
At the end of the block, you will receive information about your total earnings for that block. 
Cumulative earnings will be paid at the end of the experiment. 
  
Please press the “OK” button to start the quiz about the instructions. Once you answer the 
questions you will be able to start the 2nd block. 
 
If you have any questions whilst completing the quiz, please raise your hand and remain in 
silence until the experimenter comes to your cubicle.  
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3rd Block 
All participants will receive 150 ECU at the beginning of this 3rd block. Your role will be the 
same as in the 2nd block. However, all the groups will be dissolved and participants A and B 
will be making different decisions. 
If you are a participant B, you may buy the right to be a participant A in the 4thBlock. If you are 
a participant A, you may sell this right to one of the participants B in the experiment. 
Participants A and B will simultaneously choose the prices at which they are willing to sell/buy 
the role of participant A in the 4th block.  
The 4th block will be the last one, as the experiment will finish afterwards. The 4th block is 
exactly the same as the second block, so both participants A and B will be making exactly the 
same task, and both participants A and B will be paid at exactly the same rate. The tasks that 
participants have to perform are explained as following: 
 
Participants B… 
Each of the 12 participants B will choose their buying price to get the role of participant A by 
participating in a simple auction. The computer will start with a posted price of 10 ECU that 
will be increased by 10 ECU as long as the auction continues. The auction will stop when all the 
participants have left or when the maximum price of 500 ECU is reached.  
Participants B have to decide whether they are willing to pay the posted price. If they are not, 
they just have to click the “Leave” button to leave the auction. Each of the 6-highest 
bids/buying prices will in turn be randomly compared to a different participant A’s selling price. 
 
Participants A… 
Whilst participants B are choosing the buying price, each of the 6 participants A will be asked 
for the price at which they would be willing to sell the role as participant A. Afterwards, each of 
these selling prices will be compared to one of the 6-highest bids resulting from the auction.  
If the participant A’s selling price is lower than the buying price assigned to them, they will 
become a participant B in the 4th block. The participant B who made that offer will become 
participant A. If the selling price is higher than the auction’s buying price, the roles will not 
change for the next block. Please note that both participants A and B will be making exactly the 
same task, and both participants A and B will be paid at exactly the same rate in the 4th block. 
If you are a participant B, your earnings in 
the 3rd block will be the 150 ECU you 
received at the beginning of the block, 
minus the buying price you have chosen (if 
you are a participant B whose offer covers 
the selling price). If your price did not get to be offered to one participant A, or if you decide 
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not to buy the role of participant A (e.g. by posting a bid of zero) your earnings from this block 
will still be 150 ECU. 
 
If you are a participant A, your earnings in the 3rd block will be the 150 ECU plus the buying 
price offered to you, if your selling price is covered by a participant B. Alternatively, if you are 
a participant A whose selling price is not covered by a participant B’s offer your earnings from 
this block will still be 150 ECU.  
 
Please press the “OK” button to start the quiz about the instructions and the 3rd block.  
If you have any questions whilst completing the quiz, please raise your hand and remain in 
silence until the experimenter comes to your cubicle.  
 
4th Block 
Tasks in the 4th block are identical to the 2nd block. However, the group members will be 
completely different. You will not receive information about past decisions or the performance 
of your group members. Whether you will perform as participant A or B throughout this block 
is dependent on the result of the previous block. 
 
As in the 2nd block, participants A and B will add 2 digit numbers for one minute and will be 
paid at a rate of 5 ECU for correct answer. You will face this task 10 times.  
 
At the end of the block, you will receive information about your total earnings for that block. 
Cumulative earnings will be paid at the end of the experiment. 
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• Baseline High (BL-High) 
 
Welcome to our experiment. This exercise is part of a research project in which we are trying to 
understand how people make decisions. For attending today you will receive £2. Additionally, 
you will be paid according to the decisions you make in the experiment. During the experiment 
you will see your earnings as Experimental Currency Units (ECU). Your earnings will be saved 
in your experimental account and will be anonymously paid to you at the end of the experiment 
at the exchange rate of 150 ECU = £1.  
 
This experiment is divided in four blocks. You will get a new set of instructions at the 
beginning of each block. Please follow the instructions carefully. You will participate in a quiz 
before each block to make sure you have understood the instructions.  
 
After you read the information onscreen or complete a task as instructed, press the “OK” or 
“Continue” button to move forward. 
 
Please make sure you do not have anything on the desk. Food and drinks cannot be consumed in 
the lab. Electronic devices such as mobiles, tablets, laptops, iPods, etc. cannot be used whilst in 
the lab. Please switch them off and leave them under the desk.  
 
You are not allowed to talk to each other during the experiment. This includes laughing aloud 
and shouting. Please try to remain silent and do not attempt to communicate with other people. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand until the experimenter comes to your cubicle.  
 
 
1st Block 
In the 1st block of this experiment you will add 2-digit numbers for three minutes. You will earn 
5 ECU per correct answer. Mistakes will not be taken into account. At the end of the block you 
will be informed of your score and earnings. Your earnings in this block will be paid to you at 
the end of the experiment.  
 
Please press the “OK” button to start the quiz about the instructions and the 1st block. 
 
If you have any questions whilst completing the quiz, please raise your hand and remain in 
silence until the experimenter comes to your cubicle.  
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2nd Block 
In the 2nd block you will be randomly assigned with two others to form a group 
of three. Each group will consist of one Participant A and two Participants 
B. Participants A and B will be making different decisions and you will be 
informed about your role (A or B) at the beginning of this block. The 
composition of the groups and your role will not change throughout this block. Groups are 
independent in that your earnings will be determined by the decisions made within your group. 
 
As in the 1st block, you will add 2 digit numbers for one minute. However, in this 2nd block you 
will do this task 10 times. We will call each repetition of the task a round. We now explain the 
sequence of decisions in each round and the differences between participants A and B: 
 
Participants A… 
• Earn 5 ECU per correct answer in this block; 
• At the beginning of the round they decide the rate which participants B will earn for 
that round. The sum of both rates has to be equal to 10 ECU i.e. if one participant B is 
awarded 3 ECU for a correct answer, the other participant B must be awarded 7; 
• Have to do the same task of adding 2-digit numbers; 
• Receive information about their own score/earnings and the scores of both participants 
B in their group at the end of each round. 
 
Participants B… 
• Earn at a rate decided by the Participant A in their group; 
• Are informed of their rate at the beginning of each round; 
• Have to do the task of adding 2-digit numbers; 
• Receive information about their own score/earnings, but will not get information about 
the score of participant A or the other participant B.  
 
At the end of the block, you will receive information about your total earnings for that block. 
Cumulative earnings will be paid at the end of the experiment. 
  
Please press the “OK” button to start the quiz about the instructions. Once you answer the 
questions you will be able to start the 2nd block. 
 
If you have any questions whilst completing the quiz, please raise your hand and remain in 
silence until the experimenter comes to your cubicle.  
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3rd Block 
All participants will receive 150 ECU at the beginning of this 3rd block. Now the 18 participants 
will be enrolled in an auction in order to buy the right to be a participant A in the 4thBlock (the 
last block).  
 
The computer will start with a posted price of 10 ECU that will be increased by 10 ECU as long 
as the auction continues. The auction will stop when there are 6 participants left or when the 
maximum price of 500 ECU is reached. When the posted price exceeds your willingness to pay 
for the right of being participant A, you just have to click the “Leave” button to leave the 
auction. The 6 remaining participants when the auction stops will perform as participants A in 
the 4th block. 
 
Your earnings in the 3rd block will be the 150 ECU you received at the beginning of the block, 
minus the last posted price when the auction stops (if you are one of the last 6 remaining 
participants). If you leave the auction before it stops, your earnings from this block will be 150 
ECU.  
 
Please press the “OK” button to start the quiz about the instructions and the 3rd block. 
 
If you have any questions whilst completing the quiz, please raise your hand and remain in 
silence until the experimenter comes to your cubicle.  
 
4th Block 
Tasks in the 4th block are identical to the 2nd block. However, the group members will be 
completely different. You will not receive information about past decisions or the performance 
of your group members. Whether you will perform as participant A or B throughout this block 
is dependent on the result of the previous block. 
 
As in the 2nd block, you will add 2 digit numbers for one minute and you will face this task 10 
times. We now explain the sequence of decisions in each round and the differences between 
participants A and B: 
 
Participants A… 
• Earn 5 ECU per correct answer in this block; 
• At the beginning of the round they decide the rate which participants B will earn for 
that round. The sum of both rates has to be equal to 10 ECU i.e. if one participant B is 
awarded 3 ECU for a correct answer, the other participant B must be awarded 7; 
• Have to do the same task of adding 2-digit numbers; 
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• Receive information about their own score/earnings and the scores of both participants 
B in their group at the end of each round. 
Participants B… 
• Earn at a rate decided by the Participant A in their group; 
• Are informed of their rate at the beginning of each round; 
• Have to do the task of adding 2-digit numbers; 
• Receive information about their own score/earnings, but will not get information about 
the score of participant A or the other participant B.  
 
At the end of the block, you will receive information about your total earnings for that block. 
Cumulative earnings will be paid at the end of the experiment. 
  
Please press the “OK” button to start 4th block. 
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• Legitimacy High (LT-High) 
 
2nd Block 
In the 2nd block you will be randomly assigned with two others to form a group 
of three. Each group will consist of one Participant A and two Participants 
B. Participants A are those who had the 6-highest scores in the previous block. 
The other 12 participants will be labelled as participants B. Participants A and 
B will be making different decisions and you will be informed about your role (A or B) at the 
beginning of this block. The composition of the groups and your role will not change 
throughout this block. Groups are independent in that your earnings will be determined by the 
decisions made within your group. 
 
As in the 1st block, you will add 2 digit numbers for one minute. However, in this 2nd block you 
will do this task 10 times. We will call each repetition of the task a round. We now explain the 
sequence of decisions in each round and the differences between participants A and B: 
 
Participants A… 
• Earn 5 ECU per correct answer in this block; 
• At the beginning of the round they decide the rate which participants B will earn for 
that round. The sum of both rates has to be equal to 10 ECU i.e. if one participant B is 
awarded 3 ECU for a correct answer, the other participant B must be awarded 7; 
• Have to do the same task of adding 2-digit numbers; 
• Receive information about their own score/earnings and the scores of both participants 
B in their group at the end of each round. 
 
Participants B… 
• Earn at a rate decided by the Participant A in their group; 
• Are informed of their rate at the beginning of each round; 
• Have to do the task of adding 2-digit numbers; 
• Receive information about their own score/earnings, but will not get information about 
the score of participant A or the other participant B.  
 
At the end of the block, you will receive information about your total earnings for that block. 
Cumulative earnings will be paid at the end of the experiment. 
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• Legitimacy Low  (LT-Low) 
 
2nd Block 
In the 2nd block you will be randomly assigned with two others to form a group 
of three. Each group will consist of one Participant A and two Participants 
B. Participants A are those who had the 6-lowest scores in the previous block. 
The other 12 participants will be labelled as participants B. Participants A and 
B will be making different decisions and you will be informed about your role (A or B) at the 
beginning of this block. The composition of the groups and your role will not change 
throughout this block. Groups are independent in that your earnings will be determined by the 
decisions made within your group. 
 
As in the 1st block, you will add 2 digit numbers for one minute. However, in this 2nd block you 
will do this task 10 times. We will call each repetition of the task a round. We now explain the 
sequence of decisions in each round and the differences between participants A and B: 
 
Participants A… 
• Earn 5 ECU per correct answer in this block; 
• At the beginning of the round they decide the rate which participants B will earn for 
that round. The sum of both rates has to be equal to 10 ECU i.e. if one participant B is 
awarded 3 ECU for a correct answer, the other participant B must be awarded 7; 
• Have to do the same task of adding 2-digit numbers; 
• Receive information about their own score/earnings and the scores of both participants 
B in their group at the end of each round. 
 
Participants B… 
• Earn at a rate decided by the Participant A in their group; 
• Are informed of their rate at the beginning of each round; 
• Have to do the task of adding 2-digit numbers; 
• Receive information about their own score/earnings, but will not get information about 
the score of participant A or the other participant B.  
 
At the end of the block, you will receive information about your total earnings for that block. 
Cumulative earnings will be paid at the end of the experiment. 
  
  
	 117	
• Centrality High (CT-High) 
2nd Block 
In the 2nd block you will be randomly assigned with two others to form a group 
of three. Each group will consist of one Participant A and two Participants 
B. Participants A and B will be making different decisions and you will be 
informed about your role (A or B) at the beginning of this block. The 
composition of the groups and your role will not change throughout this block. Groups are 
independent in that your earnings will be determined by the decisions made within your group. 
 
As in the 1st block, you will add 2 digit numbers for one minute. However, in this 2nd block you 
will do this task 10 times. We will call each repetition of the task a round. We now explain the 
sequence of decisions in each round and the differences between participants A and B: 
 
Participants A… 
• Earn 5 ECU per correct answer in this block; 
• At the beginning of the round they decide the rate which participants B will earn for 
that round. The sum of both rates has to be equal to 10 ECU i.e. if one participant B is 
awarded 3 ECU for a correct answer, the other participant B must be awarded 7; 
• Have to do the same task of adding 2-digit numbers; 
• Receive information about their own score/earnings and the scores of both participants 
B in their group at the end of each round. 
 
Participants B… 
• Earn at a rate decided by Participant A in their group; 
• Are informed of their rate at the beginning of each round; 
• Have to do the task of adding 2-digit numbers; 
• Receive information about their own score/earnings and participant A’s score, but will 
not get information about the score of the other participant B.  
 
At the end of the block, you will receive information about your total earnings for that block. 
Cumulative earnings will be paid at the end of the experiment. 
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• Enforcement High (EN-High) 
 
2nd Block 
In the 2nd block you will be randomly assigned with two others to form a group 
of three. Each group will consist of one Participant A and two Participants 
B. Participants A and B will be making different decisions and you will be 
informed about your role (A or B) at the beginning of this block. The 
composition of the groups and your role will not change throughout this block. Groups are 
independent in that your earnings will be determined by the decisions made within your group. 
 
As in the 1st block, you will add 2 digit numbers for one minute. However, in this 2nd block you 
will do this task 10 times. We will call each repetition of the task a round. We now explain the 
sequence of decisions in each round and the differences between participants A and B: 
 
Participants A…`  
• Earn 5 ECU per correct answer in this block; 
• At the beginning of the round they decide the rate which participants B will earn for 
that round. The sum of both rates has to be up to 10 ECU i.e. if one participant B is 
awarded 3 ECU for a correct answer, the other participant B must be awarded at most 7 
ECU; 
• Have to do the same task of adding 2-digit numbers; 
• Receive information about their own score/earnings and the scores of both participants 
B in their group at the end of each round. 
 
Participants B… 
• Earn at a rate decided by the Participant A in their group; 
• Are informed of their rate at the beginning of each round; 
• Have to do the task of adding 2-digit numbers; 
• Receive information about their own score/earnings, but will not get information about 
the score of participant A or the other participant B.  
 
At the end of the block, you will receive information about your total earnings for that block. 
Cumulative earnings will be paid at the end of the experiment. 
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A.2.1. Experimental instructions chapter 2 
 
• Weakest Link for Individuals (I-WLM) – Translated from Spanish65 
 
This experiment consists of 20 rounds. Just for being here you have already earned 300 ECU. 
At the beginning of the experiment you will be assigned to an independent group of four 
participants, so whatever happens in one group will not affect all the others. The composition of 
your group will not change during the experiment. You will never know the identity of the other 
participants in your group. 
Every round, every participant gets an endowment of 50 ECU and needs to make a simple 
allocation decision. You may allocate part or all of this endowment to a collective account for 
your group. Every group member chooses an allocation to the collective account independently. 
The difference between your individual decision and your endowment will be automatically 
assigned to a private account. 
Your earnings in the experiment come from both the private account and the collective account. 
Your earnings coming from the collective account depend on the minimum allocation to the 
collective account in your group (that is, the lowest allocation to this account made by a 
member of your group). This minimum allocation is multiplied by 8 and equally shared by 
every single participant in the group; that is, your earnings from the collective account is always 
twice the minimum individual allocation to the collective account. 
Your earnings coming from the private account match your allocation to this account. They do 
not depend on the decisions of the other participants. 
In summary, your earnings in any round are determined in the following way: 
Earnings = Earnings from the private account  + Earnings from the collective 
account 
(50 ECU – my allocation to the collective account)   +   (2 x minimum allocation to the 
collective account in my group) 
After each round, you will get information about your decision and the minimum allocation to 
the collective account made by the individuals in your group. In addition, you will get 
information about your earnings in the round, distinguishing between the earnings coming from 
the private and the collective account. On your screen you will also see a table with the same 
information corresponding to previous rounds. 
At the end of the experiment, your ECU will be exchanged into real Euros at the exchange rate 
of 100ECU=€1.   
                                                
65 The I-VCM experimental instructions follow a similar dynamic to the I-WLM only changing the payoffs function: 
Earnings = (50 ECU – my allocation to the collective account) + (2 x average allocation to the collective account in 
my group) 
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• Weakest Link for Teams (T-WLM) – Translated from Spanish 
 
This experiment consists of 20 rounds. Just for being here you have already earned 300 ECU. 
At the beginning of the experiment you will be assigned to an independent cohort of 12 
participants, so whatever happens in one cohort will not affect all the others. Every cohort 
consists of 4 groups of 3 participants. The composition of your group and your cohort will not 
change during the experiment. You will never know the identity of the other participants in your 
group or cohort. 
Every round, every participant gets an endowment of 50 ECU and needs to make a simple 
allocation decision. You may allocate part or all of this endowment to a collective account for 
your cohort. Every group member chooses an allocation to the collective account independently 
and the average of these three allocations will be your group allocation to the collective account. 
The difference between your individual decision (not the group decision) and your endowment 
will be automatically assigned to a private account. 
Your earnings in the experiment come from both the private account and the collective account. 
Your earnings coming from the collective account depend on the minimum allocation to the 
collective account in your cohort (that is, the lowest allocation to this account made by a group 
in your cohort). This minimum allocation is multiplied by 8 and divided by four to get the 
benefits of every participant; that is, your earnings from the collective account is always twice 
the minimum group allocation to the collective account. 
Your earnings coming from the private account match your allocation to this account. They do 
not depend on the decisions of the other participants. 
In summary, your earnings in any round are determined in the following way: 
Earnings = Earnings from the private account  + Earnings from the collective 
account 
  (50 ECU – my allocation to the collective account)     +     (2 x minimum 
allocation to the collective account in my cohort) 
After each round, you will get information about the allocation of your group (the average of 
your three individual decisions) and the minimum allocation to the collective account made by 
the groups in your cohort. In addition, you will get information about your earnings in the 
round, distinguishing between the earnings coming from the private and the collective account. 
On your screen you will also see a table with the same information corresponding to previous 
rounds. 
At the end of the experiment, your ECU will be exchanged into real Euros at the exchange rate 
of 100ECU=€1. 
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A.3.1. Description of the Squawka performance score chapter 3 
 
Squawka generates the performance score by processing the Opta database and feeds that are 
delivered to Squawka live in-game. The score is calculated by an advanced algorithm that 
computes over 500,000,000 data points from all on-ball and preceding actions (attack, defence 
and possession), pitch co-ordinates (13 as presented in Figure 3. No xx), action outcomes 
(success/failed) and the playing position of the player (goalkeeper, Defender, Midfielder, 
Forward)66.  
 
Although there is not a particular limit on the number of points that a player can score, on 
average, players that play over 90 minutes can get between 10 and 20 points. Scores greater 
than 50 points are a signal of good performance, and negative scores are obtained by poor 
performers.  
 
Figure 3. 3 Pitch Areas, took from Squawka.com 
 
 
 
The team performance index is the addition of all players’ performance during the match. 
 
 
  
                                                
66 More information at http://www.squawka.com/what-is-the-squawka-player-performance-rating 
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A.3.2. Complementary tables and figures chapter 3 
 
Table 3.8 Linear Regressions for Goal Differences by Leagues67 
 
 La Liga Serie A Ligue 1 Premier Bundesliga Eredivisie 
 GD GD GD GD GD GD 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
       
h_win_prob 4.161*** 3.666*** 3.850*** 2.784*** 4.386*** 3.209*** 
 (0.342) (0.381) (0.409) (0.321) (0.439) (0.529) 
hcrc 0.925 -2.126 -0.0333 -0.407 3.512 -0.448 
 (3.500) (2.377) (1.377) (2.022) (6.638) (6.295) 
acrc 2.950*** 1.084 2.780 -0.274 1.445 3.215 
 (1.112) (1.028) (2.353) (1.569) (1.916) (5.781) 
horc -1.540*** -1.380*** -1.069** -1.157** -1.973*** -2.670*** 
 (0.452) (0.430) (0.456) (0.586) (0.625) (0.907) 
aorc 1.663*** 0.926** 1.380*** 1.989*** 1.821*** 2.038*** 
 (0.422) (0.417) (0.389) (0.482) (0.583) (0.683) 
hcrc_rt 0.0187 -0.0163 0.0163 0.0200 0.0497 -0.0144 
 (0.0433) (0.0313) (0.0207) (0.0338) (0.0826) (0.0926) 
acrc_rt 0.0443*** 0.00127 0.0273 -0.0116 0.0194 0.0442 
 (0.0169) (0.0160) (0.0305) (0.0224) (0.0352) (0.0808) 
horc_rt -0.0137** -0.0129** -0.00432 -0.00301 -0.0119 -0.0328** 
 (0.00635) (0.00595) (0.00687) (0.00909) (0.00872) (0.0132) 
aorc_rt 0.0178*** 0.00701 0.0138** 0.0212*** 0.0186** 0.0174* 
 (0.00597) (0.00575) (0.00589) (0.00714) (0.00814) (0.0102) 
hcpm 0.000616 0.000766 0.00233* 0.000268 -0.000673 0.00355 
 (0.00125) (0.00101) (0.00122) (0.00131) (0.00151) (0.00230) 
acpm -0.00106 -0.00107 0.000483 0.00192 0.000871 -0.00279 
 (0.00115) (0.00112) (0.00114) (0.00120) (0.00142) (0.00212) 
Constant -7.630* 0.271 -6.392* -2.967 -7.936 -3.203 
 (4.270) (3.212) (3.433) (3.865) (8.168) (11.20) 
Observations 1,140 1,139 1,100 1,102 918 578 
R-squared 0.186 0.144 0.131 0.111 0.154 0.149 
Number of 
id_home 
25 25 25 24 22 20 
Captain 
position 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Season Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Test hcrc=horc No signif. No signif. No signif. No signif. No signif. No signif. 
Test acrc=aorc No signif. No signif. No signif. No signif. No signif. No signif. 
 
 
 
  
                                                
67 Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.9 Means of Captain Characteristics by League  
 
Captain Variables La Liga Serie A Ligue 1 Premier Bundesliga Eredivisie 
capt_age 32.33784 32.52632 30.11594 29.98592 29.11538 27.2202 
capt_bmi 23.23243 23.07895 22.97246 22.8 23.49231 23.02 
capt_perf_min 0.4965018 0.4402214 0.2818033 0.4087701 0.3096398 0.2374245 
capt_time 45.06306 53.32435 56.58204 58.47974 59.22756 70.97607 
other_perf_min 0.1519945 0.1905294 0.1429038 0.1830523 0.1418205 0.1504291 
premium_min 0.3445073 0.249692 0.1388995 0.2257178 0.1678193 0.0869954 
Capt_rc 0.25 0.2763158 0.3009259 0.2072072 0.198718 0.2146465 
 
Table 3.10 T-Tests results for Captain Attributes’ Differences 
 
Captain Variables 
Southern vs 
Northern leagues 
La Liga vs. other 
Southern leagues 
La Liga vs. all 
leagues 
capt_age *** ** *** 
capt_bmi * ** ** 
capt_perf_min No signif. No signif. * 
capt_time *** *** *** 
other_perf_min No signif. No signif. No signif. 
premium_min No signif. No signif. ** 
Capt_rc ** No signif. No signif. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A.3.3. Complementary bivariate analysis chapter 3 
 
We estimate a bivariate ordered Probit (bioprobit) as in Dawson and Dobson (2010) and 
Dawson (2012). In a nutshell, the bioprobit model contains the following structure: ℎ_RSTUV =	∝)	+∝Y Z[\]V +	∝^ Z_`_V +	∝a 3_`_V +	∝b Zc`_V +∝d 3c`_V +∝e Z_`__`fV +∝g 3_`__`fV +∝I Zc`__`fV +∝)h 3c`__`fV +∝)) Z_ijV +∝)Y 3_ijV +	∝)^ Z_ii +∝)a 3_ii+	klTmS] + no,V                              
  (4) T_RSTUV =	∝)	+∝Y Z[\]V +	∝^ Z_`_V +	∝a 3_`_V +	∝b Zc`_V +∝d 3c`_V +∝e Z_`__`fV +∝g 3_`__`fV +∝I Zc`__`fV +∝)h 3c`__`fV +∝)) Z_ijV +∝)Y 3_ijV +	∝)^ Z_ii +∝)a 3_ii+	klTmS] + np,V                              
  (5) 
Where Corr (no,V, np,V) = rho. 
Table 3.11 delivers the result of a bioprobit estimation in which the dependent variable is the 
number of goals scored by home and away teams (h_goal and a_goal) coded in four categories: 
0, 1, 2 and +3 (for three or more goals). The interpretation of the coefficients follows the same 
rules than an ordered Probit as if they were independently estimated for home and away teams. 
Yet, bioprobit estimations deliver more effective results for our analysis as it takes into account 
the error correlation between home and away results. 
The results are consistent to the ones presented in Table 3.7. Across regions, red cards issued to 
a non-captain have a negative effect on the punished team and a positive effect on the 
opposition, and the magnitude of this effect does not differ between home and away teams 
within the same region.  
A captain dismissal has, however, an impact only in Southern leagues. A home (away) captain 
sent-off decreases the probability for the home (away) team to score an extra goal. Moreover, in 
Model 3 we find that the impact of the home captain red card on the probability for the home 
team to get an extra goal, is significantly different the effect of a red card on the away captain. 
We do not find a similar situation in Model 4, though (the home captain dismissal effect is not 
significantly different to the away captain dismissal effect).  This result reinforces our findings 
in Table 3.7 in which we state that whilst home teams are better at taking advantage of the away 
captain dismissal, away teams are less prone to use the same situation in their favour. 
Interestingly, as mentioned above, this finding does not hold for Northern leagues.  
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Table 3.11 Bivariate Regressions by Region 
 Full Southern Northern 
 H_goal A_goal H_goal A_goal H_goal A_goal 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
h_win_prob 2.136*** -1.736*** 2.353*** -1.802*** 1.849*** -1.698*** 
 (0.0803) (0.0799) (0.112) (0.114) (0.119) (0.118) 
hcrc -1.233** -0.208 -1.583*** -0.733 -1.155 0.159 
 (0.486) (0.752) (0.575) (0.827) (0.724) (1.305) 
acrc 0.331 -0.993*** 0.625 -1.327** -0.414 -0.508 
 (0.388) (0.347) (0.480) (0.517) (0.771) (0.322) 
horc -0.665*** 0.634*** -0.539*** 0.590*** -0.883*** 0.756*** 
 (0.155) (0.150) (0.193) (0.197) (0.259) (0.233) 
aorc 0.765*** -0.708*** 0.760*** -0.541*** 0.800*** -0.950*** 
 (0.133) (0.135) (0.164) (0.180) (0.231) (0.207) 
hcrc_rt -0.00806 -0.00697 -0.0104 -0.0115 -0.0112 -0.00633 
 (0.00726) (0.0108) (0.00916) (0.0121) (0.00999) (0.0184) 
acrc_rt -1.21e-05 -0.0131** 0.00377 -0.0176** -0.0117 -0.00729 
 (0.00596) (0.00531) (0.00719) (0.00778) (0.0125) (0.00446) 
horc_rt -0.00662*** 0.00344 -0.00567** 0.00307 -0.00866** 0.00390 
 (0.00221) (0.00211) (0.00270) (0.00272) (0.00388) (0.00337) 
aorc_rt 0.00762*** -0.00756*** 0.00673*** -0.00648** 0.00942*** -0.00910*** 
 (0.00186) (0.00191) (0.00228) (0.00252) (0.00324) (0.00298) 
hcpm 0.000689** 0.000194 0.000897* -1.79e-05 0.000203 0.000112 
 (0.000350) (0.000322) (0.000467) (0.000398) (0.000547) (0.000563) 
acpm -4.76e-05 0.000307 -0.000520 0.000119 0.000342 3.25e-06 
 (0.000344) (0.000348) (0.000457) (0.000458) (0.000539) (0.000550) 
       
Tests: 
capt_rc=non_
capt_rc 
No signif. No signif. * No signif. No signif. No signif. 
h_capt_rc (at 
h_goal) = 
a_capt_rc (at 
a_goal) 
No signif. No signif. No signif. 
h_non-capt_rc 
(at h_goal) = 
a_non-capt_rc 
(at a_goal) 
No signif. No signif. No signif. 
h_capt_rc (at 
h_goal) = 
a_capt_rc (at 
h_goal) 
* ** No signif. 
h_capt_rc (at 
a_goal) = 
a_capt_rc (at 
a_goal) 
No signif. No signif. No signif. 
Note: the dependent variable of these regressions is the number of goals scored by the 
home/away team. We estimate a bivariate ordered Probit in order to control for the error 
correlation between home and away results. Robust errors in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A.3.4. Complementary captain absence analysis chapter 3 
 
Table 3.12 illustrates three linear regressions of the goal difference that include the captain 
absences due to injuries (hci and aci) or substitutions (hcs and acs). We find that injuries and 
substitutions do not significantly affect the goal difference, neither in Southern or Northern 
leagues, and their coefficients are not different to one another. As the main results suggested, a 
captain red card only affects the Southern leagues, and the coefficient significantly differs to the 
substitutions’ and injuries’. Since we have no information regarding injuries and substitutions of 
non-captains, we cannot provide evidence of the relative effect between players.  
 
Table 3.12 Linear Regressions by Region including Injuries and Substitutions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Full Southern Northern 
    
h_win_prob 3.853*** 4.160*** 3.495*** 
 (0.153) (0.204) (0.232) 
hcrc -0.768 -0.842 -0.821 
 (0.948) (1.128) (1.736) 
acrc 1.266** 1.774** -0.0216 
 (0.621) (0.719) (1.177) 
hcrc_rt -0.000434 -0.000406 -0.00338 
 (0.0133) (0.0154) (0.0255) 
acrc_rt 0.0144 0.0206* -0.00263 
 (0.00918) (0.0105) (0.0179) 
hci 0.106 -0.140 0.314 
 (0.328) (0.466) (0.469) 
aci 0.499 -0.107 0.843 
 (0.429) (0.688) (0.561) 
hcs -0.00618 0.0387 -0.0885 
 (0.0613) (0.0763) (0.102) 
acs 0.0778 0.0792 0.0757 
 (0.0584) (0.0701) (0.103) 
hcpm 0.00105** 0.00149** 0.000333 
 (0.000535) (0.000654) (0.000912) 
acpm -0.000434 -0.000874 0.000318 
 (0.000515) (0.000646) (0.000847) 
Constant -2.781* -3.455** -0.877 
 (1.442) (1.660) (2.809) 
Observations 5,977 3,379 2,598 
R-squared 0.102 0.121 0.086 
Number of id_home 141 75 66 
Season Yes Yes Yes 
Home team FE Yes Yes Yes 
Test hcrc = hci No signif. No signif. No signif 
Test hcrc = hcs No signif. No signif. No signif 
Test acrc = aci No signif. * No signif 
Test acrc = acs * ** No signif 
Note: the dependent variable of these regressions is the goal difference between the home/away 
team. We estimate three linear regressions in order to compare cultural effects. Standard errors 
in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
A.3.5. Captain attributes chapter 3 
Table 3.13 Dismissed Captain Attributes 
 
Type League Season Date Captain Team 
Opposition 
team 
Red card 
time (min) Playing position 
1 home Bundesliga 2012-2013 04/11/2012 Simon Rolfes Leverkusen 
Fortuna 
Dusseldorf 65 Midfielder 
2 away Bundesliga 2012-2013 01/12/2012 Serdar Tasci Stuttgart 
Greuther 
Furth 53 Defender 
3 home Bundesliga 2012-2013 15/12/2012 Mergim Mavraj Greuther Furth Augsburg 76 Defender 
4 away Bundesliga 2012-2013 27/01/2013 Clemens Fritz 
Werder 
Bremen Hamburg 80 Midfielder 
5 away Bundesliga 2013-2014 24/08/2013 Benedikt Howedes Schalke 04 Hannover 14 Defender 
6 away Bundesliga 2013-2014 07/12/2013 Benedikt Howedes Schalke 04 M'gladbach 44 Defender 
7 away Bundesliga 2014-2015 07/02/2015 Fabian Lustenberger Hertha Mainz 58 Defender 
8 home Bundesliga 2014-2015 28/02/2015 Lars Stindl Hannover Stuttgart 89 Forward 
9 home Bundesliga 2014-2015 16/05/2015 Paul Verhaegh Augsburg Hannover 90 Defender 
10 away Eridivise 2012-2013 03/11/2012 Kwame Quansah Heracles 
PSV 
Eindhoven 52 Midfielder 
11 away Eridivise 2012-2013 26/01/2013 Sanharib Malki Roda Den Haag 49 Midfielder 
12 away Eridivise 2012-2013 10/02/2013 Nick Viergever AZ Alkmaar Feyenoord 67 Defender 
13 away Eridivise 2012-2013 12/05/2013 Mark van Bommel 
PSV 
Eindhoven Twente 71 Midfielder 
14 away Eridivise 2013-2014 06/10/2013 Sander Duits Waalwijk 
PSV 
Eindhoven 85 Midfielder 
15 home Eridivise 2013-2014 02/04/2014 Rasmus Bengtsson Twente Den Haag 64 Defender 
16 away Eridivise 2014-2015 24/08/2014 Andreas Bjelland Twente NAC Breda 55 Defender 
17 home Eridivise 2014-2015 05/02/2015 Niklas Moisander Ajax AZ Alkmaar 62 Defender 
18 home Eridivise 2014-2015 15/02/2015 Willem Janssen Utrecht Dordrecht 60 Midfielder 
19 home Eridivise 2014-2015 22/02/2015 Marten de Roon Heerenveen Groningen 83 Midfielder 
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20 home La Liga 2012-2013 26/08/2012 Francisco Puñal Osasuna Barcelona 76 Midfielder 
21 away La Liga 2012-2013 16/09/2012 Nunes Mallorca Osasuna 35 Defender 
22 away La Liga 2012-2013 29/09/2012 Casto Betis Malaga 11 Goalkeeper 
23 home La Liga 2012-2013 09/02/2013 Manuel Pablo La Coruna Granada 95 Defender 
24 home La Liga 2012-2013 24/02/2013 Gabi Ath Madrid Espanol 49 Midfielder 
25 away La Liga 2013-2014 25/08/2013 Borja Oubiña Celta Betis 85 Midfielder 
26 away La Liga 2013-2014 01/09/2013 Duda Malaga Sevilla 91 Midfielder 
27 away La Liga 2013-2014 21/10/2013 Bruno Soriano Villarreal Ath Bilbao 46 Midfielder 
28 away La Liga 2013-2014 01/12/2013 Francisco Puñal Osasuna Valencia 16 Midfielder 
29 away La Liga 2013-2014 21/12/2013 Juanfran García Levante Ath Madrid 90 Defender 
30 away La Liga 2013-2014 16/02/2014 Ricardo Costa Valencia Sevilla 50 Defender 
31 away La Liga 2013-2014 28/02/2014 Diego Mainz Granada Ath Bilbao 73 Defender 
32 away La Liga 2013-2014 21/03/2014 Duda Malaga Celta 66 Midfielder 
33 home La Liga 2014-2015 23/08/2014 Duda Malaga Ath Bilbao 88 Midfielder 
34 home La Liga 2014-2015 22/11/2014 Gabi Ath Madrid Malaga 88 Midfielder 
35 away La Liga 2014-2015 23/05/2015 Daniel Parejo Valencia Almeria 89 Midfielder 
36 away Ligue 1 2012-2013 18/08/2012 Mickael Tacalfred Reims Bastia 59 Defender 
37 home Ligue 1 2012-2013 25/08/2012 Andre Luiz Nancy Toulouse 49 Defender 
38 away Ligue 1 2012-2013 25/08/2012 Jean-Baptiste Pierazzi Ajaccio Valenciennes 38 Midfielder 
39 away Ligue 1 2012-2013 08/12/2012 Ahmed Kantari Brest Rennes 89 Defender 
40 home Ligue 1 2012-2013 05/05/2013 Thiago Silva Paris SG Valenciennes 43 Defender 
41 away Ligue 1 2013-2014 24/08/2013 Cedric Kante Sochaux Montpellier 74 Defender 
42 away Ligue 1 2013-2014 06/10/2013 Maxime Gonalons Lyon Montpellier 83 Midfielder 
43 home Ligue 1 2013-2014 09/11/2013 Lionel Mathis Guingamp Lille 80 Midfielder 
44 home Ligue 1 2013-2014 04/12/2013 Vitorino Hilton Montpellier Lorient 89 Defender 
45 home Ligue 1 2013-2014 08/12/2013 Jonathan Zebina Toulouse Montpellier 68 Defender 
46 home Ligue 1 2013-2014 08/12/2013 Yannick Cahuzac Bastia Lyon 88 Midfielder 
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47 away Ligue 1 2013-2014 06/04/2014 Didier Digard Nice St Etienne 90 Midfielder 
48 home Ligue 1 2013-2014 04/05/2014 Bruno Ecuele Manga Lorient Ajaccio 25 Defender 
49 home Ligue 1 2014-2015 24/09/2014 Yannick Cahuzac Bastia Nantes 40 Midfielder 
50 home Ligue 1 2014-2015 17/10/2014 Jerome Lemoigne Lens Paris SG 53 Midfielder 
51 home Ligue 1 2014-2015 24/01/2015 Yannick Cahuzac Bastia Bordeaux 62 Midfielder 
52 away Ligue 1 2014-2015 21/03/2015 Ludovic Sane Bordeaux Toulouse 92 Defender 
53 home Ligue 1 2014-2015 02/05/2015 Vitorino Hilton Montpellier Rennes 93 Defender 
54 away Premier 2012-2013 04/11/2012 Fabricio Coloccini Newcastle Liverpool 84 Defender 
55 home Premier 2012-2013 18/11/2012 Brede Hangeland Fulham Sunderland 30 Defender 
56 away Premier 2012-2013 13/01/2013 Vincent Kompany Man city Arsenal 75 Defender 
57 away Premier 2013-2014 31/08/2013 John O'Shea Sunderland 
Crystal 
Palace 78 Defender 
58 away Premier 2013-2014 07/12/2013 Kevin Nolan West Ham Liverpool 82 Midfielder 
59 away Premier 2013-2014 01/01/2014 Kevin Nolan West Ham Fulham 44 Midfielder 
60 away Premier 2013-2014 19/01/2014 Nemanja Vidic Man United Chelsea 92 Defender 
61 away Premier 2013-2014 15/03/2014 Vincent Kompany Man city Hull 10 Defender 
62 home Premier 2013-2014 16/03/2014 Nemanja Vidic Man United Liverpool 77 Defender 
63 home Premier 2013-2014 26/04/2014 Ryan Shawcross Stoke Tottenham 52 Defender 
64 home Premier 2014-2015 27/09/2014 Wayne Rooney Man United West Ham 59 Forward 
65 home Premier 2014-2015 03/11/2014 Mile Jedinak Crystal Palace Sunderland 87 Midfielder 
66 home Premier 2014-2015 28/12/2014 Fabian Delph Aston Villa Sunderland 49 Midfielder 
67 away Premier 2014-2015 15/03/2015 Fabricio Coloccini Newcastle Everton 59 Defender 
68 home Premier 2014-2015 22/03/2015 Steven Gerrard Liverpool Man United 46 Midfielder 
69 away Serie A 2012-2013 26/09/2012 Daniele Conti Cagliari Milan 66 Midfielder 
70 home Serie A 2012-2013 30/09/2012 Daniele Gastaldello Sampdoria Napoli 66 Defender 
71 home Serie A 2012-2013 11/11/2012 Stefano Mauri Lazio Roma 85 Midfielder 
72 away Serie A 2012-2013 27/01/2013 Fabrizo Miccoli Palermo Cagliari 0 Forward 
73 home Serie A 2012-2013 28/04/2013 Daniele Gastaldello Sampdoria Fiorentina 80 Defender 
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74 away Serie A 2012-2013 12/05/2013 Francesco Totti Roma Milan 92 Forward 
75 away Serie A 2012-2013 19/05/2013 Massimo Ambrosini Milan Siena 68 Midfielder 
76 away Serie A 2013-2014 06/10/2013 Francesco Magnanelli Sassuolo Parma 88 Midfielder 
77 home Serie A 2013-2014 10/11/2013 Sergio Pellissier Chievo Milan 91 Forward 
78 away Serie A 2013-2014 10/11/2013 Riccardo Montolivo Milan Chievo 83 Midfielder 
79 away Serie A 2013-2014 25/01/2014 Gianluigi Buffon Juventus Lazio 24 Goalkeeper 
80 away Serie A 2013-2014 16/02/2014 Daniele Gastaldello Sampdoria Roma 80 Defender 
81 home Serie A 2013-2014 16/03/2014 Daniele Conti Cagliari Lazio 77 Midfielder 
82 away Serie A 2013-2014 27/04/2014 Daniele Portanova Genoa Atalanta 50 Defender 
83 home Serie A 2013-2014 04/05/2014 Sergio Pellissier Chievo Torino 65 Forward 
84 away Serie A 2013-2014 11/05/2014 Alessandro Lucarelli Parma Torino 64 Defender 
85 away Serie A 2014-2015 06/01/2015 Daniele Conti Cagliari Palermo 26 Midfielder 
86 home Serie A 2014-2015 11/01/2015 Gianpaolo Bellini Atalanta Chievo 89 Defender 
87 home Serie A 2014-2015 31/01/2015 Nicolas Burdisso Genoa Fiorentina 81 Defender 
88 home Serie A 2014-2015 22/03/2015 Alessandro Lucarelli Parma Torino 36 Defender 
 
 
 
 
 
